Kremlin scales back plans to bring 100 war veterans into the next State Duma
02.04.2026
This is a translation of the article by Verstka, published with permission. To access the original text in Russian, follow the link.
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After the 2026 elections, the State Duma will undergo a significant turnover of deputies, but this is unlikely to lead to meaningful changes in its work. United Russia needs to secure two-thirds of the seats in the elections, and the main battle will be for second place. The authorities will try to displace the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) with the help of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and New People. While the former will be as pro-war as possible, the latter, on the contrary, will distance themselves from the war and attempt to present themselves as a party of “conditional freedom” for opposition-minded voters.
At the same time, the Kremlin no longer expects “at least 100” participants in the war in Ukraine to be elected to the State Duma following the 2026 elections. The reason is a preference for political controllability over a heroic background. Within the ruling party, participants of the “special military operation” (SMO) are increasingly viewed as “disposable deputies” who are useful in the short term and only in limited numbers.
The outlet Verstka discussed election forecasts with its sources in regional and federal authorities. REM publishes an abridged translation of the original article.
Veterans will run in the primaries, but are unlikely to receive serious positions
Probably the most important decision the Kremlin may take during the upcoming campaign is to abandon the idea of massively promoting “SMO veterans” to the State Duma. After Vladimir Putin called the participants in the war in Ukraine “the true elite of Russia” back in February 2024, United Russia and the presidential administration actively promoted them to deputy positions at various levels. The results, however, have been mixed. For example, ahead of the 2024 Moscow City Duma elections, all 15 SMO participants who ran in the United Russia primaries lost. This was one of the reasons for the resignation of the ruling party's secretary general, Andrei Turchak, who was subsequently sent to serve as governor of the Altai Republic (for more details on the story of Turchak's exile to Altai, read A Wizard with Federal Connections - REM).
A year later, following the 2025 regional elections, Turchak’s successor Vladimir Yakushev stated that 890 war participants had received mandates. The overwhelming majority of these positions were in municipal councils. In many cases, regional election supervisors manipulated the process by nominating people with prior political or business backgrounds as “SMO veterans,” rather than individuals actually known for their military service. At the same time, none of the genuine war veterans who became deputies primarily because of their participation in the war have emerged as particularly productive lawmakers.
The 2026 elections will be the first State Duma elections since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Last year, several media outlets reported that the Kremlin planned to allocate a significant number of parliamentary seats to war participants. Important Stories reported plans for 150 seats, while Faridaily mentioned 100 seats. The ruling party was supposed to select these candidates primarily from the “Time of Heroes” program launched by Putin in 2024.
However, the Kremlin now appears unwilling to proceed with this experiment. This was reported to Verstka by two participants in the traditional pre-election seminar for vice governors, held by the Kremlin's internal political bloc.
One of the seminar participants explained to Verstka that regions will no longer be required to nominate veteran candidates. “They will run in the primaries, but they won't get serious positions”, the source added. According to him, the main thing for the new deputies is “complete loyalty and manageability”, not a heroic background. “Now they cautiously say that there should be at least 70-80 of them. Otherwise, people in uniform might feel offended. But even this figure is hard to believe”, said a source close to the leadership of United Russia.
At the same time, the Kremlin does not plan to completely abandon the idea of “veteran quotas”. Some real combat veterans may still be nominated in several national republics, where voting results are tightly controlled by regional authorities. They may also be supplemented by individuals who possess formal veteran status (for example, officials who briefly traveled to frontline zones not to fight, but to obtain the documentation granting veteran benefits and accelerating their political careers - REM.) One example cited is Oleg Golikov, a deputy and businessman representing the Chelyabinsk region. Another source interviewed by Verstka does not exclude the possibility that all nine deputies elected from the so-called “new regions” (the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine - REM) will formally be classified as SMO participants. A source within United Russia confirmed that while public rhetoric about broad representation of war veterans will remain, actual winnable positions in the federal party list and single-mandate districts will continue to be distributed according to the traditional logic of internal political balance.
CPRF, LDPR and New People: battle for the second place
The question of who will win is not an issue. At the Senezh training center, regional officials were instructed to aim for 55% result for United Russia with a 50% turnout. The party must retain its qualified majority.
At the same time, some regions were given “special assignments” based on the ruling party's target results. “Some received increased social obligations, while others were given concessions due to local specifics. In some places, the target figures may differ from the average by as much as 15–20%”, one participant of the seminar told Verstka.
