Competitive elections in Russia remain only at the local level
01.09.2024
Golos, the movement in defense of voters' rights, has published a final report (in Russian) on the results of candidate nominations and registrations for elections to representative bodies of power.
By-elections to the State Duma, elections to regional and local legislatures, as well as elections for heads of municipalities and local councils, will take place in the regions of Russia on 6-8 September 2024. In some regions bordering Ukraine and annexed territories, early voting will begin as early as the end of August.
REM publishes a translation of the main theses of the report.
INTRODUCTION
The elections of deputies of representative bodies and heads of municipalities are taking place amidst apathy among political elites. These elections demonstrate that, under the current conditions, the intensity of electoral campaigns rarely depends on political parties, which generally operate in alignment with the authorities. There are almost no regions left in Russia where party branches can conduct electoral policies independently of local administrations. They have to coordinate candidate lists, the allocation of electoral districts, and even the content of the campaign itself. The authorities may only face some concern from a few remaining civic activists and democratic politicians who have run either as independents or from non-parliamentary political parties in some major cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, this "problem" is effectively managed by electoral commissions, which can always find the necessary number of invalid signatures.
In those regions where the political field is still sufficiently fragmented intra-elite conflicts that escalate in the run-up to elections are the most acute in election campaigns. The peculiarity of these conflicts is that elite groups, unlike civil activists and democratic politicians, have sufficient financial resources to ensure the smooth collection of the required voter signatures for their candidates and thanks to their political and administrative influence on the ground can easily prevent the election commisions from making wrong decisions about candidates registration. The siloviki [reprsentatives of law enforcement agencies - REM] can also play a significant role in these conflicts.
The most active political life remains at the level of local self-government. This level today holds the greatest potential for the revival of real elections, political discourse, and competition.
KEY FINDINGS
1. The majority of the existing political parties are showing minimal involvement in the 2024 elections. Apart from the "parliamentary five" (United Russia, CPRF, LDPR, New People, Just Russia), only a few parties are actually visible at the regional level, including in regional capitals. These include the Pensioners' Party, the Communists of Russia, and sometimes the Rodina party. Other parties appear only occasionally. This is largely due to the need to collect voter signatures in support of candidate nomination.
2. Political parties show maximum loyalty to the expanding practice of disqualifying their candidates by election commissions. This is particularly evident in the by-elections to the State Duma, which have become of blatantly contractual nature. In all three constituencies where by-elections are being held, only Just Russia has nominated candidates. United Russia, the CPRF, the LDPR, and New People have each nominated two candidates, but none of these four parties have put forward candidates in Khakassia, which suggests a coordinated agreement. In Khakassia, candidates were nominated by Civic Platform, the Green Environmental Party, the Green Alternative Party, and the Direct Democracy Party. There is only one self-nominated candidate, who is an administrative candidate simultaneously supported by both United Russia and the CPRF. The Yabloko Party nominated a candidate in the Southern District. Thus, a total of 10 parties (the "parliamentary five" and five non-parliamentary parties) out of 25 registered in Russia have nominated candidates. The remaining 15 parties, including those entitled to participate in the elections without collecting signatures, such as the Pensioners' Party, the Communists of Russia, and the Rodina Party, did not attempt to participate in these by-elections.
3. The dropout rates for party lists look very low - 3% at the level of regional parliaments and 7% at the level of city councils of regional capitals. However, this low rate is due to a decrease in the number of parties willing to participate in elections under conditions of political repression and arbitrary refusals of registration. Among the party lists that have to collect voter signatures, the dropout rates are much higher — half of the list at the regional level and one-third at the city level. At the same time the privileged parties (those entitled to participate in the elections without collecting signatures) faced almost no disqualifications. As a result, the average number of nominated and registered party lists remains very low. In the regional legislative elections, an average of 6.3 party lists per region were nominated, with 6.2 being registered. This is the lowest figure in the last six years.
4. The situation in single-mandate districts more clearly demonstrates the lack of willingness to participate in elections. In the elections to regional legislatures, non-privileged parties that must collect signatures nominated only 73 candidates across the entire Russia, which is four times less than the number of available mandates. Only 28 candidates were registered, all of them in Moscow. However, even in Moscow, 28 candidates are fewer than the available 45 mandates. The situation with independent candidates is not much better. Across the country, only 155 independent candidates were nominated, which is exactly half the number of available mandates. Of these, only 55 were registered, which is five times less than the number of available mandates. The dropout rate amounted to 65%. Out of the 55 registered independent candidates, 41 are in Moscow, which again is less than the 45 available mandates.
5. For parties without the privilege of bypassing the signature collection process, the chances of getting candidates registered were mainly for spoiler candidates rather than those genuinely intending to compete for voter support. It seems that serious candidates understand how slim their chances of being registered are. In the city council elections in eight cities, no non-parliamentary parties even attempted to nominate single-mandate candidates. In six out of 11 cities where such candidates were actually nominated, not a single one was registered. Only in five regional centers candidates from non-privileged parties were registered. Among non-parliamentary parties, most candidates were registered by [so-called spoilers of the CPRF – REM] the Communists of Russia (15 candidates), the Russian Party of Social Justice (9 candidates), the Party of Social Protection (5 candidates), and the Pensioners' Party (4 candidates). Yabloko and Rodina managed to register only one candidate each. In total, non-parliamentary parties nominated 81 candidates in these elections, which is five times less than the number of available mandates. Out of these, only 35 were registered, which is ten times less than the available mandates.
6. Nevertheless, it is the local government that still holds some potential for real political struggle, although even here, competition is artificially and arbitrarily limited. The gradual implementation of municipal reform in various parts of the country, likely aimed at eliminating competition at the local level, will result in a significant reduction in the number of elected positions within local governments. Consequently, this will diminish opportunities for citizens to participate in the governance of their municipalities.
7. The practice of disqualifying opposition candidates through the initiation of administrative cases under articles related to the public display of prohibited (extremist) symbolics has become more frequent. Most often, symbols of Alexei Navalny's numerous projects or swastikas are found in old posts of undesirable candidates on social networks. Another preventive measure to avoid competition in elections, especially in Moscow, was the adoption of a law prohibiting foreign agents from participating in elections. Now this regulation is actively used to deprive potential and already nominated candidates of the right to be elected.
8. Golos once again emphasizes the need to revise the procedures for collecting and verifying voter signatures. The current procedures facilitate the registration of candidates whose primary purpose is not to win but to hinder serious contenders and draw votes away from them. The spoiler candidates lack any real electoral base, while candidates who do have voter support are disqualified on the grounds of invalid signatures.
