"Big Brother" of Russian elections
20.12.2024
by Andrey Pertsev
Electronic voting is poised to become the Kremlin's key tool for securing desired outcomes in the 2026 State Duma elections. With United Russia's low approval ratings, traditional methods of coercion and vote manipulation will be challenging. However, remote electronic voting (REV), alongside administrative mobilization, amplifies administrative pressure and opens the door to direct fraud. This analysis explores how the Kremlin and regional authorities are leveraging the e-voting system for their gain.
A controversial method
In a meeting with Vladimir Putin shortly after the Unified Election Day 2024, the chairperson of the Central Election Commission (CEC) Ella Pamfilova stated that 37 Russian regions already had the experience of using electronic voting, and their populations "liked it". According to Pamfilova, 21 million voters have already used REV, and its geography is likely to expand. She promised to scale up the use of REV, which allegedly means that e-voting will be implemented nationwide in the parliamentary election in 2025 (by comparison, in the 2024 presidential election REV was used only in a quarter of the regions).
On the surface, it may seem that the authorities, who take pride in digitizing public services, are simply extending this process to voting, supposedly making it more convenient for citizens. However, the Kremlin has its own goals in deploying this method of voting, which have already been tested during election campaigns in Moscow and other regions.
On the surface, it may appear that the authorities, proud of their progress in digitizing public services, are simply extending this trend to voting, supposedly making it more convenient for citizens. However, the Kremlin's expansion of e-voting serves its own goals, rather than being in the best interests of voters.
In Europe, electronic voting is seen as a controversial method, largely due to ongoing concerns about its technical security. In the highly digitalized Estonia, REV is widely used, with 51.1% of voters participating online in the 2023 parliamentary elections. While there were no doubts about the legitimacy of the election results, experts identified vulnerabilities in the software and demonstrated how, in theory, the voting process could have been interfered with externally.
In Russia, concerns center primarily on the fairness and transparency of the electronic voting system, as it operates on platforms developed and controlled by the authorities. Federally, this system is managed via the Gosuslugi portal, while Moscow uses its regional equivalent, Mos.ru. Electoral law expert Andrei Buzin describes Russian electronic voting as "fundamentally uncontrollable".
History of REV
Moscow became a pioneer in implementing online elections, a development rooted in the mass protests of 2011–2012. During this period, the city saw widespread demonstrations against the falsification of the 2011 Duma elections. Despite reports of numerous violations at polling stations, the official results claimed that United Russia had received 46.6% of the vote in the capital.
This discrepancy, along with reports of fraud, fueled widespread dissatisfaction. At the time, the authorities were unprepared for large-scale repression and sought to avoid mass protests in the streets. They learned from this experience and worked to create the appearance of competition in the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny was allowed to participate in the elections, running a dynamic campaign that won him 27.24% of the vote. Officially, the popular incumbent mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, won 51.37% of the vote, narrowly avoiding a run-off. However, many believe that an honest count would have led to a second round of voting, with unpredictable results.
The second indication of public discontent came in 2019 during the Moscow City Duma elections. Of the 25 seats, 20 were won by candidates not backed by the city authorities but recommended by Alexei Navalny's Smart Voting initiative. While the results were relatively plausible, the mayor's office recognized the need to address the issue of Moscow's election outcomes diverging sharply from the official nationwide results. The deadline for solving this "problem" was the 2021 State Duma elections. The solution was electronic voting, which effectively moved the electoral process into the virtual sphere.
The “effectiveness” of remote electronic voting (REV) became evident through its results. During the 2021 State Duma elections, protest candidates supported by Smart Voting were leading in single-member districts at polling stations. However, once the electronic voting results were added, the candidates of United Russia emerged as the winners. This event marked the beginning of REV's rapid expansion across Russia. By the time of the 2021 elections, it appeared to dominate the electoral landscape entirely. The system was used again in the Moscow mayoral elections, where voters could cast their electronic ballots at polling stations using special terminals (TEV – terminal for electronic voting). Commission members strongly encouraged voters, many of whom had deliberately come to polling stations to avoid REV, to use the TEVs instead. Crucially, the commission members often refrained from explaining the details of the process, leading many voters to mistakenly believe they were voting offline. In the 2024 presidential elections, President Vladimir Putin officially won 85% of the vote in Moscow, and in the Moscow City Duma elections later that year, pro-government candidates (United Russia members and candidates from parties allied to the system) won in all districts.
Remarkably, for the Moscow parliamentary campaign in 2024, e-voting became the primary method of casting ballots. To vote offline, citizens needed to file a special application and submit it directly to the electoral commission.
The use of REV continued to expand across the country. During the 2024 presidential elections, electronic voting on the Central Election Commission's platform was implemented in 29 regions, in addition to Moscow.
According to Ella Pamfilova, head of the Central Election Commission, following the results of the September 2024 regional elections, seven more regions had introduced REV, bringing the total to 37 regions.
Greater control over results
The critics of e-voting argue that it is completely fraudulent and disconnected from how people actually vote. While this might not be entirely accurate, REV undoubtedly became a game-changer for the Russian authorities, enabling them to secure desired election results effectively.
REV offers more than just a tool for direct falsifications; it complements the Kremlin's long-standing model of corporate mobilization, which has been spearheaded by Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of the Presidential Administration (AP).
Since 2018 this approach has significantly expanded the scope of coercing dependent voters to participate in elections. Before Kiriyenko's tenure, coercion was generally limited to employees of state or municipal institutions and businesses totally loyal to the regime. By the 2018 presidential election, political administrators had incorporated employees of state companies and large businesses seeking to maintain good relations with the Kremlin into the framework of administrative mobilization. The approach itself also changed. Political strategists from the AP began working directly with organizational leaders and managers, who were tasked with ensuring voter turnout among their subordinates. These strategists were also engaged in compiling electronic databases of the administratively dependent electorate, and it was counted. Total coercion had a paradoxical effect: it reduced the need for falsification, making the results more plausible. The outcomes became more believable because people could personally witness — either directly or through relatives and acquaintances — many voters supporting the government, albeit under pressure.
