Coverage of the North Caucasus is typically dominated by security concerns, Chechnya, and the outsized figure of Ramzan Kadyrov. Yet the region is of interest for reasons that extend beyond these issues. For years, the North Caucasus has served as a kind of laboratory for political practices, many of which have subsequently spread to other parts of Russia. The 2026 electoral cycle offers another opportunity to trace this pattern.

This article examines the specific features of how elections in the North Caucasus are organised, the role of the federal centre and administrative resources, the process of shaping candidate lists, and the prospects for independent candidates to take part.

In this article, the North Caucasus refers to the national republics of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD): the Republic of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino–Balkaria, Karachay–Cherkessia, North Ossetia-Alania, and Chechnya.

Alongside the State Duma elections on 18–20 September 2026, most constituent regions of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) will also hold regional and local elections, including votes for legislative assemblies, heads of republics, and municipal authorities.

In Dagestan and North Ossetia, voters will elect regional parliaments, which will then elect the Heads of the respective republics. In Chechnya, there will be elections to parliament as well as a direct election for the Head of the republic.

Residents of Ingushetia will elect only members of parliament. In Karachay–Cherkessia, the Head of the republic will be elected by the regional parliament, while Kabardino–Balkaria will hold municipal elections, including elections to the city council of the republican capital, Nalchik.

Specifics of Elections in the North Caucasus

The forthcoming elections once again demonstrate that the Kremlin does not follow a single model for governing Russia’s national republics. Depending on the region, Moscow uses different mechanisms of control: in some cases, it relies on federal appointees, as has happened in Dagestan. In others, it seeks to maintain a balance between local political groups, as in Karachay–Cherkessia and Kabardino–Balkaria.

North Ossetia has historically not developed a system of influential teips, or clan-based structures comparable to those found in Chechnya, Dagestan, or Karachay–Cherkessia. Following the Beslan (North Ossetia) school siege in 2004, in which more than 1,000 people were taken hostage and 334 were killed by the terrorists in pursuit of their demands, including the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya, the federal centre significantly strengthened its control over the region. The appointment of republican Heads has taken place with Moscow’s active involvement, while key political decisions have been made in close coordination with the Russian presidential administration.

Chechnya stands apart from all other regions, not only in the North Caucasus but across Russia as a whole. The federal centre has effectively given Ramzan Kadyrov an unprecedented degree of freedom in domestic politics. This year, Kadyrov, who has headed the republic since 2007, is seeking another term as Head of the Chechen Republic in an election decided by direct popular vote. It is the only region in the Caucasus where the Head is elected directly, as elsewhere governors are elected not by voters but by regional parliaments.

This year, indirect elections will be held in Dagestan, North Ossetia, and Karachay–Cherkessia. The model of electing governors through regional parliaments is initially goaled to strengthen stability, but in practice it has made the process even more dependent on decisions taken by the federal centre. These parliamentary votings acquire a largely ceremonial character: candidates nominated by the Russian president are approved by a majority of deputies without meaningful competition. In other words, the formal procedure of election remains in place, but the actual choice has long been made in the Kremlin.

For example, in October 2021, the People’s Assembly of Dagestan elected Sergei Melikov as a Head of the republic with 82 votes in favour and four against. That same year, the parliament of Karachay–Cherkessia re-elected Rashid Temrezov unanimously, while the North Ossetian parliament elected Sergei Menyailo with 57 votes out of 68 deputies present.

Menyailo’s rivals at the time were the relatively obscure local MPs Valery Balikoev and Medea Eldzarova. Temrezov’s fellow candidates for the post of Head of Karachay-Cherkessia were also unknown local MPs — Renat Akbaev and Oleg Zhedyaev.

Throughout the entire period in which this model has existed, there has not been a single case of a regional parliament rejecting the principal candidate put forward by the Russian president.

Another distinctive feature of elections in the North Caucasus is the abnormally high turnout figures, which have remained largely consistent regardless of the level of elections and have changed very little over many years.

