Immunity from the military: How Russia's power vertical resists career advancement of the “special military operation” participants

by Andrey Pertsev

Vladimir Putin refers to participants in the war as the "true elite," with the presidential administration's political block establishing a special recruitment competition called "Hero Time" for them, and the United Russia party providing preferential conditions for their nomination as deputies. The most high-profile 'military' appointment of recent times is the transfer of the speaker of the parliament of the annexed DPR, Artyom Zhoga, to the post of Presidential Envoy to the Ural Federal District. However, based on the results of regional elections, it’s clear that the system is not ready to place "front-line soldiers" in significant positions, and the military themselves are in no hurry to pursue deputy roles, which are often unpaid.

Impressive Numbers?

According to official figures from United Russia, 308 war participants became deputies following the regional elections 2024. This number may seem impressive until one realizes that a total of 35,000 mandates were up for grabs on election day, meaning the front-line participants only secured 1% of the mandates. Only 34 members of the military have been elected to regional parliaments across 13 regions, and even this number is misleading — one-third of these seats came from "special" territories such as annexed Sevastopol (6 seats) and Crimea (5 seats). In the rest of Russia, only 20 military personnel were elected, and not a single front-line soldier made it to the Moscow City Duma. Moreover, those who were elected were not given a significant role in their respective legislatures.

In the early 2000s, many regional parliamentary seats were paid positions, allowing independent local politicians to represent voter interests. However, the Kremlin soon realized the danger of this and started phasing out MPs' salaries. Now only positions such as spokesperson, deputy spokesperson and committee chairperson remain paid roles, and even these are limited. As a result, the majority of deputies today are either prominent state employees — such as school or hospital directors — or businesspeople with close ties to the government. For these individuals, parliamentary work is either a form of public service or a platform for lobbying their business interests. Naturally, this group overwhelmingly supports both federal and regional initiatives.

None of the newly elected speakers and deputy speakers of the regional parliaments are war participants. Instead, speakers have either retained their positions or been replaced by regional or federal officials. For example, in the Republic of Altai, the parliament is now headed by a former regional official, while in Khabarovsk, the new speaker is a former federal inspector. Committee head positions were also filled by prominent local United Russia members, with the exception of Sevastopol, where two committees are headed by front-line soldiers. However, this is a unique case due to the city’s annexed and militarized status. Additionally, some military-elected deputies have even declined their mandates, as happened in Tuva.

At the municipal level, there are even fewer paid positions, typically limited to chairpersons, and municipal councils have minimal authority. Municipal budgets are often deficit-ridden and highly dependent on subsidies from higher levels of government, which makes the role of municipal deputy unattractive, especially in small towns or rural areas.

Exceptions to the Rule

The situation is slightly better in regional capitals and large cities, but even here municipal councils are often dominated by businesspeople looking to secure municipal contracts for road repair, building maintenance, and public transport services. These people are not keen to welcome outsiders. For military personnel who do not have their own businesses in these sectors, the idea of an underpaid public role is also likely to be unappealing. One exception is the appointment of Colonel Evgeny Chintsov, described by state media as a war participant, as speaker of the Nizhny Novgorod City Duma — a position of status in a city with a population of over one million. However, a closer look at Chintsev's biography shows that he was already part of the local elite, having commanded the Nizhny Novgorod garrison before the war.

There are also examples of military officials advancing politically long before the invasion of Ukraine. For instance , General Vladimir Shamanov once led the Ulyanovsk region, and Admiral Sergey Menyailo governed the annexed Sevastopol before becoming the presidential envoy to the Siberian Federal District and later head of North Ossetia.

The system also provides some token cases of promotion, such as the appointment of Russian Hero Yuri Nimchenko, a participant in the invasion of Ukraine, as a senator from the annexed Crimea. However, these exceptions only highlight the broader reality that military careers in politics remain limited despite official rhetoric. Additionally, a career military officer, Amyr Argamakov, became a senator from the Republic of Altai. It should be noted, however, that both Nimchenko's and Argamakov's appointments are special cases. Crimea is generally considered a special territory of Russia, and its leadership has long been trying to please Putin with conservative initiatives. The head of Altai, Andrey Turchak, has fallen out of favor with the president and would like to rehabilitate himself — promoting a military figure to the Federation Council is one way of doing so.

The same pattern is observed for military appointments to government positions, which are equally rare. For example, Sergei Efremov, commander of the volunteer battalion "Tiger" from Primorsky Krai, became vice-governor of his region, while Alexander Surazov took over the sports and youth committee in the Republic of Altai. In Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Ruslan Alexandrov was appointed district head. However, most of these individuals were already officials before going to the front. Vice-Governor Efremov was a deputy mayor of a major city, and Ruslan Alexandrov worked in the district administration before the war. Similarly, Alexey Kondratiev, a former mayor of Tambov who went to war, became a senator from the Kursk region. So far, the highest-ranking position among military figures has been given to the speaker of the parliament of the annexed DPR, Artyom Zhoga, who became the Presidential Envoy to the Ural Federal District. However, this position does not hold significant influence within the power vertical, and sources from the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that Zhoga was sent to the Urals due to his conflict with the head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin. Last year, the speaker of the parliamentary assembly was the formal author of the proposal for Putin to run for another term and was appointed co-chairman of his official campaign headquarters. As a result, Pushilin saw him as a potential rival for the regional leadership.

Outsiders Not Welcome

Russian authorities frequently talk about promoting military personnel. President Putin shows them special attention, calling them “the true elite” and probably genuinely believes this. His subordinates, eager to stay in favor, follow his lead. The head of the Presidential Administration's political block organizes the "Hero Time" competition for participants in the invasion of Ukraine, while United Russia provides them with advantages in primaries. Governors report the appointment of front-line soldiers to administrative positions. All of this has been the subject of widespread media coverage, both by the government and the opposition. For the former, it's part of their contract with Putin's circle, while for the latter, it’s a fear-inducing news item that resonates with their critical audience. Sometimes the news seems absurd — federal media will report on the appointment of a rural district head in Khanty-Mansi or the head of a sports committee in sparsely populated Altai.

A closer look reveals that military personnel are not even significantly integrated even into the regional elite. The system has developed an "immunity" against such appointments, keeping outsiders at bay. To participate in the "Hero Time" competition, candidates need managerial experience, and many of the front-runners are already established figures, such as former Krasnodar mayor Yevgeny Pervyshov. Those climbing the career ladder are usually current officials and deputies who volunteer for the war, knowing it could boost their careers. What they do at the front is unclear — there are no reports of officials or parliamentarians dying in combat. But they return with a valuable addition to their résumés .

The system is willing to allocate a small number of deputy seats, but the status of a deputy has been devalued in recent years, and most roles are unpaid. Paid positions are of interest to the existing elite, and here the rule applies again — "outsiders are not welcome". Consequently, the additional unpaid public burden does not interest military personnel, who earn well at the front, and the power vertical does not allow them to advance further. For now, the promotion of military personnel remains a loud PR project for the political block of the presidential administration and the governors aligned with it. They aim to fulfil two objectives: showing that they are responding to the president's wishes, while also reassuring the rank-and-file "front-line soldiers" that they won’t be forgotten after the war. The solution is simple: individuals already within the system, who went to the front, are being presented as military personnel climbing the career ladder.