To Russian opposition after the disaster of 2022: Enlighten, not repent

Author: Alexander Kynev. This is the full version of his article for Svoboda.org

The ‘special operation’ that began on February 24, in addition to multiple tragedies in Ukraine, caused shock, mass frustration and despair for many in Russia. Millions of people’s life strategies have been completely destroyed; rather than broken plans, it is about broken lives.

This social calamity has also had the most severe effect on the Russian opposition. The mass migration of the most politically and socially active part of society is an enormous blow to its development prospects. That goes on top of the blow already caused by military action, sanctions, and the virtual isolation of the country, as well as growing internal constraints on freedom of expression and even professional activities.

Representatives of Russia’s democratic opposition now find themselves in a situation of a double victim, who is not welcomed either in Russia or abroad. To the Russian authorities, they are the enemy and a fifth column. To the outside world, they represent an aggressor country, and few foreigners would take the trouble to discern what kind of a Russian you are. The desire to lay collective guilt on each and every Russian spares no one.

This catastrophic situation of defeat and exodus is accompanied by an internal crisis, with the opposition splitting over questions of ‘whom to blame’ and ‘what to do’. This crisis is also connected to whether to flee the country or stay and the public position on the opposition’s fault in what is happening. Some part of the opposition (not the largest but the most vocal) generates emotional appeals to admit the collective guilt, the need to repent, the shame of being a Russian, etc. One of my old acquaintances even wrote a post that he would try to disown his Russian citizenship and surname at the first opportunity. This quilt question may sound purely philosophical and speculative; however, it is fundamentally important in light of whether the current Russian opposition has a future at all. The question is about the opposition as a whole, not about rare individuals who might successfully get involved in few foreign projects or foundations.

In reality, this story is not so much about ‘The noble promptings of the spirit*’ (in some cases, though, the self-flagellation is undoubtedly sincere, albeit skilfully kindled by the propaganda). It is mostly about what happens next and what we urgently need to do to avoid this ever happening again. Errors in nuances lead to errors in conclusions. There are three essential points to be understood in this whole discourse about collective responsibility, which many are trying to turn into collective guilt.

First, all these hand-wringing and pathetic calls to each end everybody to repent is the utter public suicide of the opposition and a priceless gift to the government. Does anybody understand it? Clearly, some understand (especially the political technologists), but many in the emotional ecstasy of collective unity with the social milieu are unaware of it. Obviously, to go out to the people, and instead of a programme to better the country and its governance, to explain to them how ignorant and retarded they are, how they are responsible for all the bad things whatsoever and need to do penance for their own miserable lives, and then hope that the people will support you and vote for you, is naive, to say the least. It is impossible to explain to an ordinary person, struggling all his life to survive and make ends meet, often facing domestic injustice, that they are supposed to be blamed for everything. Not only does it reek of the most blatant victim-blaming for ‘not fighting back, ‘provoking’, ‘fearing’, ‘not understanding’, etc. But it is also the arrogant snobbery towards ordinary citizens that part of our elite loves so much, which prescribes to seem to be as sophisticated, pompous and sacrificial as possible.

There are no examples of electoral campaigns conducted and won in this way in human history. Of course, it might be possible to trade this image abroad for support; however, no one has ever come to power or won an election on the pretext of humbling themselves and repenting. Therefore, this approach is an absolute dead-end and insane endeavour, at least from the electoral point of view.

Yet, electorally, the political suicide of the remnants of the political opposition in a situation of an inevitable and imminent rise in protest sentiments is more than beneficial to the government. The farther opposition’s rhetoric from the ordinary people, the better and easier it is for the authorities. It is even better if the dissidents flee in droves and call for all this from abroad. The latter combination is quite invaluable for state propaganda. Therefore, intimidating and motivating opponents to leave are beneficial for the authorities in this context, both in terms of PR and practical handling of the situation, so there would be no troublemakers.

Secondly, the appeals to universal repentance is the path, in reality, to public indulgence for the authorities. After all, since everyone is guilty, and so is the opposition, the authorities just did what society allowed, i.e. society wanted. The call for unity leads to unity, and the authorities are pretty happy about that. Only, it will not be the unity about which the opposition dreams. It will be the unity of grudge and isolation.

Thirdly, the narrative of common guilt dilutes and levels the personal responsibility of some opposition members, who have worked for the state propaganda, served the government as political strategists, organised boycotts when actions could have made a difference, harassed other opposition members, and so on. If everyone is to blame, then the personal guilt is not truly personal, and one is free not to recall it at all.

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What is there to do if an excessive emphasis on guilt and repentance does not, in fact, bring any benefit and cannot help out the crisis?

The first and most important thing is that if you want people to understand you, you must speak a language comprehensible to them and not arrogantly lecture them. Out of the Russian opposition of the 2000s and the 2010s, only Alexei Navalny was relatively successful in this regard. That is why he achieved popularity, and that is why they wanted to poison him and put him in jail. It is telling that the presidential election of 2018 already saw an attempt by Kseniya Sobchak’s ghettoised niche campaign to counter Navalny’s broad opposition platform aimed at issues that mattered to people. At the time, Sobchak’s campaign deliberately selected the most controversial public topics, ‘locking’ the democratic opposition into an extremely limited electoral ghetto. I wrote an article about this at the time, ‘Boycott or Ghetto’, for Republic, which drew a significant response.

Secondly, Russian authoritarianism has quite clear and distinct institutional roots. Always and everywhere, a successful departure from authoritarian and totalitarian legacies is only possible through deep institutional reforms. To this end, it is necessary to say explicitly that the leading cause of the catastrophe and crisis is the outrageous concentration of power in one person’s hands. This concentration has made possible the monopoly in all other spheres, including omnipresent corruption and the creation of an equally omnipresent system of information propaganda. The catastrophe has a name, and so does the political and institutional framework created in Russia. When Volodin said, ‘Russia exists as long as Putin does,’ in reality, he was talking about a very specific political system. Rather than an abstract ‘bad’ nation, now is the time to pinpoint the creator and symbol of this system and articulate plans for how the Russian state should be organised after the inevitable fall of the current system so that authoritarianism is never restored.

Many a representative of the ‘democratic’ movement both in the 2000s and 2010s has defended not the ‘achievements’ of the 1990s (like ‘there was adopted a good Constitution’) but their personal contribution to them. In reality, the Tragedy of 2022 was made possible and spawned by the distortions of the Constitution of 1993. While creating ‘autocracy for the sake of reforms,’ a system was ultimately shaped that could not help but metamorphose into ‘autocracy for the sake of autocracy’.

Thirdly, if we want to change the country, we must stay in it. But, of course, security considerations for quite a multitude make temporary departure almost inevitable. Nevertheless, it must be for the time being, and we must return as soon as the opportunity arises.

The abovementioned does not eliminate the need for those who feel personal guilt to repent and be purified. If you feel this necessity, of course, you need to. Yet, to change society, we must understand what is possible and what is not, what can be understood and accepted and what cannot not. If we want such tragedies to be prevented from happening again, we must, above all, know, understand and love our country.

* A well-known quote from the famous poet Pushkin’s verse ‘To Chaadaev’.