Elections without change?

Do observers in Russia possess the tools to maintain independent oversight of elections? How has the war influenced the pre-election campaign? Can the recent vote even be described as an election? What is the Russian government's motive for holding such “elections”, and what might we anticipate from the 2024 presidential campaign?

REM presents an abridged version of the discussion surrounding these topics and the primary outcomes of Russia’s 2023 vote. Contributing to the discussion are: journalist and moderator Mikhail Sokolov, co-chairman of the ‘Golos’ movement Stanislav Andreychuk, and political analyst Alexander Kynev. The original conversation in Russian from September 11 is available on Radio Svoboda's website.

Is There Public Oversight of the Elections?

Mikhail Sokolov: Shortly before the elections, Grigory Melkonyants, the co-chairman of the ‘Golos’ movement, was detained. Several activists from ‘Golos’ were also subjected to searches. How do you interpret these events? Did these incidents affect your movement's ability to monitor the Russian election?

Stanislav Andreychuk: I'm convinced there's a direct correlation to the elections in this case. These events happened three weeks before the September vote and a mere four months ahead of the commencement of the presidential campaign. Yet, these setbacks didn't deter us; we followed our initial strategy. We released all reports, ensured all our platforms were operational, upgraded our mobile applications, and refined the training materials [for our observers]. [We flagged] numerous infractions. I hope we will also operate during the presidential elections, and attract more volunteers.

Mikhail Sokolov: The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported no election violations that might influence the vote outcomes. Are there prominent instances of overt pressure or significant breaches highlighted by ‘Golos’ in its concluding statement?

Stanislav Andreychuk: The Ministry of Internal Affairs consistently overlooks significant violations. We know the statistics about court trends indicating that very few criminal cases arise from election manipulation. When they do emerge, the outcomes tend to favor those caught in the wrongdoing. This year, it appeared that law enforcement often aligned with the perpetrators rather than the observers identifying the infractions.

Regarding overt violations, we firstly noted direct falsifications. There are traditionally problematic regions where this happens a lot - Kuban, Bashkortostan, and the Moscow Oblast. This year, we also observed this type of fraud in Moscow, Khabarovsk, the Amur Oblast, and many other locations. The scarcity of observers at polling stations suggests that this issue was widespread. Secondly, there's the issue of remote electronic voting (REV) which is both non-transparent and non-verifiable. This system can easily be used to pressure voters. As for how individuals actually cast their votes through REV, we're frankly in the dark.

Mikhail Sokolov: According to reports, "public sector employees are forced [to vote and] report and confirm their voting". They are pressured to produce these confirmations under the threat of dismissal. It's hard to call this an election, as one cannot say it's a tool to form power or influence it. So, what exactly is it?

Alexander Kynev: These are still elections. Admittedly, they take place under significant pressure, with restricted competition and manifold hurdles for both candidates and voters. However, they remain elections. A complete absence of choice, as seen in the Soviet Union with its single-candidate system, would be a "non-election." Regarding pressure tactics, could one say we hadn't experienced this pressure in the past? Features like the three-day voting period and electronic voting [were designed] to amplify control. The need for this increased control became evident in 2018. Amid pension reform, traditionally compliant voters - like public sector employees, military personnel, and pensioners - perceived a violation of the social contract. While they continued to show up for elections [often under compulsion], their voting began to reflect a sense of defiance [toward the state]. This shift led to mounting frustration among the authorities.

Then COVID hit, and this "brilliant" three-day voting idea came about. It was for better control, a more streamlined organization and to ensure that nobody could escape the process. Then there was this electronic voting thing. It was piloted during the Moscow City Duma elections in two districts. The trials revealed that, in both districts, electronic voting significantly aided pro-government candidates in securing their deputy roles. And well, it kind of snowballed from there.

Now, electronic voting largely serves as a tool for exerting pressure, with individuals voting via their devices often under the direct supervision of their superiors. This situation severely compromises a fundamental tenet: the right to a free and secret vote. Privacy is hard to maintain outside of official polling places. If one is voting from home or is merely prompted to show proof, it's relatively simple to sidestep. However, with a supervisor literally looking over one's shoulder, there's no way around it.

Why Do the Authorities Even Need (Such) Elections?

Mikhail Sokolov: In your view, what objectives did the government set for these elections, and how could the public respond?

Stanislav Andreychuk: I believe the government's primary goal was to secure re-election with a fairly good outcome. Additionally, they were keen on trialing the REV system. Their focus was on testing mobilization strategies using REV and its overall management. I anticipate we'll witness more extensive utilization of this system in March.

