The Komi Republic is one of the largest regions in Northwestern Russia. Its political life has been shaped for decades by the resource-based economy and relations with the federal center. Oil, gas, coal, and timber provide a substantial part of the region’s economic base, but key decisions about the development of these industries are largely made elsewhere. Against this backdrop, environmental conflicts and disputes over whether Moscow takes the region’s interests into account have periodically become sources of mass political mobilization.

In recent years, environmental protests and conflicts over decisions by the federal center — most notably the dispute over Shies — have become an important source of political mobilization in the republic. They have brought together people with different political views, while some activists went on to enter municipal and regional politics.

In the 2021 State Duma elections, CPRF candidate Oleg Mikhailov was one of only nine their candidates across Russia to win a single-member district. He won his seat in the Komi Republic and is running here again five years later. Since then, the republic has seen a change of governor, tighter control over public political activity, and the emergence of a new type of pro-government candidate. The elections will show whether Komi has retained its ability to turn regional discontent into independent political representation.

The Land They Defend

Komi is a major oil-producing region, and oil extraction here has repeatedly been accompanied by accidents and safety violations. In May 2021, an oil spill at a LUKOIL-Komi facility contaminated the Kolva River with petroleum products. At a meeting with local residents, Komi head Vladimir Uyba arrived wearing a company-branded jacket. Asked who was responsible, he said that only the president could punish LUKOIL. The company paid around €5–6 million in compensation for the spill, equivalent to roughly 0.1% of its annual revenue. Environmentalists called the compensation “negotiated” and said it was unrelated to the actual cost of restoring the environment.

The Kolva spill was not the region’s only major environmental problem.

The biggest conflict of recent years centered on a project to build a landfill for Moscow’s waste at the Shies railway station in Arkhangelsk Region, near the border with Komi. The project envisaged accepting up to 500,000 tons of waste a year for 20 years. Residents of both regions had opposed it since 2018. The protest quickly grew beyond a local dispute: activists set up camps around the proposed landfill, thousands took part in rallies in Syktyvkar, and the movement attracted environmental activists, the CPRF, and representatives of the Komi national movement.

For residents of the republic, Shies was more than a dispute over the location of a landfill. It reflected a broader problem in relations between the federal center and the region: Moscow produces the waste, while the consequences of its consumption are left to the northern territories to bear. The environmental agenda therefore quickly became intertwined with social and regional issues. The protest was one of the few instances of mass mobilization in the republic to bring together people with different political views. Some activists went on to enter municipal and regional politics, while others were later forced to emigrate. The CPRF, meanwhile, managed to make the environmental conflict part of its electoral campaign.

For Oleg Mikhailov, Shies became one of the most important episodes in this politicization. A CPRF member of the Komi State Council, Mikhailov took part in protests against the landfill, represented protesters in talks with the regional authorities, and linked the conflict to the broader issue of relations between the federal center and the republic. Environmental activism helped him reach beyond the CPRF’s traditional electorate and build a reputation as a politician who spoke for the interests of the republic’s residents.

The landfill project was eventually halted. After the governors of Komi and Arkhangelsk Region were replaced in 2020, the new regional leaders refused to support its continuation, and the investor formally abandoned the project. In January 2021, activists declared the protest over. But participants in the movement had already gained political experience, while the issue had expanded far beyond environmental protection.

The Republic's Voice

Komi remains a national republic, although ethnic Komi now make up a minority of its population. According to the 2021 census, around 22% of residents who reported their ethnicity identified as Komi. The Komi language has official status alongside Russian, but its use is declining: the number of schoolchildren studying it as their native language fell almost fourfold between the 2009/10 and 2021/22 academic years. For the Komi national movement, preserving the language and culture remains an important goal.

But the national question does not fully capture what residents see as protecting the republic. A broader issue is also important: to what extent do decisions made in Moscow take into account the needs of people living here? This is particularly evident when federal decisions affect natural resources, major infrastructure projects, or the environment. As a result, people with different political views and different attitudes toward the national question can unite around defending Komi’s interests.

It was at the intersection of these two demands that Oleg Mikhailov’s political position emerged. His rhetoric combined social demands, criticism of the federal center, and the defense of Komi’s interests. Environmental protests gave him an opportunity to appeal to voters who did not necessarily support the CPRF but were willing to vote for a politician seen as a defender of the republic’s interests.

This helped Mikhailov move beyond the CPRF’s traditional electorate in 2021. His victory in the State Duma elections was more than a success for a party candidate: it showed that in Komi, a politician could win support through his personal reputation and ability to speak for the region.

2021: A Break and a Reset

The 2021 result showed a clear difference between support for Mikhailov and support for the CPRF. He received 81,400 votes, compared with 67,500 for United Russia candidate Olga Savastyanova, while the CPRF lost to United Russia by a wide margin in the party-list vote in Komi.

One factor was the conflict surrounding then-Komi head Vladimir Uyba, who was appointed in 2020. His tenure was marked by public conflicts and strained relations with municipalities and parts of the regional elite. Against this backdrop, Mikhailov could present himself not simply as a CPRF candidate, but as the governor’s political counterweight: a local deputy who spoke for the republic and was not dependent on the executive authorities.

At the same time, the victory did not change the balance of power in the republic. The CPRF lost the party-list vote, while Mikhailov remained effectively the only major opposition politician from Komi at the federal level. But his result showed that a single-member district could become a point where discontent with the regional authorities, federal policy, and a particular governor could come together behind an individual candidate.

