Free elections post-Putin: Not a cure-all

This article belongs to a series of op-eds by Dr. Grigory Golosov, a political science expert, published by the online magazine Holod, an independent Russian socio-political media. The series is dedicated to post-Putin Russia and possible scenarios of regime change. Here we present a translation of the original article in Russian that came out in July 2023.

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It is a common belief that the first order of business after the fall of the current regime should be to conduct free nationwide elections. However, Dr. Grigory Golosov argues that this is not how it works and explains why.

The demand for free elections should be an indisputable cornerstone of any democratic reform program. The issue is that Russian authorities consider the elections they conduct to be free. One of the primary objectives of any faction of the current regime that manages to retain power is to convince the opposition to recognize election results, essentially those conducted under the old rules. Such an agreement by opposition politicians would be a monumental mistake, however. Therefore, despite the importance of elections, this issue shouldn't be the first on the agenda.

I can only seriously consider one scenario in which holding elections becomes an absolute priority. This would be a complete collapse of the old regime, where the ruling faction would be eager to relinquish power as quickly as possible, either by dispersing and leaving the country (preferably while retaining the wealth they've amassed) or staying but focusing on business ventures. The latter scenario has previously played out in Eastern European countries, where ruling parties (as it was said back then) "traded power for property." This won't work in Russia because here, one doesn't exist without the other.

However, if the country's leadership is indeed ready to hand over power to an opposition party fortunate enough to win an election, there doesn't seem to be an alternate mechanism. The use of the word "fortunate" here is intentional. In the context of political chaos (a common companion of revolutions) and the organizational weakness of all factions vying for power, the structure of the opposition movement and random fluctuations in voter sentiments will be decisive.

Elections After Dictatorships: The Eastern European Experience

Events in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s serve as the best example to illustrate this point. Poland's example is the least indicative, where the first post-communist elections took place in an environment where the ruling party was genuinely aiming to win, while "Solidarity" was acknowledged as the predominant opposition force. Polarization in the first free elections in Poland quite naturally led to voters in the next elections, disappointed with the results of the first phase of reforms, voting the former communists into power, who by that time had repainted themselves as social democrats.

In other Eastern European countries, the situation varied, presenting two other scenarios. The first scenario was most evident in Czechoslovakia. It involved creating such a broad opposition coalition of inherently weak groups that voters had a justified perception that this coalition wasn't merely the dominant force, but the only one capable of taking responsibility for governing the country.

In Czechoslovakia, the Civic Forum emerged as such a coalition, securing nearly half of the seats in the 1990 parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, Hungary held its first free elections that same year. In the absence of a broad opposition coalition, the conservative-nationalist Hungarian Democratic Forum, to the surprise of many, prevailed with almost a quarter of the votes.

Both scenarios presented challenges. Following the elections, Czechoslovakia underwent an extended and painful period of political discord within the Civic Forum. This turmoil could have compromised the state's functionality. However, this did not occur, largely due to the exceptional tactical prowess of Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus.

Things were even less smooth in Hungary. The initial phase of reforms was ineffective and marred by sharp political conflicts between various anti-communist parties. Matters escalated to the point where, before the subsequent elections, there was widespread speculation that the Hungarian Democratic Forum was poised to usurp power. While this takeover didn't occur, the 1994 elections saw former communists take the reins in Hungary. The most negative scenarios in Eastern European countries were largely averted due to the prospect of joining the European Union, which tempered political attitudes and deterred politicians from taking drastic measures. In the current political climate, Russia won't have this mitigating factor.

It turns out that holding elections too quickly posed problems even when they seemed almost indispensable. In the context of Russia, such a scenario seems difficult to imagine. I've previously outlined two possible outcomes: a more positive (though less probable) scenario where the leadership, without holding elections, includes members from opposition groups; and a less positive scenario where a segment of the current leadership remains in power but is amenable to compromise. Nonetheless, when it comes to addressing the election issue, there's no significant distinction between these two scenarios.

The Possibility of Free Elections in Russia

Transitioning from sham to authentic elections involves a complex process including both political and technical dimensions. In Russia, the emphasis often leans towards the technical side of elections. This makes sense, as the illusory character of modern Russian elections is predominantly upheld by "electoral technologies," many of which can be technically eliminated by establishing and legally enshrining fairer rules. However, today I'll start with the political dimension.

