Russia’s CEC reappointed. What defined the previous lineup?
11.04.2026
On 30 March 2026, a new composition of Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) began its work, with a mandate for the next five years. However, 12 out of its 15 members were reappointed from the previous lineup. Vadim Ternovoy, an expert from the Atlas of Elections project, examines why the changes in the CEC’s composition have been minimal and highlights how Russia’s electoral system deteriorated under the previous commission. REM presents an abridged translation of the original article (in Russian).
Three newcomers
Only three members of the new CEC composition are new appointees. Notably, these include a veteran of the war in Ukraine, 49-year-old Anatoly Sysoev, a former aide to the governor of the Tver region, and 31-year-old Alena Bulgakova, who throughout her short career has headed Kremlin-controlled NGOs whose sole function is to simulate election observation and counter genuine monitoring organizations. Bulgakova heads the Corps “For Clean Elections” and serves as executive director of the Association of Independent Public Monitoring (NOM). Notably, Bulgakova was delegated to the CEC by the New People party. The third newcomer is a relatively low-profile, three-term State Duma deputy from LDPR, 44-year-old Vasilina Kulieva, formerly a member of the Duma Committee on Family, Women and Children.
Meanwhile, 58-year-old United Russia member Alexander Kurdyumov, 63-year-old dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Moscow State University Andrey Shutov, and 76-year-old Boris Ebzeev will no longer serve on the commission.
Such continuity in the composition of the Russian CEC appears unusual. When the commission was formed in 2021, only seven out of 15 members from the previous lineup were reappointed. This personnel stagnation suggests that the President, the Federation Council, and the State Duma — each of which appoints five members to the CEC — evaluate the work of the previous commission as “excellent”.
Seven blows to Russian elections
The past five years have not been exceptional for Russia’s electoral system. All the key processes that contributed to the degradation of elections had been set in motion earlier. The leadership of the Central Election Commission, Chair Ella Pamfilova and Deputy Chair Nikolay Bulaev, has remained unchanged since 2016.
Electronic voting, multi-day voting, and voting outside polling stations (the so-called “stump voting”) as well as a blatantly dismissive attitude toward the rights of voters and observers, and, as a consequence, the rapid increase in falsifications, were all introduced into the CEC’s toolkit way before 2021. However, much has also happened over the past five years.
1. The right to stand for election has deteriorated
During the outgoing electoral commission's term, the number of grounds for depriving citizens of passive voting rights has increased significantly. In April 2021, certain tools were introduced that allow arbitrary exclusion of undesirable candidates from elections. Overtly political grounds for disqualification now include convictions for organizing rallies, for “public calls for extremist activity”, for the “public dissemination of knowingly false socially significant information”, for the involvement in “extremist” or “terrorist” organizations, and for being included on the “foreign agents” register. The authorities have gained the ability to selectively strip citizens of their right to stand for election through extrajudicial mechanisms and without any substantial justification, including at the early stages of an election campaign. According to independent observers, the number of individuals stripped of their right to stand for election in Russia has exceeded 10% of the electorate, amounting to around 11 million people.
2. The scale of electoral fraud has increased significantly
According to expert estimates, around 22 million votes were falsified in the 2024 Russian presidential election, excluding electronic voting and the annexed territories of Ukraine. This is significantly more than in 2018 or 2012. Many regions that previously reported relatively credible official results have effectively turned into “electoral sultanates”, while in regions that had not previously shown major irregularities, entire administrative districts have begun producing anomalous results. This trend is partly the result of the Central Election Commission’s campaign against independent election monitoring, which has now been made extremely difficult.
3. Public oversight of election commissions has been restricted
One of the central agendas of the Central Election Commission over the past five years has been the suppression of independent election monitoring. The CEC has put a lot of effort into making Russian elections as opaque as possible. At its initiative, several legislative amendments were adopted that effectively shut citizens out of the electoral process. “Foreign agents” were barred from any participation in elections, including observing or working for election commissions, and the role of commissioners with a consultative vote was effectively abolished. Further, accreditation for media representatives to work at polling stations was severely restricted. Special enclosures for observers were introduced at polling stations, limiting their ability to monitor proceedings.
