Express review of the first voting day on 6 September
07.09.2024
Based on the Golos report, REM summarized the key trends observed during the first voting day.
During the first day of voting, the Golos Movement received 107 reports to the Map of Violations and through other channels. The top five regions by the number of reported possible violations on 6 September are:
1. Moscow - 48
2. St. Petersburg - 26
3. Moscow Region - 13
4. Mari El - 4
5. Tatarstan - 3
MAIN TRENDS OF THE FIRST VOTING DAY
The ongoing voting is predominantly organized in an administrative and mobilization manner.
To achieve the desired election outcome, the work of election administrators centers around three main tasks.
The main task of the pro-governmental candidates (nominated by United Russia or systemic parties, some are self-nominated) and those who ensure their victory is to force the voters dependent on the state to come to the polling stations and vote. The second task is to neutralize the efforts to independently monitor the elections and procedures in and around polling stations. The third task is to create necessary conditions for vote rigging, should it be needed.
1. Voter mobilization
1.1. Control over the turnout of dependent voters
Preparations began long before the start of voting: lists of voters in budgetary and educational institutions, state-controlled enterprises and commercial structures were compiled, and the time for their voting and reporting forms were determined. During the Unified Election Day, their attendance at polling stations is carefully monitored.
Therefore, on the first voting day, two main types of reported violations can be identified: testimonies of voters being forced to vote on a working day (Friday) either at the polling stations themselves or through electronic voting (REV or DEG in Russian), and complaints about various illegal restrictions on independent observation.
On 6 September, reports about the mobilization of the state-dependent electorate came from different parts of the country: Ufa (Bashkortostan), Moscow, St. Petersburg, Penza and other regions. These voters are required to take photos at polling stations and send a geolocation tag using a special QR code or SMS.
1.2. REV (remote e-voting)
As of 19.00 Moscow time, the turnout of online voters was 70%. The absolute leader by the percentage of online turnout was the Republic of Mari El, where 83% of voters cast their votes by 19.00 on the first voting day. The second place is the Republic of Altai (78%), which is followed by Kamchatka Krai (77%). The Vologda Oblast (76%) and Lipetsk Oblast (76%) round out the top 5 regions in terms of turnout.
To avoid abnormal activity in the REV online system, which might be found suspicious by observers, the “mobilizers” of electronic voting tried to distribute the load on the system more evenly, so that the turnout in the REV would look more natural. The chat rooms of budget-funded institutions began to display instructions with the exact time when their employees should cast their online votes.
Nevertheless, observers noticed several glitches in the operation of the Federal REV Platform. It is difficult to assess to what extent they affected the system's operation yet.
1.3. Restriction of paper voting in Moscow
Moscow de facto replaced traditional voting with paper ballots with electronic voting. Although voters were given the opportunity to vote on a paper ballot, using this opportunity turned out to be difficult in practice. It was reported that some voters were asked to provide supporting documents proving that they had “good reasons” for voting by paper ballot. Reports that voters were unable to vote by paper ballot came from a wide range of Moscow districts throughout the day. Some voters received outright rejections. Instead of assisting voters in exercising their right to vote, many election commissions prevented it.
2. Restricting election observation
2.1. Denial of access to polling stations
As the amendments to the electoral legislation came into force, local election commissions got an opportunity to “reject” observer lists submitted by candidates and parties not affiliated with the authorities. They take advantage of this.
Thus, serious problems with the access of observers to polling stations were reported by candidates and parties in different districts of St. Petersburg. For example, more than a hundred observers of the Just Russia party could not get to the polling stations. Observers from independent candidates were also not allowed to enter many polling stations. Similar reports came from other regions, such as Bryansk Oblast, where observers from the CPRF and the New People party were prevented from entering polling stations. In all such cases, the formal reason for refusal by election commissions was that the lists of observers were allegedly compiled in violation of legal norms.
Allegedly due to a legal error in the paperwork, the regional branch of the New People party in the Republic of Mari El withdrew all of its observers, about 200 persons, from the election.
2.2. Unlawful restrictions on observers
Attempts by PEC members to prohibit observers from taking photos and video recordings have been reported for many years and contradict Russian electoral legislation. The current regional election 2024 is no exception. On 6 September, reports of illegal restrictions on photos and videos were received from Moscow, Lipetsk Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai and some other regions.
3. Preparations for vote rigging
3.1. Voting outside the premises
Mass outdoor voting is a widespread technology for ensuring the desired results in elections. Surprisingly, the introduction of REV in Russia did not have any effect on the scale of outdoor voting. In many regions, observers recorded an unreasonably large number of applications for voting “at home”, which numbered dozens and sometimes hundreds of people. Numerous reports of mass home voting (including with violation of procedures) were received on 6 September from Moscow and St. Petersburg.
3.2. Other violations
In Chelyabinsk, local journalists discovered “phantom” houses in the voter lists. Among the addresses assigned to these polling stations were houses demolished and resettled several years ago.
Several reports with suspicions of “carousel voting” came from the Moscow Region, which is notorious for using this falsification technology.
Golos experts state that at least in those polling stations where violations of election procedures have been reported, falsification of the voting results can’t be excluded.