The conditions that made this victory possible, however, changed over time. In November 2024, Uyba was replaced by Rostislav Goldstein, who had previously headed the Jewish Autonomous Region. In September 2025, Goldstein was elected head of Komi with 70% of the vote on a turnout of 37.7%. The change of governor primarily altered the political context: instead of a conflict-prone and unpopular leader against whom Mikhailov had been able to build a protest coalition, the republic now had a new administration.

An important factor was Mikhailov’s absence from the election for head of the republic. He again failed to register as a candidate because he could not secure enough support from municipal deputies, most of whom represented the ruling party. The first gubernatorial campaign after Uyba’s departure therefore took place without a politician who had already demonstrated four years earlier that he could defeat United Russia. Mikhailov retained his federal mandate, but the scope for public political activity that had enabled his victory five years earlier began to narrow rapidly.

How the Authorities Changed the Rules of the Game

Mikhailov’s victory in 2021 did not mean Komi was returning to competitive multiparty politics. The CPRF lost the party-list vote, while Mikhailov remained effectively the only major opposition politician from the republic at the federal level. But his result showed that, with a strong local candidate, regional discontent could translate into a federal mandate. In the following years, the authorities both changed the governor and restricted the opportunities for such mobilization to emerge.

One important part of this space was the Revolt Center in Syktyvkar, created with the participation of the independent regional outlet 7x7. It hosted public discussions and meetings, including events related to the protests against Shies. After the start of the full-scale war, this civic environment came under heavy pressure. In March 2022, Roskomnadzor blocked the 7x7 website, which continued to cover the war and developments in Russia’s regions. Much of its team continued working from abroad, and in July 2023 the Justice Ministry added the outlet to the register of foreign agents. The Revolt Center itself remained open until 2025, when its premises were sealed after searches. On 15 August, the organization was added to the register of foreign agents. The following day, the center announced its closure.

Pressure also began to affect Mikhailov himself and people around him. In 2022, Komi head Vladimir Uyba publicly accused the deputy of sympathizing with Nazism, while police issued him warnings over his public activities. In 2023, pressure from law enforcement also reached the regional CPRF branch. By 2025, it had also reached people associated with Mikhailov: the Komi State Council asked the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Justice Ministry, and the State Duma to investigate the activities of the deputy and other CPRF representatives over alleged links to the Revolt Center and its founder Pavel Andreyev.

By the 2026 elections, therefore, not only had the regional authorities changed, but so had the environment in which Mikhailov had achieved his result five years earlier. Independent media and public organizations came under pressure, opportunities for public mobilization narrowed, and the CPRF itself faced new restrictions.

But the authorities offered voters not only less space for the opposition, but also a different type of regional politician — one associated with the state, military service, and official heroism.

War and a New Campaign Language

One of the most prominent new candidates is Stanislav Kochev. Born and raised in Syktyvkar, he spent almost all of his adult life outside Komi. After completing his mandatory military service, Kochev pursued a military career and from 2014 served in GRU special forces in Rostov Region. After the full-scale war began, his unit was deployed to Ukraine. In 2023, Kochev was seriously wounded and awarded the title of Hero of Russia, after which he continued his military service.

Kochev entered regional politics only in 2025 through the Time of Heroes presidential program, created to prepare war veterans for work in government. He was sent to Komi for an internship, with regional head Rostislav Goldstein serving as his mentor. A few months later, Kochev was elected to the Komi State Council on the United Russia ticket and became deputy speaker. In 2026, the party nominated him in a single-member district against Mikhailov.

His trajectory is sharply different from the usual path into regional politics. Mikhailov spent many years working in Komi, took part in environmental protests, and advocated for residents’ interests in conflicts with the authorities, the federal center, and major businesses. Kochev spent most of his adult life in the military outside the region and returned to Komi through a federal program for veterans, after which he almost immediately entered regional government. In 2026, the two political biographies met in the same electoral district.

2026 Elections: Will 2021 Repeat Itself?

In 2026, Oleg Mikhailov is running again in the same single-member district that brought him victory five years ago. But repeating his 2021 result will be more difficult. Then, several factors worked in his favor: Vladimir Uyba’s unpopularity, accumulated regional discontent, and the opportunity to build a broader protest coalition around the CPRF. That political configuration has now changed.

Mikhailov nevertheless remains a prominent figure within the CPRF itself. In the party’s People’s Candidate project, which served as an internal selection process for State Duma candidates, Mikhailov ranked fourth by number of votes among participants from across Russia. However, he was not included in the party’s federal list. He was second on the regional group’s list covering Komi, Arkhangelsk and Sverdlovsk regions, and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, while also being nominated in his single-member district. The party was therefore relying on his personal result in Komi but did not guarantee him a seat in the State Duma through the federal list.

The current campaign will therefore test whether Mikhailov has retained the support that allowed him to win five years ago. Then, regional discontent propelled an opposition candidate into the State Duma. Now the conditions are different: the governor has changed, the space for protest mobilization is narrower, and his opponent represents an entirely different type of political power.

If he wins again, it will mean that his political capital has proved stronger than the changes Komi has undergone since 2021. If he loses, his victory five years ago will remain more of an exception — a moment when regional protest managed to break through into the federal political system.