At the 2024 presidential election, turnout in Chechnya was 97%, in Kabardino–Balkaria – 95.7%, in North Ossetia – 91.8%, in Dagestan – 91.6%,  in Karachay–Cherkessia – 90%, and in Ingushetia – 86.2%.

In all these regions, Vladimir Putin received a significantly higher share of the vote than the national average: 98.99% in Chechnya, 94.2% in Kabardino–Balkaria, 92.9% in Dagestan, 90.0% in Karachay–Cherkessia, 89.6% in Ingushetia, and 89.0% in North Ossetia. By comparison, nationwide turnout was 77.5%, while Putin received 87.3% of the vote.

A similar pattern was observed during previous federal campaigns. At the 2018 presidential election, turnout in Chechnya exceeded 95%, in North Ossetia, it was around 90%, in Karachay-Cherkessia and Dagestan, it was above 87%, and in Ingushetia, it exceeded 86%. Putin received more than 91% of the vote in Chechnya, in Kabardino–Balkaria, more than 93% of voters supported him, while in Dagestan the figure was above 90%.

The 2020 constitutional referendum showed the same pattern. Chechnya once again recorded the highest turnout in the country, at more than 95%, with 97.9% of those who voted supporting the amendments. In Dagestan, turnout exceeded 89%, with 89% supporting the amendments, while in Karachay–Cherkessia turnout was 84%. In Ingushetia, almost 84% of those who voted supported the amendments.

The same trend can be seen in parliamentary elections. At the 2021 State Duma election, official turnout in Chechnya was around 94%, in Karachay–Cherkessia around 89%, and in North Ossetia more than 86%. United Russia received more than 80–90% of the vote in most of the North Caucasus republics.

The third distinctive feature of the national republics is the greater influence of informal institutions on electoral processes. In the NCFD republics, particularly Chechnya and Ingushetia, strong traditional institutions continue to exist alongside bureaucratic mechanisms. Teips, councils of elders, and religious leaders exert informal influence over elections: they endorse or reject candidates and mobilise their communities.

Public support from councils of elders, religious leaders, and representatives of influential teips has no legal force, but it serves as an important political signal both to the population and to regional elites. Such support is intended to demonstrate that a leader possesses not only a formal state mandate but also recognition within traditional society. These structures continue to serve as a kind of bridge between state institutions and traditional society.

In Ingushetia, the Council of Elders has the most formalised status. It operates under the Head of the republic and is legally a consultative and advisory body. Its role is to participate in addressing the most important issues affecting the republic's social and political life. Although the council does not make political statements, it nevertheless participates informally in political life, as its approval or disapproval can influence both political decision-making and the election of individual deputies.

For example, in 2019, the Ingush Council of Teips, unhappy with the signing of an agreement establishing a new border with Chechnya, called for a boycott of municipal elections.

In July 2026, the Council of Elders of Chechnya publicly endorsed Kadyrov’s nomination for another term, once again demonstrating that clan-based and collective forms of legitimising political leaders remain an important component of the political system.

There was also an example of traditional institutions becoming involved in the electoral process ahead of the previous election for the head of Chechnya in 2021. The republic’s mufti, Salah-Hadzhi Mezhiev, called on residents to turn out to vote and support the policies of the incumbent authorities.

The North Caucasus republics are not characterised by significant party pluralism. Regional branches of political parties, including those that are formally opposition parties, are effectively controlled by the executive authorities. As a result, the process of drawing up party lists takes the form of closed-door negotiations among elites: decisions on the allocation of seats are made by the office of the regional head, security agencies, and dominant ethnic and clan groups.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) remained the second-largest political force in the North Caucasus for many years. In the 1990s, the Communists enjoyed significant support across virtually all the republics of the North Caucasus, particularly in North Ossetia. Communist candidates regularly won seats in regional parliaments and stood in elections for republican Heads and the State Duma.

