Remote electronic voting: results cannot be verified

Schools in Russia are not only educational institutions but also key players in the electoral process. Most polling stations are located in schools, while school staff make up the majority of election commission members.

To address the shortage of teachers in small towns and villages, Kremlin is now retraining 'war veterans' as educators.

This reportage explains how it works.

According to the recent Golos report, the rules meant to ensure financial transparency of political parties are not functioning as intended.

Instead, parties have become more secretive and learned to circumvent legal restrictions.

REM shares key findings of the report.

What is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation undergoing amidst the war and the totalitarian evolution of Putin’s regime?

Does it stand any chance of surviving Putin? And what can the CPRF’s past reveal about its future?

Journalist Azamat Izmailov traces the party’s evolution.

In 6-8 September elections, 83 men and only 12 women are running for governor in 21 regions.

Being a female politician in Russia means facing numerous challenges.

7x7 shares stories of women who stand for office in 2024.

How did “systemic parties” emerge in Russia?

What makes a political party “systemic” in general? And why does Vladimir Putin’s regime still need them?

Political researcher explores these questions.

In September 2024, Vladimir Putin’s hometown will elect its governor. Most likely, it will again be the Kremlin's protégé Alexander Beglov.

Presidential Administration's documents leaked to the journalists of “Vot tak” indicate that the entire campaign is managed from a single center, and Beglov’s rivals are carefully selected candidates with no chance of winning.

“Vot tak” reveals how Kremlin is running a fake campaign that costs 1.8 mln USD.

The Moscow parliament should be ‘maximally cleared’ of opposition candidates, with 'Sobyanin's people' taking their place. The election campaign should not attract unnecessary attention.

According to sources of the Verstka media, these are the objectives set by the Moscow mayor's office for the upcoming elections on 8 September.

In September, elections will be held for 13 regional legislatures and 22 governors.

Kremlin is actively preparing by further restricting both the citizens’s voting rights and political competition in 'problematic' regions.

More about the election-related developments of May/June 2024 in this review.

Despite being given advantages, only 19 war participants won ‘passable’ parliamentary seats in United Russia primaries.

How was this even possible? Read in the article by Verstka.

How do Russians living abroad vote and what factors drive their electoral behavior?

In the presidential election 2024, volunteers conducted exit poll surveys in 44 countries where Russian citizens cast their votes.

The results identify the most problematic polling places with significant discrepancies between survey results and official voting results.

Although the 47-year-old Chechnya's leader Ramzan Kadyrov denies rumors about his potentially fatal illness, media and experts on Russian elites claim that Kremlin has begun to develop a plan for power transfer.

What kind of person does Kremlin need to be in charge of Chechnya, and who are potential candidates for this post – in REM's review.

In the first three months of 2024, Russian authorities declared more organizations “undesirable” than in the full year of 2022.

The law on undesirable organizations was adopted in 2015. Foreign NGOs labeled “undesirable” are banned from establishing legal entities, disseminating information and implementing programs in Russia.

This long read examines how the legislation on undesirable organizations has evolved since then and how the law is enforced today.

REM commissioned an independent team of analysts to monitor Russia's leading social networks, VKontakte and Telegram, to show how the Kremlin's propaganda machine works on social media.

Here we present the main findings, fascinating data, and diagrams revealing the mechanisms behind this massive propaganda machine.

In regimes such as Russia's, a typical voter lacks motivation to participate in the elections due to the high predictability of the outcome.

At the same time, election organizers need to ensure a high turnout to show that the society is not tired of its national leader even after decades of his rule.

How do they do it? Find out in this long read.

After the CEC refused to register Ekaterina Duntsova and Boris Nadezhdin, it became clear - in presidential election 2024, there will be no one on the ballot who opposes the war in Ukraine and criticizes the government.

Nevertheless, prominent opposition leaders continue to agitate Russians to go to the polls and vote for "anyone but Putin". The most obvious choice for many is Vladislav Davankov, a presidential candidate from the New People party.

Golos, the Movement in defense of voters' rights, has published a report summing up the results of candidates' nomination and registration during the Russian presidential election campaign 2024.