At the same time, there has been a rapid deterioration in data transparency. The CEC has actively restricted the possibility of machine analysis of official election results by introducing captchas and encryption on the official results portal. Consequently, much of the data from past elections has become inaccessible in the State Automated System “Vybory”. Publicly available video streaming from polling stations has also been dismantled.
For the first time in many years, international observers from the OSCE/ODIHR — the most authoritative international body assessing the democratic quality of elections — were unable to attend the State Duma and presidential elections in Russia.
Perhaps the culmination of this crackdown on election monitoring was the arrest and criminal prosecution of Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of the election watchdog Golos. The formal pretext was his speech at a CEC session, delivered at the invitation of CEC Chair Ella Pamfilova. Following Melkonyants’ conviction, Golos ceased to exist in July 2025.
After dismantling genuine election monitoring, the Russian CEC established a broad network of fake oversight structures, presented, for instance, through the organization “Independent Public Monitoring” or a group of so-called “international experts”.
Finally, the 2026 reform of precinct election commissions has been accompanied by repeated scandals: representatives of parliamentary parties were excluded from commissions, further reducing transparency in the electoral system.
4. The use of voting methods beyond public oversight has expanded
Until 2022, remote electronic voting (REV) was considered experimental and was used only in a limited number of pilot regions. However, since 2022 its use has expanded rapidly, despite recurring scandals and evidence of data manipulation revealed by independent experts. Today REV is used in roughly half of Russia’s regions. In Moscow, traditional voting on paper ballots has been replaced altogether, as in-person voting takes place within the same digital infrastructure via electronic voting terminals. This has not only expanded opportunities for electoral fraud but has also created a highly effective mechanism for coercing people to vote, including in workplaces.
Since 2021, multi-day voting has become nearly universal in Russian elections, following its initial use during the 2020 constitutional “referendum”. This practice has also led to a rise in falsification and voter-coercion cases: there is ample evidence that employers require administratively dependent voters to cast their ballots on Friday mornings and then report back to their management.
In addition, in 2022 so-called “extraterritorial polling stations” were introduced — set up outside the regions where elections are formally held. Oversight of voting at such stations is also nearly impossible.
5. Campaigning has become more difficult
Over the past five years, the election commission system has been granted new powers that effectively allow it to censor campaign materials. Candidates and electoral associations are now required to submit copies of campaign materials intended for television, radio, or print media to election commissions in advance. This has expanded the commissions’ ability to obstruct campaign activities by opposition parties and candidates.
The following restrictions have limited the ability of parties and candidates to engage with voters: a ban on campaigning on blocked websites, COVID-19 restrictions on public gatherings that remain in place to this day, and a prohibition on voluntary donations of less than 400 rubles (approximately 4 euros) to election funds.
6. Fewer candidates are willing and able to participate in such elections
It is not surprising that the number of people willing to take part in such elections has been steadily declining. Compared to 2020–2021, the number of nominated candidates and party lists at all levels of elections has decreased by approximately 20–25%, affecting both party nominees and independent candidates. In many elections in smaller municipalities, it is sometimes impossible to find any candidates at all, leading to elections being cancelled — often repeatedly.
7. Election commissions have lost their autonomy
Another consequence of these changes has been the loss of agency within the election commission system itself.
Established more than 30 years ago as an institution independent from the executive branch, the Central Election Commission was meant to serve as a guarantor of electoral rights and an arbiter in disputes between political competitors. Today, however, it has effectively become — and has turned the entire system of election commissions into — a routine executor of the will of behind-the-scenes organizers of elections. Political decisions are now made exclusively within the Presidential Administration; the approval of candidates is largely determined by security services; and the organization of electronic voting, which involves millions of citizens, is handled by the telecommunications operator Rostelecom together with the Moscow Mayor’s Office. Election commissions, meanwhile, simply sign voting protocols, the outcomes of which they have no real role in determining.
Given all of the above, changing the composition of the Central Election Commission makes little sense, as membership in the commission has effectively become a pre-retirement position for individuals with no real influence.