On the subject of the public, it's noteworthy that in areas where genuine opposition politicians were active, the government struggled to counteract them. In Khakassia, the sitting governor from the opposition party worked hard and secured his re-election. Consider Yekaterinburg, Novgorod, and several other regions, including the LDPR's results in the Krasnoyarsk region. When there are formidable candidates, they make a difference. The primary concern isn't the society's apathy but rather the inactivity of the politicians. If there aren't any compelling politicians [to support], it's unrealistic to anticipate enthusiasm from the electorate.

Mikhail Sokolov: What drives the political decision to conduct elections that many regard as not genuine?

Alexander Kynev: Firstly, elections, though costly, are a necessary procedure to legitimize the current regime. By upholding these standard procedures, the authorities signal to the citizens that all is well in the country. It's a key reassurance, illustrating that even with ongoing challenges, sanctions, and difficulties, the situation is stable and there's no immediate crisis or emergency. Any break from this routine would stir doubts among the populace, leading them to question: what could be amiss if the authorities can't hold regular elections? Secondly, these elections are an essential tool for the authorities to ensure political stability, which stands as the foundation of governance. Examining the outcomes, it's clear that the strategies used to retain power haven't varied over the years. It hinges on rallying voters tied to administrative dependencies, while largely excluding the general public from participating. This dynamic fosters a landscape beneficial to the ruling class but disadvantageous for the opposition.

This year, the opposition's campaign was significantly tougher than in any previous year. For the candidates, it was not only challenging but also costly and high-risk. The outcome is clear: turnout was low, with the majority being those who didn't physically visit the polling stations (instead voting via REV). Among the attendees, a significant portion were those with administrative dependencies.

The results speak for themselves: United Russia now dominates all regional parliaments. Their weakest result was in the Nenets Autonomous District with 44%, whereas regions like Bashkiria and the Kemerovo Region saw them peak at 69% and 69.4% respectively. When juxtaposed with the 2021 State Duma election outcomes, there's a noticeable uptick of approximately 1.5 to 2 times in their favor across regions. Meanwhile, the Communist Party's performance has dropped significantly, with their results being two to three times worse in certain areas. Their loyalty to the existing regime might be a factor. Many who previously supported the Communist Party as a beacon of revanchism now side with the ruling authorities, observing that they are facilitating this desired comeback. Democrats and local civil activists, who previously supported the Communist Party as a form of protest due to limited viable alternatives, have since recoiled. They wouldn't support the "SMO'' in any circumstance, and they haven't. Meanwhile, Just Russia, with its unclear campaign strategies and courting of Prigozhin, has been sidelined in regional parliaments. They couldn't even secure a foothold in six regions where they formerly held seats.

The Impact of War on the Elections

Mikhail Sokolov: How have military actions shaped the trajectory of the campaign? Were there any significant shifts or changes?

Alexander Kynev: They mainly impacted the situation due to the implementation of bans and barriers against all forms of campaigning. The restrictive and censorship measures put in place from February to March of the prior year were still enforced. There have been continuous legal actions against those disseminating false information or tarnishing the army's reputation. Throughout this campaign, no one was immune to such pressure.

In the past eighteen months, members of all political parties have encountered administrative charges, detentions, and financial penalties. These campaign constraints impacted everyone: demonstrations were broken up, and campaign materials seized. Engaging with voters became the central challenge, given the inability to host public events or advertise. With numerous opposition media outlets eliminated, there were scant avenues for advertising. So, how could parties and candidates adapt? Campaigning increasingly moved online, gravitating towards social media and the ever-multiplying [political] Telegram channels, with dozens now existing in every region.

Mikhail Sokolov: What was United Russia's overarching campaign message? "Keep everything the same, maintain the status quo, and nothing special is happening." Is this merely another pledge of stability, or does it carry implications related to the war?

Alexander Kynev: There's an underlying sense of continual advancement, marching towards a phase of mature socialism. If you don't know about the Special Military Operation (SMO) and solely rely on regional news chronicles, it appears as though nothing is happening. The governor has launched an urban beautification program, and since it includes various streets, every day, at least one courtyard can be showcased. In certain regions, hospitals have seen renovations, while in others, children receive vacation vouchers. This stream of news flows unceasingly each day.

