“Foreign agent” filter for parliamentary opposition
28.02.2025
by Andrey Pertsev
The Russian Ministry of Justice is increasingly labeling members of systemic parties as foreign agents — prominent regional politicians who lose their parliamentary mandates and the opportunity to participate in elections. The law, under which foreign agents are deprived of the ability to run for office or hold parliamentary seats, helps the Kremlin shield Russian parliaments from undesirable regional charismatic leaders and increases systemic parties' dependency on the authorities.
A Reserve of Prominent Regional Politicians
The Russian authorities have a variety of tools to prevent undesirable candidates from participating in elections, especially at the federal level. Politicians independent of the Kremlin cannot register a party to participate in regional campaigns, nor can they take advantage of the exemption from collecting signatures to run for State Duma elections, which can only be achieved by winning seats in at least one regional parliament.
Registration requirements seem relatively simple — a party must gather 500 members and establish branches in at least half of Russia’s regions. However, actors deemed undesirable by the Kremlin face rejection from the Ministry of Justice. This was the case for Alexei Navalny and his team, presidential candidate 2024 Ekaterina Duntsova, and even the “Beer Lovers Party”, whose founders from the 1990s attempted to revive recently. The latter emphasized they did not wish to oppose the Kremlin but feared the party's relatively high rating might disrupt the Kremlin's political plans. The Ministry of Justice gradually closes small “sleeping” parties that Kremlin opponents could potentially revive. Parliamentary opposition operates within the political system established by the Kremlin, meaning that 'non-systemic' candidates are unlikely to be nominated by parliamentary opposition parties.
This system that prevents independent politicians from becoming registered candidates can be referred to as a “party-based filter”. Undesirable independents are weeded out at the signature collection stage, with election commissions often invalidating even the signatures of their relatives and friends. Courts generally side with the commissions in these cases.
As the political system becomes more closed and controlled, more and more politicians find themselves outside its boundaries. A decade ago, the Kremlin was willing to retain prominent politicians from the 1990s within systemic politics, allowing them to join various parties and even get elected. For example, in 2016, Anatoly Greshnikov from Yaroslavl’s Just Russia and Sergei Furgal from the LDPR in Khabarovsk were allocated districts in State Duma elections. The Presidential Administration (PA) saw the risk of their political radicalization and opted to allow their election while maintaining partial control over them. In return, Furgal and Greshnikov refrained from criticizing the Kremlin or Vladimir Putin, nor did they support non-systemic forces. For systemic parties, having prominent regional figures ensured strong results in their respective territories, which positively affected nationwide party outcomes.
Prominent members of the Just Russia party included leftist politician Oleg Shein (Astrakhan), notable Chelyabinsk businessman Valery Hartung, and public politicians from the 1990s like Anatoly Greshnevikov (Yaroslavl) and Alexander Burkov (Yekaterinburg). The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) had figures like Vyacheslav Markhaev, head of the Buryat special-purpose police, former Irkutsk region governor Sergey Levchenko, 2018 presidential candidate Pavel Grudinin, former Novosibirsk mayor Anatoly Lokot, Saratov blogger Nikolai Bondarenko, and State Duma deputy from Komi, Oleg Mikhailov. In the LDPR, a leader-driven party, the situation was more complex, but notable figures like Sergey Furgal stood out. Powerful regional branches also existed within Yabloko, which straddled the line between systemic and non-systemic opposition. For example, the Pskov branch, led by Lev Shlosberg, not only maintained a stable faction in the regional parliament but also elected municipal leaders.
Popular regional politicians in systemic parties were inconvenient for regional authorities, as their popularity led to United Russia losing seats in legislatures and municipal councils, which caused issues for the Kremlin’s political bloc. A prominent politician could develop their branch, speak from the rostrum of the legislature, and thus enter the State Duma, as occurred with CPRF’s Komi branch leader Oleg Mikhailov, who won a competitive election in 2021 against a United Russia candidate.
In 2021, the Kremlin attempted to pressure the Communist Party into rejecting nominations for several of its prominent candidates. However, Gennady Zyuganov refused to comply, and all of these politicians secured winnable positions and entered the State Duma. The “party filter” failed. It also failed when the Just Russia in Yaroslavl nominated former governor Anatoly Lisitsyn, leading the party to win two single-mandate districts in the region, leaving United Russia empty-handed. This example demonstrates how systemic party branches might attract local elites dissatisfied with the current regional leadership, offering them a platform for representation.