However, this system quickly revealed its flaws. Firstly, managers couldn't always verify whether their subordinates had actually voted unless a separate polling station was set up at the workplace. Secondly, in traditional offline voting, it is impossible to check how exactly an employee voted. A photo of the ballot did not resolve the issue, as people had learned to imitate a check mark. There have even been cases in Russian elections where military personnel or shift workers voted collectively, but the results did not favor the government's nominees. Full control over the outcomes was, and continues to be, hindered by the secret ballot.
In the Russian context, e-voting either completely undermines the secrecy of the vote or, at the very least, calls it into question. Election organizers control the platforms used for e-voting, meaning they could theoretically verify whether a specific person voted and for whom. Even if this ability remains theoretical, many voters who depend on government or corporate administration are unlikely to challenge the limits of electronic voting control. To avoid any risk, they will likely vote in favor of the authorities. This fear alone is enough to influence the election results and improve the official outcomes for government-backed candidates. This is why administrations at various levels and managers of large businesses pressure employees to vote electronically. The strictest companies may even force their subordinates to vote at their place of work, using a computer or smartphone to directly monitor their actions.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Central Election Commission (CEC) introduced multiday election, a practice that has continued even after the pandemic ended. This format further facilitates corporate mobilization. The voters dependent on the authorities are often required to visit polling stations early in the morning on the first day of voting. This allows their supervisors to push any lagging voters to participate in subsequent days. Again, electronic voting enhances control over dependent electorates during multi-day elections.
The extremely high turnout rates on electronic voting platforms (officially reported by authorities to be around 90% demonstrate that this method of compelling voters to participate is highly effective.
Voters versus the Internet
Despite the triumphant spread of electronic voting across Russia, it faces one significant hurdle: Russian citizens — understandably — fear data breaches on the Internet and are reluctant to share their personal information. While Moscow residents have grown accustomed to various online services over the years and largely overcome these fears, in the provinces, such concerns remain strong. This issue became apparent during United Russia’s primaries, which were moved online during the pandemic. The ruling party faced a severe turnout drop, even though its preliminary voting traditionally involves the same administrative-dependent electorate. While people were willing to be coerced into showing up at offline polling stations and spending their time there, they were hesitant to entrust their passport details to an internet platform.
The discrepancy between Moscow and the provinces in terms of electronic voting participation is significant. In Moscow, online voting accounted for approximately half of all voters — 3.6 million out of 7.6 million eligible voters. For comparison, in the provinces, the figure averages around 20% and in some regions, only 10-15% of voters participate electronically.
However, the authorities are also trying to address this problem. In Moscow, they have already tested terminals for electronic voting, which are installed at offline polling stations. For many voters — especially older people — voting using the smart machine recommended by the commission will appear more reliable than voting directly on the "dangerous" internet. The control locus will be maintained and even increased by the terminals, as they scan passports, meaning the "big brother" continues to monitor the voters. It is likely that terminals will appear at elections in all major cities, where protest moods are still strong. This primarily concerns St. Petersburg, where the current governor, Alexander Beglov, received 59% of the votes in the September election, even though most candidates for regional head positions received 70-80% of the votes on this unified election day. In addition to St. Petersburg, the issue of protest voting is relevant for million-plus cities such as Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, as well as regional centers in the Northwest federal district.
Interestingly, Moscow authorities, in promoting electronic voting, have emphasized that it is predominantly chosen by young people who do not want to spend time going to a polling station. This positioning allowed them to legitimize the election results to some extent. According to social surveys, Russian youth is the most protest-oriented segment of society. The positioning of the REV as a youth form of voting made it possible to say that young people, in general, support the authorities. But Ella Pamfilova let it slip and drew a real portrait of the average “electronic” voter.
"We analyzed who else prefers electronic voting, and it turned out to be quite surprising: a complete defeat for men – 66 percent are women. Can you imagine? It's surprising, right? 34 percent are men. The most active age group: 44 percent, almost half, are from 36 to 50 years old, and the groups from 18 to 35 years old and 50 plus are almost the same – 27–29 percent", she told Vladimir Putin.
It turns out that the most active users of electronic voting are not young people at all but middle-aged women — a typical profile of a public sector employee: a teacher, a civil servant, or a doctor.
Big Brother is coming for votes
The Kremlin cannot completely abandon elections. Therefore, Russian authorities are mastering new methods of controlling voting to secure desired results. Firstly, high official support figures please Vladimir Putin, who most likely does not realize how they were obtained. Secondly, the very fact that the elections are being held allows the Presidential Administration to retain influence and secure budgets for its work.
But to set new records, the Kremlin needs ever more technological tricks. According to data from research centers cooperating with the Presidential Administration, the approval rating of United Russia hovers around 35%. In the last elections, the ruling party officially secured 49% of the vote. This figure must be surpassed, but most likely, due to economic issues — primarily high inflation — the party's rating will continue to decline.
The Presidential Administration (PA) needs to increase the number of voters through coercion — a method of electoral legitimization that the Kremlin's political bloc has long relied on. Its philosophy is straightforward: it is better for people to vote under pressure but perceive the numbers as real than to protest due to outright falsifications. However, there is little room left for growth in the dependent electorate segment — virtually all public sector employees and employees of large companies have already been "digitized". The Kremlin sees no alternative but to tighten control, which it is doing through electronic voting. "Big Brother" has entered Russian elections and will remain as long as the Putin regime endures.