Stanislav Andreychuk: For United Russia, their campaign predominantly showcases the accomplishments of the incumbent governors - it's their typical narrative. In contrast, other parties demonstrate a clear lack of cohesion and organization, with many of their regional branches underperforming. Take Yabloko, for instance: they'd consider it a win to have ten productive regional branches across the country. Just Russia faces similar challenges. A recent addition to the political landscape, New People, seems to struggle with regional staffing as well. The Communist Party maintains its organizational structure, while the Liberal Democratic Party does so in only select regions. However, most forms of campaigning are thwarted; media access is restricted, street actions are halted - often to this day under COVID precautions - even including solitary pickets. While social media remains an option, many platforms face blocks, and some are directly overseen by the president's administration, making Telegram the last refuge. It's unclear where the opposition can effectively engage with the voters. Physical promotional materials meet swift ends - either being removed by street cleaners or entire print batches being confiscated. Given this landscape, the campaign is inherently skewed, leaving [independent candidates] with scant opportunities to gain visibility.

Is There Still Opposition Capable of Competing for Power?

Mikhail Sokolov: Has the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) under Zyuganov maintained its status as the second-largest party, or has it been surpassed by the late Zhirinovsky's party, the LDPR?

Alexander Kynev: Nominally, the CPRF remains the second-largest. While they maintain this rank on paper, it's not with the same prominence as two years ago. In the 2021 State Duma elections, the CPRF secured a position significantly ahead of other parties, leading by almost one and a half times. However, that lead has now nearly vanished. They've lost the ultra-patriots, who have shifted their allegiance to the authorities, and the local protest supporters, who never aligned with left-wing orthodoxy, have also turned away. What's left seems to indicate an identity crisis. But this crisis isn't unique to the CPRF; many parties are grappling with similar issues. In today's political climate, every party is vulnerable; they can be shut down, and individuals within them can face personal challenges. Currently, while the CPRF holds second place, it's closely matched with the LDPR in many regions, and has even fallen behind them in some instances. In Yakutia, for example, New People claims the position of the second-largest party, pushing the CPRF to third place.

Stanislav Andreychuk: The situation varies from region to region. Strong opposition figures can be found in almost any political party, and they don't necessarily align with their party's federal stance. I know many instances where individuals have views that fundamentally differ from the party they were elected from. In some areas, the pushback against authority is notably strong.

Mikhail Sokolov: How did the Yabloko party fare, given that it was the sole party to adopt a pacifist stance with the slogan “We are for peace”? Did it benefit them in any way?

Stanislav Andreychuk: Yabloko participated in elections in three cities and secured victories in two. Yet, I'm inclined to believe that their success hinged [less on pacifist slogans] and more on the presence of candidates who had served as deputies and had genuinely worked hard over the last five years. These deputies didn't just hold their titles; they operated public offices, were accessible to the public, and earned their trust and support. To me, it's less about pro-war or anti-war stances and more about whether representatives serve their communities.

Alexander Kynev: I agree that one shouldn't overemphasize the role of an anti-war or pro-war position in elections. These are local elections. Most voters cast their ballots based on personal reputation, familiarity with the candidates, and their proven track record. In Yekaterinburg, the main agenda was entirely city-related: economical development, considering citizens' views, transportation, and other local matters. These issues drove voters to the polls. Veliky Novgorod was perhaps the only place where peace became a primary topic of discussion. Yet, given Novgorod's smaller size, the factor of personal connection [between candidates and voters] was also significant.

What Can We Expect from the 2024 Presidential Campaign?

Mikhail Sokolov: What do these sentiments and election results imply for the upcoming presidential campaign?

Stanislav Andreychuk: The upcoming presidential campaign will certainly see significantly more efforts to mobilize voters, though primarily those loyal to the current regime. Any initiative that could potentially demobilize opponents will be embraced. The major focus will be on deterring those opposed to the present leadership from casting their ballots. It's apparent a sufficient number of controlled and loyal voters will be mustered for essentially non-competitive elections, marked by a closed campaign, scant intrigue, and minimal political depth. People will be driven to the vote through online voting. In regions with remote electronic voting, there will be widespread coercion. In regions we refer to as 'electoral sultanates,' [results] will be outright fabricated.

Alexander Kynev: I anticipate that the presidential campaign will bear similarities to this year's gubernatorial elections. The campaign is likely to be uneventful, dull, and lackluster, aiming to leave everyone devoid of hope. If people suddenly sense hope, a brighter future, or any prospects, they might become more engaged. The authorities don't want the public to mobilize and turn out to vote outside of their predetermined plans. If a candidate arises who inspires new hope, it would spell a nightmare for the government, as things could quickly spiral out of control. Such candidates mustn't emerge. The whole environment must be steeped in apathy, monotony, and stringent orchestration. I predict the chosen candidates will reflect this ethos: they'll likely be among the oldest, uninspiring and most mundane. I'm not holding out for any spark or vibrancy because any hint of brilliance carries a risk; it's venturing into the unknown.