Kaliningrad Region is the only Russian region geographically separated from the rest of the country. Before 2022, the position of exclave was quite advantageous for Kaliningrad: the region maintained close economic, transport, and social ties with Europe, while its proximity to the EU was an important part of its regional identity.

After Russia started the full-scale war against Ukraine, the transport routes got disrupted, relations with the EU deteriorated sharply, and Kaliningrad Region became more dependent on the federal center. Along with the changing system of regional governance, the space for civic activity continued to shrink. Although these changes had begun not in 2022 but way earlier, the full-scale invasion accelerated the transformation of the region’s relationship with the federal center.

The effects of this transformation for Kaliningrad politics became particularty visible during the 2026 elections.

The Exclave’s Economy After 2022

The economic consequences of the breakdown in the region’s previous ties have been most tangible. Before 2022, a significant share of goods reached the region through Lithuania and Poland. As EU introduced economic sanctions, overland routes became less accessible, while transit through Lithuania became the subject of ongoing disputes between Moscow and Vilnius.

One response was to reroute freight traffic to maritime routes. The federal authorities increased subsidies for water transportation between Kaliningrad and ports in Leningrad Region, while regional authorities began treating sea logistics as the main way to ensure uninterrupted supplies. But shipping takes longer and costs more than the previously used overland transit. This is particularly consequential for such regions as Kaliningrad, which has no alternative domestic land route that could quickly replace the disrupted logistics chain.

The restructuring of the transport system also affected the industry. The Special Economic Zone, created to attract investment and offset the costs of being an exclave, became one of the main tools for maintaining economic activity after 2022. Companies received additional support to offset higher transport costs and adapt to sanctions. Major manufacturers had to find new markets and suppliers at the same time. Avtotor, for example, restructured its production after the withdrawal of the Western automakers and began working with Chinese brands.

The vulnerability and dependence of Kaliningrad Region on the federal center is particularly visible when it comes to fuel supplies. In 2025, Kaliningrad experienced several disruptions in gasoline supplies. Regional authorities attributed the shortages to limited delivery capacity and the need to increase maritime shipments. In any other Russian region, a disruption on one route can be offset by supplies from neighboring regions; for Kaliningrad, replacing a disrupted supply route is a considerably bigger challenge.

The regional economy has nevertheless continued to function. Kaliningrad has continued to attract investment, while its population has grown in part through migration from other parts of Russia. But since 2022, maintaining this level of activity has required greater state involvement: subsidies for logistics, benefits provided under the Special Economic Zone, and support for individual enterprises.

The restructuring of the economy was an important, yet only one aspect of the exclave’s changing reality. The geographic position of Kalinigrad has acquired much greater military significance since 2022.

Surrounded by enemies

In 2022, Kaliningrad Region obtained a new degree of strategic importance as one of the centers of political and military confrontation between Russia and NATO. A region long seen as Russia’s most culturally open and European-oriented territory is now increasingly viewed through the lens of military security. Discussions of a possible blockade, the security of the Suwałki Corridor, and the buildup of military forces in the Baltic region have become a regular part of the public agenda.

Kaliningrad’s geographic position makes the region both vulnerable and strategically important to Russia. This became particularly clear in summer 2022, when Lithuania restricted the transit of sanctioned goods. Although the restrictions were soon eased, the crisis showed how heavily the exclave depends on such decisions by the neighboring countries and how quickly a transport issue can become a security issue.

The region’s military significance only continues to grow. Kaliningrad is home to Baltic Fleet units and Iskander missile systems, and Russian authorities regard the region as an important part of the country’s western defense. After Finland and Sweden joined NATO, Kaliningrad found itself surrounded by alliance members, making its role in Russian military strategy even more prominent.

Change of Governor and New Governance Model

In 2022, governor Anton Alikhanov moved to the federal government, where he became Minister of Industry and Trade. His successor was Alexei Besprozvannykh, who had previously served as deputy minister of industry and trade. The governorship therefore went to a politician with direct experience in the federal system.

Unlike other Russian regions, Kaliningrad has to deal with issues that go well beyond typical regional politics: maintaining transport links with the rest of Russia, supporting industry and supplies under sanctions, dealing with the growing military tension. Many of these matters require federal decisions and extra funding, which makes the governor figure one of the main intermediaries between Moscow and the region.

Hence, under Besprozvannykh, the regional government focuses on industry, logistics, and attracting federal resources, while the governor regularly works with federal agencies on crucial issues. Under these conditions, the regional authorities are less concerned with developing an independent economic model than with adapting federal decisions to the region’s circumstances.