Creating such alternative centers of influence at the local level clearly contradicted the Kremlin’s policy of verticalization and unification. However, for a long time, the PA could do little about it, as systemic party leaders had direct contact with Vladimir Putin. For a long time, the most common way to deal with it was a compromise between the Kremlin and the systemic party, which involved moving inconvenient figures away from the federal level. For example, Just Russia denied a winnable spot in the 2021 State Duma elections to Oleg Shein, leader of the Astrakhan branch, while the CPRF did the same with Saratov blogger and deputy Nikolai Bondarenko. However, both Shein and Bondarenko retained their positions in their regions and remained part of the party’s reserve.
Pressure from the Outside
The PA resolved this dilemma with the new “foreign agent filter”. In May 2024, amendments to the electoral legislation came into effect. Those designated as ‘foreign agents’ could no longer run for office at any level, and if they hold parliamentary mandates, they must relinquish them. As a result, popular regional politicians Oleg Shein, Lev Shlosberg, and Boris Vishnevsky lost their mandates. Members of State Duma deputy Oleg Mikhailov’s team from Komi, such as Viktor Vorobyov, as well as participants of Novosibirsk’s opposition coalition Anton Kartavin and Svetlana Kaverzina, also had to leave their posts. They will no longer be able to run for new terms or seek State Duma seats. Authorities have barred participation in the 2024 Moscow City Duma campaign for former deputies Daria Besedina (Yabloko), Mikhail Timonov (Just Russia), and Evgeny Stupin (CPRF).
At the federal level, only Yabloko defends its ‘foreign agent’ deputies Shlosberg and Vishnevsky; other parties have accepted the new rules. The Communists rushed to expel Evgeny Stupin, while Just Russia stripped Oleg Shein of his party card.
The "foreign agent filter" enables the PA to remove troublesome regional figures from political life. The simplicity of removing these figures makes it easier for the Kremlin to exert pressure on the leadership of systemic parties, increasing their dependence on the Kremlin. The PA can threaten to designate both charismatic leaders and major resource players as foreign agents. Unsurprisingly, when backed into a corner like this, systemic opposition leaders would prefer to keep their sponsors rather than risk losing everything all at once.
Communists in the Danger Zone
In these new circumstances, promising Communists find themselves most exposed. Although CPRF’s leadership fully supports the war and takes even more radical positions than the Kremlin, the PA’s political bloc seeks to remove undesirable figures from the State Duma and regional branches of the Communist Party. Furthermore, it aims to displace CPRF as the country’s second-most popular party - a goal facilitated largely by the Communist Party’s own leadership. The party alienates protest voters with its cult of Joseph Stalin and pro-war rhetoric, leaving only a core electorate that is aging and declining. According to current FOM and VTsIOM polls, the CPRF is the second most popular party after the LDPR. Nevertheless, in election campaigns, charismatic and resourceful CPRF players could mobilize their personal electorate and win State Duma seats. Should CPRF’s leadership defend such figures, authorities might threaten them with ‘foreign agent’ status.
This threat could target popular Buryat politician Vyacheslav Markhaev, who has repeatedly criticized both local and federal authorities. The PA’s political bloc also holds long-standing grievances against former Irkutsk Governor Sergey Levchenko, elected on a protest wave in 2015, and against figures like Pavel Grudinin, Valery Rashkin, and Nikolai Bondarenko. CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov will likely try to nominate former presidential candidate Pavel Grudinin for the State Duma again. In past elections, the PA had to fabricate dubious reasons to block Grudinin’s registration, but now the "foreign agent" label provides an easy way to do so. Oleg Mikhailov, a Komi State Duma deputy, and former Novosibirsk mayor Anatoly Lokot also face uncertainty due to their strong regional influence.
In the ranks of the LDPR and New People there are few resourceful players involved in public politics. In Just Russia, such figures exist, but it is unclear whether the Presidential Administration (PA) will allow this party to participate in the Duma campaign, as its ratings are already below the passing threshold and continue to decline. Strong Yabloko politicians Lev Shlosberg and Boris Vishnevsky have been removed from the electoral field with the help of the "foreign agent filter". It is uncertain whether the PA will actually keep using its new "foreign agent filter", or if they will simply threaten to use it.
The political bloc may test the "foreign agent filter” in the upcoming elections this year in the Novosibirsk region, where residents will elect deputies to the regional parliament and the city council. Novosibirsk is a Communist Party stronghold, with the party receiving higher percentages here than the national average. The mayoral election was also won by the party’s regional branch leader, Anatoly Lokot, who is supported by a dedicated team.
It is far from certain that the Presidential Administration will decide to actually use its new “foreign agent” weapon against strong candidates – it is quite likely that merely threatening with it will be enough. However, one thing can be said with certainty: there will be fewer bright regional charismatic figures who were elected to the federal parliament amid fierce opposition to United Russia in the new composition of the State Duma. The systemic parties themselves, without regional charismatic figures, will increasingly resemble the LDPR in its new form: a party where the leader and main political lines are determined by the Kremlin.