In this review, we share the main takeaways.

On 1 February 2024, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office declared the Russian Election Monitor a so-called ‘undesirable organization’.

Russian CEC adopted regulations for candidates to run for the presidency. Predictably, not all applicants were able to obtain the status of a registered candidate. Meanwhile, the election campaign of incumbent President Vladimir Putin started with violations of electoral legislation.

In this review, we briefly recap the most significant events of late 2023 and early 2024.

After 600 days of genocidal war in Ukraine, dozens of women - mothers, wives and sisters - attempted to rally demanding the return of their loved ones home.

Any manifestation of dissent is an unlikely event these days in Russia due to the highly repressive environment and immediate crackdown on any instance of public discontent.

In this report, we recount the most significant November 2023 developments related to the presidential elections 2024.

Among them are Putin's presidential bid, test of e-voting, amendments to legislation on presidential elections and political “cleansings” in Russian regions.

The report is based on a regular news digest by the Golos Movement for Defense of Voters' Rights.

The election on 17 March 2024 will be the first presidential election during the war in recent Russian history. Further, it will be the first presidential election after the constitutional amendments 2020 that nullified the count of consecutive presidential terms and allowed Vladimir Putin to stay in power until 2036.

We asked an expert if there is any room for maneuver for opposition voters, given the unprecedented level of political constraints.

On 8-10 September 2023, Russia held local elections in two dozen different regions. The Kremlin could have easily canceled them by declaring martial law. Instead, elections were held in the newly occupied areas of Ukraine despite martial law. This suggests that Putin’s regime still finds sham elections useful.

This essay provides a brief history of elections in post-Soviet Russia, exploring the latest example of the Kremlin’s sham democracy and sketches the prospects of political changes.

8-10 September in Russia were days of elections of State Duma deputies in four districts, heads of 21 regions, deputies of 16 regional parliaments, 12 city councils of regional capitals, as well as elections in the occupied territories and numerous local elections.

REM summarizes the main conclusions from the observation.

The practice of nominating namesake candidates or similar-looking candidates is widely used in Russian elections.

In this article, we explain how this electoral technology works to mislead the voter and pull votes away from the opposition.

Parties are reluctant to participate in elections to regional and municipal assemblies, an expert report concludes. They understand the impossibility of fair competition and do not want to invest effort in fighting the ruling party. Further, the elections in the occupied territories cannot be considered legitimate either legally or procedurally.

Read more about the results of the nomination of candidates for deputies of local and regional parliaments.

This article delves into the process of elimination of municipal autonomy from the 2010s to the present, leading us through a series of reforms that have helped Kremlin build the so-called ‘power vertical’.

A gradual transition from weak, but somewhat independent local governance toward loyal local appointees contributes to our understanding of how political decision-making works in high-capacity authoritarian states like Russia.

In the past, parties and candidates would offer distinct promises to voters, address social concerns, and even position themselves against the government. However, the current campaigns appear lackluster and devoid of a clear message. Even the topic of war is scarcely touched upon by the primary candidates.

This REM review explores why the war in Ukraine hasn't emerged as the predominant topic of the recent election campaign.

Holding elections in the occupied territories of Ukraine on 8-10 September is a daunting task for the Russian authorities.

This long read explores how the ongoing military actions affect election preparations and how the Kremlin is making sure that there are no surprises.

On the eve of the elections, Russian authorities adopted a new package of amendments to the electoral legislation. The changes aim to help candidates from the ruling party win in the September elections.

News on Just Russia's withdrawal of electoral activity in the regions began to emerge shortly after Prigozhin's uprising in June 2023. Expert opinions differ: some believe it signals the falling from favor for the systemic opposition, while others argue that the party uses the uprising as a rhetorical cover-up for the internal splits.

Prigozhin's failed mutiny on June 24th sparked various speculations concerning his support among the Russian population.

In times of political turbulence, approval ratings become subject to interpretations fueled by the hope of regime collapse. An expert explains why putting so much trust in politicians’ approval ratings originating from today’s Russia might be delusional.