This is particularly visible in personnel policy. In recent years, people with experience in federal and law enforcement agencies have taken up positions in the regional administration. At the same time, the war has created a new source of political legitimacy: participation in combat and veteran status have increasingly been used as a basis for advancing into government and public institutions. The regional government has sought to institutionalize this shift through Heroes 39, a programme launched in 2025 to prepare war veterans for careers in government and public institutions. In the 2026 elections, two Heroes 39 graduates won seats in the regional Duma, while seven other war veterans were elected to municipal councils across the region.

All in all, this model of governance leaves barely any room for independent regional policy. Following the full-scale invasion, Kaliningrad became an exclave whose economic and transport stability, as well as security situation, fully depend on decisions made in Moscow.

From an Open Region to a Closed Public Sphere

The last four and a half years have also transformed the social environment that developed around the open border and regular contacts with neighboring EU countries.

Before 2022, Kaliningrad Region stood out not only because of its geography, but also because of the density of its contacts with the neighboring countries. Poland and Lithuania took part in dozens of joint projects, ranging from culture and education cooperation to environmental protection and urban development. In March 2022, the European Commission suspended cross-border cooperation programs with Russia, while Poland and Lithuania withdrew from further participation in Interreg programs with Russian regions. Some projects were halted, and the era of close cooperation with European partners effectively came to an end.

This changed not only the region’s international ties, but also the overall environment in which local civic organizations, universities, cultural institutions, and independent initiatives operated. Previously, cross-border projects fostered partnerships and joint programs with the neighboring democracies. After 2022, that channel largely disappeared: Russian participants lost the access to European funds, while the working relationships with European NGOs crumbled.

As in all other parts of Russia, after 2022, the space for independent journalism and civic activity significantly narrowed. One of Kaliningrad’s best-known journalists, Igor Rudnikov, was designated a foreign agent in 2025; in February 2026, he was fined for failing to include the required labeling in his publications. Other independent projects either ceased operations or moved their activities outside Russia.

Against this backdrop, the regional agenda itself is changing. Previously, Kaliningrad’s position as an exclave made it possible to view the region through its ties with Europe: joint projects, cultural contacts, trade, and travel. Official policy now describes the region’s international ties primarily through its place in the new geopolitical environment, emphasizing cooperation with Belarus, China, and other countries, as well as ensuring transit and security.

The situation with the region’s public sphere has therefore deteriorated fundamentally in just a few years, driven, from the other side, by the crumbled cross-border ties and, from the other side, by the domestic crackdown on independent press and NGOs. The 2026 elections were the first electoral snapshot of this transformed regional environment.

The 2026 Elections

The elections to the eighth convocation of the Kaliningrad Regional Duma were held under a mixed electoral system: 20 deputies were elected from party lists and another 20 in single-member districts. With 100% of polling-station protocols counted, United RussiaRead Term in glossary received 52.78% of the party-list vote. The CPRFRead Term in glossary won 13.17%, New People 11.61%, LDPR 10.1%, and Just Russia 5.22%. The Pensioners’ Party and Communists of Russia failed to clear the 5% threshold.

Compared with the 2021 elections, United Russia’s party-list result increased substantially, from 38.95% to 52.78%. The CPRF’s share fell from 19.03% to 13.17%, while Just RussiaRead Term in glossary’s dropped from 11.27% to 5.22%. LDPRRead Term in glossary retained a comparable level of support, receiving 11.22% in 2021 and 10.1% in 2026. New PeopleRead Term in glossary took part in the regional elections for the first time in 2026 and received 11.61%. Over five years, therefore, both the balance between the parties and the lineup of political forces represented in the regional legislature changed.

The results in the single-member districts were considerably more one-sided. United Russia candidates won all 20 districts. Many had already held elected or senior positions in the region; the winners included sitting members of the regional Duma and city council, business executives, and regional Duma Speaker Andrei Kropotkin. In 2021, United Russia had also dominated the single-member districts, but one of the 20 seats went to a CPRF candidate. In 2026, the ruling party therefore increased its representation in the single-member component by one seat.

The victories of United Russia candidates in all districts did not, however, mean that other parties failed to attract significant support. In District No. 99, United Russia candidate Andrei Kozlov received 46.4%, while the CPRF candidate received 16.66% and candidates from New People and Just Russia received 10.75% and 7.85%, respectively. In District No. 100, United Russia’s Marina Orgeyeva received 46.64%, followed by candidates from LDPR, the CPRF, New People, and Yabloko. This shows that support for alternative parties remains, but it has little effect on the distribution of single-member seats.

The 2026 elections therefore did not alter the region’s basic political configuration. United Russia retained its dominant position in the regional Duma, while several other parties received significant levels of electoral support. The distribution of votes, however, suggests that some sort of political competition remains in place in Kaliningrad Region, even despite the tightly controlled elections.