A commonly held belief is that if free elections were conducted immediately, "communists and fascists" would surely win. This notion is absurd, mainly because the idea of holding free elections "immediately" is unfeasible. Clearly, any elections without a prior political transition leading to the current governance system's downfall would not be free. The victors won't be the "communists and fascists" but the same "United Russia," albeit under a different name and perhaps in a slightly altered form.

A situation somewhat reminiscent of this — though with the crucial distinction that the leadership was genuinely pursuing change — can be seen in the 1989 elections for the People's Deputies of the USSR. The majority of seats in these elections went to members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), with only a handful of elected deputies pushing for deeper democratization. While the 1989 election results were undeniably significant, the subsequent course of events was influenced more by Mikhail Gorbachev's political decisions than by the lineup of the elected deputies.

While the political outcomes of the perestroika-era elections were far from perfect, delving into this topic may be redundant. This is because there's unlikely to be another figure like Gorbachev, and if "United Russia" survives the political process that makes free elections possible (which I doubt), it will be in a much-diminished form. The victors of the elections will be those who play leading roles in this process. If these are the "communists and fascists," they will claim the main prize; but I do not think that is going to be the case.

It's possible that instead of the communists, known for their political impotence and extreme servility towards the authorities, radical nationalists might indeed play a significant role in the country's forthcoming development phase. However, if these nationalists truly emerge as the main players interacting with the authorities, free elections will be inherently off the table. The "national-democrat" movement in Russia remains in the past; even before this, it was largely a journalistic fantasy rather than a tangible project. Russian radical nationalists, like many of their counterparts worldwide, are far from liberal and simply don't desire free elections. If necessary, they'll negotiate with the authorities about entirely different matters.

This is a straightforward logical conclusion. While the communists, notorious for their political ineffectiveness and extreme subservience to the authorities, may not be at the forefront, radical nationalists could potentially play a pivotal role in the nation's upcoming developmental phase. However, if these nationalists become the primary negotiators with the authorities, the prospect of free elections will likely be dismissed. The 'national-democratic' movement in Russia is a thing of the past, and even before, it was more of a journalistic fantasy rather than a tangible project. Much like their global counterparts, Russian radical nationalists lean away from liberal values and aren't particularly keen on free elections. Their negotiations with the authorities would likely revolve around entirely different issues.

Free elections will only be on the agenda if those in power interact mainly with the groups interested in holding them. This will naturally draw public attention to these groups. In a short time, they will not only become widely recognized among the general public, but also appeal to those segments of the ruling class wishing to secure a political future in the new Russia.

Democratic Forces in Free Elections

Certainly, years of aggressive propaganda won't fade without a trace, and Russia will have to contend with a notably strong nationalist component in its societal mindset for years to come. However, the future significance of this segment shouldn't be overstated. Collective consciousness is flexible. It can easily shift when new ideas become widely accessible, especially when old notions are debunked by everyday experiences.

It's said that nothing succeeds like success, but for the collective consciousness, it's also true that nothing fails like failure. So, I wouldn't be overly concerned about the "communists and fascists." Democratic forces will have a good chance of winning free elections.

However, to attain such an outcome, democrats need to position themselves not just as recognizable opponents of the current leadership but also as an organized force across every stratum of society, encompassing both social and territorial aspects. This can't be achieved without meeting the four basic requirements I outlined in my previous article. Even if these requirements are accepted by the authorities, and even if someone from the democratic camp joins the political leadership, the practical implementation of this program will still require a considerable amount of time.

Even the release of political prisoners may not happen overnight, but if the will is there, this can still be accomplished relatively quickly. The same is true for ensuring the freedom of assembly. Making this right accessible to the opposition promptly is both achievable and essential. On the other hand, the dynamics surrounding freedom of speech, and notably freedom of association, are more intricate. Merely passing relevant laws isn't enough to guarantee these constitutional rights. True freedom of speech will materialize only after profound shifts in the governance, supervision, and potentially ownership patterns of the media. As for freedom of association, it will become a reality only after parties evolve into structured political units, a complex journey that demands substantial effort.

Elections can indeed be a powerful driving force for party-building at the local level. Following this rationale, the electoral journey should begin with municipal deputy elections rather than national ones. I believe this approach would be immensely advantageous and should be considered as a top priority.

National elections, whether parliamentary or for a constituent assembly, shouldn't be viewed in such a manner. They need a clear and comprehensible framework of political choices for voters. Crafting this framework takes time.

Author: Grigory Golosov

The views expressed by the author may not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board.