However, from the mid-2000s onwards, the CPRF’s influence gradually declined. The strengthening of administrative control over elections, the movement of a significant part of regional elites into United Russia, and changes to electoral legislation substantially reduced the party’s opportunities. Nevertheless, CPRF branches continue to operate in all the North Caucasus republics, and the party retains seats in most regional parliaments.

The liberal Yabloko party has never enjoyed mass support in the North Caucasus, although its regional branches were most active in North Ossetia and Daghestan. In the 1990s and early 2000s, party representatives took part in elections at various levels but failed to achieve significant electoral success.

After 2014, and particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Yabloko’s activities in the North Caucasus republics became even less visible.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) has traditionally been weaker in the North Caucasus’s national republics than in most other Russian regions. This is largely due to the rhetoric of its former leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. For decades, Zhirinovsky repeatedly made inflammatory statements about the North Caucasus and its residents. Among other things, he proposed restricting the birth rate in the North Caucasus republics and putting the region behind ‘barbed wire’. The party's weak position is also explained by the absence of strong regional elites within its North Caucasus branches.

The A Just Russia — For Truth party also has branches in all the North Caucasus republics, but its political role remains limited. At the regional level, the party occasionally wins individual parliamentary seats, but it does not represent an independent political force capable of competing with United Russia.

The attitude towards opposition parties in the region has changed considerably over the past three decades. In the 1990s, the CPRF and Yabloko were able to hold public meetings, take part in competitive elections, and campaign openly. The space for political competition gradually narrowed. Following the reforms of the mid-2000s, the strengthening of executive power, and tighter control over the electoral process, opportunities for parliamentary and, particularly, non-systemic opposition forces declined significantly. After 2022, the public activities of parties critical of the federal authorities or the war became even more restricted.

The familiar pattern of electoral fraud

Although electoral violations are by no means unique to the North Caucasus, some of Russia’s most notorious cases of electoral falsification have been documented in the region. The International Crisis Group cites the testimony of a polling-station commission chair in Daghestani Derbent, who claimed that although actual turnout was low, the commission reported that 94% of voters had turned out. In Makhachkala, observers at one polling station counted 104 voters, while the official protocol recorded 2,143 votes. In Chechnya, people interviewed by the organisation described pressure on public-sector employees to participate in staged demonstrations of high turnout and the filling in of voter lists after voting had ended. Regional electoral commissions systematically rejected such allegations.

Unlike many other Russian regions, the constituent republics of the North Caucasus have not yet been connected to the federal remote electronic voting system. According to the Central Election Commission (CEC), by 2026 remote electronic voting had been introduced in 33 regions, out of a total of 42 participating in the experiment, but none of the NCFD’s constituent republics was included.

One possible explanation is that regional authorities see little need to change a system in which traditional in-person voting already allows them to secure the desired levels of turnout and support. A shift to an electronic platform could also transfer part of the management of the electoral process to the federal centre. Moreover, direct personal mobilisation may be better suited to the region’s clan-based political practices than anonymous remote electronic voting.

In 2026, therefore, the North Caucasus regions are likely to continue operating under essentially the same model as in previous electoral cycles. Formal rules are uniform across the country, but in practice they are supplemented by local informal arrangements. The combination of administrative resources, party machinery, and clan-based mobilisation helps sustain a form of ‘stability without alternatives’. At the same time, the system remains fragile: it depends heavily on agreements among influential groups and on the federal power vertical. Major internal shifts — such as a change of regional leadership or a reshuffling of elite coalitions — could therefore pose a serious challenge to its stability.

Overall, the North Caucasus does not constitute an institutional exception within Russia’s political system. Chechnya is the outlier: its leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, operates under an informal arrangement with the Kremlin that grants him unusually broad autonomy in regional decision-making. Beyond this exception, however, the North Caucasus represents one of the clearest manifestations of the broader Russian model of governance, characterised by centralised control over personnel, limited political competition, and the predominance of administrative mechanisms in the management of electoral processes.