The battle for second place is considered to be one of the main intrigues in the Kremlin. Since the 2003 elections, that position has traditionally been held by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). As in all previous State Duma elections, the party list will again be headed by its long-time leader Gennady Zyuganov, who will turn 82 in September 2026. Zyuganov can hardly be described as a genuine opposition figure, even with great reserve.
The CPRF faction in the State Duma — like all other factions — consistently votes in favor of key bills supported by the Kremlin and the Russian government. Nevertheless, the communists are traditionally considered the “default choice” for opposition-minded voters. “The issue of second place is important precisely for this reason: people choose the communists not because they like Zyuganov or their Soviet rhetoric, but because ‘these guys are definitely going to get into the Duma’”, a United Russia State Duma deputy who has worked on elections for many years explained to Verstka.
Throughout most of 2025, officials and political strategists in communication with Verstka referred to Leonid Slutsky's LDPR as the main “torpedo” targeting the CPRF's second place. The LDPR tried to promote itself as a “Russian party”, emphasizing anti-migration policies and advocating legislation to strengthen “Russian culture”.
However, by the end of the year the strategy had changed. “The ‘Russian question’ was taken away from us. We no longer even use the slogan that the LDPR is a Russian party. All our efforts went to waste”, one LDPR State Duma faction member complained to Verstka. As a result, the party’s ideology has become increasingly amorphous. “We can talk about supporting SMO participants. Occasionally about social issues. But that won't attract new supporters or new members”, the source said. To ensure the party follows the Kremlin’s recommendations closely, a trusted associate of presidential administration political strategist Alexander Kharichev was even placed within the party’s central apparatus. This is Olga Larina, originally from Kostroma, who now oversees the party’s information policy.
Against this backdrop, the New People party has become more active. “It’s easy to shape them into a party of choice for those who are quietly against the war — and for those who are simply tired of it”, the head of one Kremlin public opinion told Verstka. According to him, this is why party leader Alexey Nechaev, former presidential candidate Vladislav Davankov, and other prominent figures such as State Duma deputy Sardana Avksentyeva speak far less about supporting the war and its participants than leaders of other parties.
“We are not planning to place SMO participants in winnable positions on our lists”, a source in the party’s central apparatus told Verstka. Nechaev confirmed this publicly in early March, telling journalists that war participants may appear on party lists, but this is not the main criterion. “It is important that a person shares our principles and is a professional in their field — and I’m not talking only about combat skills”, Nechaev said. The party also seeks to maintain its “liberal” image by actively opposing internet blocking.
If New People succeeds in attracting votes from opposition-minded liberals, it could potentially repeat the success of Just Russia in 2011, when the party received 13.25% of the vote and for the first time became the third-largest faction in the State Duma.
Among parliamentary parties, Just Russia currently faces the most difficult situation. After its success in 2011, the party barely cleared the 5% electoral threshold in the 2016 and 2021 elections, receiving 6.22% and 7.46% of the vote respectively, according to the Central Election Commission.
In 2021, the Kremlin attempted to strengthen the party by merging it with a group of right-wing politicians led by writer Zakhar Prilepin. However, this appears to have done little to improve its ratings.
“We basically have no serious sponsors, no active members, and no loyal voters. Although it seems party leader Sergey Mironov was promised support from the Kremlin one last time”, a State Duma deputy from Just Russia told Verstka. However, a source in the presidential administration did not confirm such promises: “If he manages to stay afloat himself, that’s good. If not — well, so be it”.
According to the pro-government polling agency VCIOM, the CPRF, LDPR, and New People currently have almost identical ratings, each slightly below 10%, while United Russia stands at 32.4%. The rating of Just Russia fluctuates around 5–6%.
Renewal through targeted purges
At the same time, according to Verstka, the State Duma will see a significant turnover of deputies. For example, a major reshuffle is expected in what has become one of the most important parliamentary bodies during the war years — the Defense Committee. It is currently chaired by General Andrey Kartapolov, a long-time associate of former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the key lobbyist for the Ministry of Defense in parliament. Kartapolov is a career military officer and the central figure behind the promotion of war-related legislative initiatives. However, he will not seek re-election.
