The election campaign and administrative mobilization of voters in September 19, 2021 elections

Scheduled for September 19, 2021, the upcoming elections are marked by growing pressure on media and individual journalists, attempts at blocking information on "Smart Voting", and massive coercion of voters to vote and register for e-voting and mobile voting. In parallel, social media has been growing in importance for years, as a space of more freedom and an alternative information channel. This report focuses on the impact of these two antipodal trends upon the current election.

Below are the key findings of the 'Golos' Movement's long-term monitoring of the electoral campaign preceding the 19 September 2021 vote. Given monitoring covers the campaigning and voter mobilization. Previous reports focused on results of candidate nomination and registration at main regional and local elections, results of candidate nomination and registration¹ at the elections to the State Duma of Russia, the infringement on electoral rights of Russian citizens, the legal peculiarities of the State Duma election², and political and legal peculiarities of regional and local elections³ of 19 September 2021.

The full report may be found here: https://www.golosinfo.org/articles/145472 (in RU).

Key findings

1. Despite the political repressions against many journalists this year, the presentation of parties in media is unexpectedly more equal than during the previous State Duma election in 2016. Back then, Golos documented a twofold (or bigger) gap between United Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and other parliamentary parties by a number of references in all federal and regional media. By contrast, United Russia is only 21% ahead of CPRF by a number of references this year, accompanied by Just Russia – For Truth in a well-articulated top-3 group of leader parties in this indicator. Notably, federal media mention CPRF even more often than United Russia.
2. However, the information space situation is far from satisfactory, as the largest and most influential media display the worst imbalance in covering the activities of parties. For example, the party inequality is fantastic on federal TV stations, where United Russia alone enjoys as many references as the rest of the parties in total, outcompeting the closest competitor, CPRF, by 4.5 times. The shares of broadcasting time dedicated to the parties are as unequal as the number of references. The analysis of the tone also shows TVs' bias against some parties, primarily CPRF. In essence, while the federal TV channels remain the main source of information for large groups, they intentionally distort the picture to prevent citizens from articulating and expressing their will on their own. These media serve as the stronghold of state censorship. Regional media exhibit a gigantic imbalance in covering the activities of parties. Here, United Russia enjoys an almost twofold gap from the CPRF. Regional media mention the communists even less frequently than Just Russia – For Truth. Other parties are even further behind. As a result, United Russia outperforms CPRF and other parties threefold in the Visibility Index.
3. The engagement of state authorities and local self-government in campaigning for the 'power party' exacerbates the informational inequality. By the Visibility Index, publications on their websites mentioning United Russia are almost seven times more common than the publications referring to CPRF, leave alone other participants of the elections. While websites of state bodies refer to all parties predominantly in the context of publications of the electoral commissions, United Russia enjoys a different kind of treatment, with many stories about the party's activities, 'projects', and contribution to the community. The public authorities of Russia have de facto dropped their constitutional duty to defend rights and freedoms and provide a level playing field to political parties and opted to advance the interests of just one of the race participants.
4. In addition to this system of state control over the voters' will, the elections are marred by coerced voting, attempts to create obstacles for campaigns of pro-opposition candidates or parties, and illegal campaigning by officials (offline and on social media, as well as on their institutions' websites).
5. In parallel, the communication space of Russia has seen the emergence of another environment with more freedom, primarily relying on social media and the remaining independent media. Even though United Russia is also significantly leading by the number of references on social media, this phenomenon is different in nature. Frequently initiated by supporters of other parties or politicians opposing the 'party of power', such posts are usually negative. By total engagement, posts featuring United Russia and CPRF generate very similar outcomes while prevailing over other parties by a large margin.
6. The analysis of information on Smart Voting makes the freedom of social media even more evident, as opposed to the government-controlled media. Comparison between the phrase 'Smart Voting' and names of political parties by usage on social media, potential audience, and engagement reveals that Smart Voting rose to third place by the number of references over the last two weeks (30 August to 12 September), right below CPRF; it ranked second by the potential audience, outrunning CPRF, and first by engagement, with an almost twofold advantage over United Russia.
7. Remaining the freest space of communication, social media also attract attention from the government via accounts of large pro-government media with many subscribers and big pre-moderated communities. Similar to traditional media by structure, these two groups of social media entities, in fact, operate as agents of web censorship. Yet, censored social media agents are limited in impact. This is testified, in particular, by the ratio of engagement and potential audience of posts, which are much better for CPRF than for the 'party of power'.
8. Therefore, Russia has two established informational environments, both exerting direct influence upon the will of the voters. The first one, resting in the consolidated system of state censorship and propaganda, is dominated by major TV stations and other state-affiliated media, especially in regions, websites of state authorities and local self-government, and communication tools of public institutions. This is a long-standing system, which has been present in a certain way since the mid-2000s. However, a second and more independent environment has come into existence and is gaining traction. It includes the remaining independent traditional media and social media. This environment enables more diversity in information for voters.
9. These particularities of the information environment make this election different from the previous ones by adding equality to the public presentation of parties. Rather than by the merit of the government, which is obliged to defend the rights and freedoms of citizens by the Constitution of Russia, this happens due to the changing context in which the state propaganda machine is gradually losing in impact. This might be a reason for the government's increasingly repressive practices in managing the information space.

References:

¹ See a brief summary in English here.

² See a brief summary in English here.

³ See a brief summary in English here.