As it turned out at legal proceedings held on the 9th of March, proving the illegality and inadequacy of the online voting system used in Moscow's elections in 2022 wasn't rocket science or high mathematics. On the contrary, it was as easy as asking for a certificate!

Moscow's i-voting system is not lawfully certified and contradicts legal requirements, court investigations revealed.

A new study of Russian social media proved half of the sabre-rattling messages to be artificial duplicates orchestrated from the single centre. The research has also revealed prolific pro-governmental professional bloggers trying to dominate the Russian Internet community. And yet, they are 1.5 less popular than anti-war authors.

Over 10 years, EPDE has evolved into a professional network of 16 members from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Ukraine. EPDE is united in the common goal of improving democratic election processes across Europe and providing a platform for peer learning and professionalisation for its members and experts.

The United Nations Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights defenders and on the right to freedom and peaceful assembly and of associations issued a statement on 27 October 2022 explicitly recognising citizen and international election observers as human rights defenders.

We continue to acquaint our readers with those rare, brave individuals who challenged the Putin regime at home during elections in September 2022, when the regime began to receive the first sobering blows at the front in Ukraine.

What happened with the reckless candidates after the elections? How did they survive the ordeal? Who managed to stay, and who had to flee the country? You will learn it in the following, the final part of this coverage, which is currently being written exclusively for REM.

On 12 September 2022, President Zelensky announced the liberation of 6,000 km² in a massive counter-offensive. For President Putin, the day was the beginning of a period of humiliating defeats, of the disgraceful retreat of his army and a chaotic attempt at mobilisation.

But up to this very day, there had been an election campaign in Russia. In the choking atmosphere of "special military operation", under censorship and repression for any word of dissent, there were amazing people who dared to challenge the System.

The election outcomes were achieved in unfree, unequal election campaigns, in an environment of restrictions on the right to be elected for a substantial number of citizens and on fundamental political rights. Under such conditions, it is impossible to establish the actual will of the voters.

Without the successes in Ukraine or on the propagandistic internal front, these elections are the last opportunity for the Kremlin to assert the concept of business-as-usual, to ensure the grip on regional assemblies. It is vital in the anticipation of an economic slump, Moreover, the new municipal structure needs a strong hand. Finally, it is a testing ground for “distant voting”, impermeable for observers.

The failure of the PR campaign uncanny resembles the collapse of the military campaign on the battlefields. A new media monitoring report on "special operation" describes the unexpected resistance of the Russian population to a heavy propagandistic barrage.

The upcoming E-day in Russia: deprived of the freedom of speech and party lists, elections are still the only way to grasp the citizens' attitude towards authorities.

Essential changes to Russia’s electoral legislation were introduced after its aggression against Ukraine. Indeed, one might discern some military flavour in these adjustments: discipline, unification, centralisation, monopolisation of chain of command, and elimination of tools of civil control. Dr Arkady Lyubarev, candidate of legal sciences, co-author of federal and Moscow electoral legislation, and editor in chief of the draft Electoral Code, gives his assessment of the further deterioration of the electoral system in Russia.

The invaders have not been consistent in governing the temporarily occupied territories. L/DPR militants ‘appoint’ nonames to nonexistent offices in some places. In others, there are talks of holding a pseudo-referendum, and PR campaigns are run elsewhere to an incorporation in the occupied Crimea. The ‘people’s republic’ format will not work this time. However, it is still worth preparing for a negative scenario.

The Russian authorities keep emasculating the institution of elections and modelling it after the Belarusian version. Notably, these changes do not match too well with the allegedly increased popular support for the Russian authorities against the backdrop of the war. Instead, it demonstrates a lack of confidence that the autumn elections will go smoothly.

The 'League of Voters' Foundation appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for an interim measure requiring the Russian authorities not to liquidate it pending the ECHR proceedings on its earlier complaint. Should the liquidation proceed, it would make all future legal activities of the Foundation impossible: the organization would be unable to rent office space, collect donations, will lose all of its property, and would be forced to cease its human rights and educational activities.

Stanislav Andreychuk on how the Kremlin is changing laws that regulate Russia’s polity and elections to maintain the status quo.