Kartapolov’s first deputy, Andrey Krasov, is also expected to end his parliamentary career. United Russia is currently coordinating possible replacements for these positions, but the final decision will likely rest with the Ministry of Defense, a source close to the committee told the outlet. According to the them, the rotation is linked to the change in leadership at the ministry: the team of the current Defense Minister Andrey Belousov would prefer to see its own people in these roles.
Nevertheless, no fundamental change in the State Duma’s policy on defense issues should be expected. Members of the Defense Committee are not lawmakers, but rather lobbyists and spokespeople for the military establishment within parliament. Historically, the committee has served as a platform through which the Ministry of Defense promotes its initiatives, secures budget allocations, and conveys the necessary messages to the public. As a source close to the committee emphasized, “Even if the war ends, there will still be plenty of work in this area. Russia will have a large army and many veterans who will need to be dealt with”.
General Andrey Gurulev, known for his scandalous statements and harsh assessments of the course of the war, will also not be part of the new State Duma. A source in the parliament told Verstka that Gurulev had already been removed from the Defense Committee in February of the previous year precisely because of his public remarks. As a committee member, he was perceived as an authoritative and well-informed source, but he “often spoke outright nonsense”, a member of United Russia explained.
One of the few appointees from among the so-called “heroes of the SMO” who is considered successful, Artem Zhoga, may join the new Defense Committee. He currently serves as the presidential envoy to the Ural Federal District. “He is a clear, loyal figure with an impeccable biography”, a source within United Russia said.
Kremlin officials are also reluctant to see in the next State Duma those politicians who won in single-mandate districts in 2021 by defeating United Russia candidates. There were fewer than a dozen such cases, but many of those deputies turned out to be quite prominent figures. One example is Mikhail Matveev, a communist who in 2021 defeated United Russia candidate and Hero of Russia Igor Stankevich. In the State Duma, Matveev became the most visible advocate of restrictions on migrants. His supporters’ Telegram channel has over 64,000 users, and the main topic of discussion there is the expression and reinforcement of xenophobic views.
Two other communists also face a difficult fight: Oleg Mikhailov, a deputy from the Komi Republic, and Maria Prusakova from the Altai region, both of whom defeated United Russia candidates in their districts in 2021. Both remain in strong opposition to regional authorities. In 2021 Mikhailov — who gained popularity during the largest environmental protests in modern Russia against the Shies landfill — benefited from confronting the team of the then-weak head of Komi Vladimir Uiba. Now he will face Rostislav Goldstein, a businessman who replaced Uiba as the region’s leader. “He is a tough and effective political manager”, a political strategist familiar with Goldstein told Verstka. Meanwhile, local security services have been actively targeting Prusakova’s political circle, and even support from the party’s first deputy chairman and one of the most influential leaders of the CPRF Yury Afonin has so far not helped her. “The logic is exactly the same: we don’t need people who are too independent”, a Kremlin-linked political strategist explained.
According to several of Verstka’s sources in regional and federal authorities, the new State Duma will also exclude a number of deputies who are described as “dubious” or even “freakish” behind their back in parliament. For example, TV personality Anatoly Wasserman, Oleg Leonov, head of the Liza Alert search-and-rescue organization, and actor Dmitry Pevtsov are not expected to seek re-election. “We’re wrapping up the experiment of fielding figures of this kind”, a Kremlin-aligned political strategist joked. Supporters of Zakhar Prilepin are also facing expulsion from the State Duma. Several such public figures were elected in 2021 by the party lists of Just Russia. Among them were Nikolai Novichkov, one of the founders of the Congress of Russian Communities and a co-organizer of the Russian Summer festival; former television host Marina Kim; and right-wing economist Mikhail Delyagin. These individuals may either be placed in unwinnable positions on party lists or attempt to run as members of the marginal Rodina party led by State Duma deputy Alexey Zhuravlev. Zhuravlev himself also risks losing his seat, as he may run in the Zaporizhzhia region and compete there with a United Russia candidate (possibly a participant in the war – REM).
Neither the possible appearance of war veterans among candidates nor the replacement of some loyalists with others in key parliamentary posts is expected to prevent the State Duma from consistently passing all initiatives important to the executive branch. A source in the United Russia's leadership even described the future veteran deputies — the only relatively large new group of parliamentarians — as “disposable”.
“These are people who bring no legacy to the party; they are situational. They won’t be of any use in the next election”, the source told Verstka.
