Opposition coalition: A good thing or “To hell with it”?

This article belongs to a series of op-eds by Dr. Grigory Golosov, a political science expert, published by the online magazine Holod, an independent Russian socio-political media. The series is dedicated to post-Putin Russia and possible scenarios of regime change. Here we present a translation of the original article in Russian that came out on 29 September 2023.

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On September 25, supporters of Alexei Navalny published a large text in which he, among other things, rejected a coalition with the rest of the opposition. On the same day, Maxim Katz released a video where he disagreed with Navalny and called on “dissenters” to unite before the presidential elections in 2024. The “Holod” Magazine asked the political scientist Grigory Golosov to explain which strategy is more effective, and whether political coalitions in modern Russia make any sense at all.

The Tradition Not to Unite

The topic of opposition coalition has reappeared in the Russian public space - or rather, what's left of it. This is a habitual topic that makes us remember the game that the Russian authorities have been playing with the opposition since the late 1990s. The rules of this game were as follows: Russia's democratic and liberal forces were divided into two - the “Yabloko” party on one hand and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and its successor organizations on the other hand. These two forces were somehow related in their ideological views; however, they also had deep, unbridgeable differences. And this naturally destined them to compete intensively during the election campaigns.

Before every election the media have raised the question of a “coalition of democratic forces”. But since it was impossible to create such a coalition, the second step of the information campaign inevitably led to the statement that the democrats were quarrelsome, couldn’t come to an agreement even among each other, and therefore not ready to govern the country responsibly. Against this background, the Russian authorities favorably emphasized their monolithic unity and cohesion around the leader. Indeed, the party “United Russia” did not need to negotiate coalitions with anyone. It simply absorbed its competitors (for example, the party “Fatherland” and the “Agrarian Party”) or excluded them from the elections.

It would seem that this game is a thing of the past. United Russia's electoral victories are now achieved in a different way, and the characters once included in the scenario described above are no longer the same. However, the topic of a “coalition of democratic forces” still comes up from time to time - and now it doesn’t look like a strategy of the authorities. Most likely, some Russian oppositionists want to remind of themselves, but can’t come up with anything new; so they play on memories of the traditional democratic electorate.

The Tradition to Unite

I don’t think that the topic of coalition politics is important in the current Russian situation. In a broader sense though, it is certainly not only worthy of discussion, but has long been discussed by academic political scientists. However, the focus of their attention has always been on coalitions in parliaments - that is, after the elections have taken place. In parliamentary systems, especially when combined with a multiparty system, coalition politics is crucial for the formation of function governments. In presidential systems, it is less important, but still plays a significant role in ensuring the effectiveness of the legislative process.

Electoral coalitions are also possible in the democracy, for sure. This is a relatively rare phenomenon though; it depends on the electoral system and the structure of inter-party competition whether such coalitions are possible or not. However, I will not further elaborate on this thesis, since the motives that induce parties to coalition strategies in a democracy have nothing in common with the political reality of contemporary Russia.

Nevertheless, pre-election coalitions can sometimes emerge under authoritarianism as well. To analyze this phenomenon, let us figure out first why they are created at all.

Is Boycott a Good Idea for Coalitions?

Let me start by saying that the most common form of pre-election coalitions under authoritarianism is a coalition of parties boycotting the elections. Of course, we are not talking about abstention appeals to voters by politicians who can’t participate in the elections. Unfortunately, in Russia the words “boycotting the elections” have exactly this very meaning. No, we are talking about a unanimous strategy of parties that have both the right and opportunity to compete for power in elections, but deliberately refuse to do so, referring to the electoral process being unfair.

At the same time, boycott is one of the least effective strategies of the anti-dictatorial opposition. Following the results of campaigns boycotted by the opposition, the ruling forces, having won the presidency and/or a huge parliamentary majority, consider such results not just as a victory, but as a mandate to suppress the opposition, referring to its lack of electoral support.

Such coalition strategy is only justified if the united opposition has reasonable grounds to believe that the people won’t recognize the election results, take to the streets at their call and overthrow the regime. This scenario is not absolutely improbable, but it has hardly ever come true. And indeed, if the opposition is strong enough to spirit the people up to revolt, why should it boycott the elections at all? It makes more sense to participate in the elections and, if their results are falsified by the authorities, to call the people to protest. That’s how the Yellow Revolution took place in 1986 in the Philippines.

How Can a United Opposition Participate in Elections?

The Philippine case, however, is quite unusual. In the vast majority of cases, coalitions of opposition parties that aimed to win the elections have not succeeded. The reason is quite simple and obvious: authoritarian elections are not organized for the autocrat to lose them. They are organized for exactly the opposite reason: to once again reinforce the autocrat's right to stay at power by the “will of the people” - and thereby strengthen the regime and secure it from coup attempts by factions of the ruling group (mainly the security forces) that see the existing order as threatening their position or simply not favorable enough for themselves.

This seems to be contradicted by the fact that in some cases the opposition did manage to win authoritarian elections. Such cases were few, and they are thoroughly studied. The general conclusion that researchers come to is that the opposition – be it a coalition of opposition parties or a single party that enjoys the support of the majority of voters – wins authoritarian elections only when the regime is ready to lose them. This usually happens when the regime itself has already entered the phase of collapse. The collapse can be caused by loss of control over the electoral process, an external shock or a successful struggle of the opposition. More often, it is a combination of these factors.

How to Act if Putin Weakens?

Russia is not experiencing anything like this, and the probability of such a situation occurring in upcoming five months can be assessed as negligible.

Suppose, however, that by some miraculous coincidence it does turn out that Vladimir Putin not only does not run in the elections, but also fails to define a plausible successor, at least one conditionally supported by the other members of the ruling group. I will even not rule out the far-fetched possibility that Putin will remain on the ballot, but will lose control over the situation, i.e. de facto lose power. In other words, the regime will indeed enter the phase of collapse, and the “black swan” will arrive not someday, but just before the elections.

I believe that such a turn of events would put the opposition coalition before a really difficult choice. After all, should the assumptions made above come true, the coalition would have to support those candidates allowed to run: from the CPRF, Just Russia, and the LDPR. I hardly believe that a candidate from the “New People” party will be allowed to run, and I not even remotely believe in a candidate from the “Yabloko” party. Should someone identified by the media as a “liberal” get on the ballot at all, it will be someone far worse than Alexei Nechaev or Grigory Yavlinsky – a really repulsive and/or pathetic character.

Now that all conceivable and inconceivable, plausible and far-fetched scenarios have been taken into account, let's sum up the results. If the authorities win the elections (which is most likely to happen), the state propagandists will only have to state that the “liberals” have once again failed in their coalition endeavors. This is not to say that such propaganda does not influence critical citizens at all. It does, because it supports the general atmosphere of faithlessness and pessimism that already prevails among the opposition's supporters.

Should the “black swan” arrive all of a sudden, the country will be left with a president chosen according to the principle of negative selection, who will feel the least obliged to the hypothetical “opposition coalition”. Such an outcome, if we strain our imagination and try to visualize it, would evoke a wide range of emotions among critical citizens, from embarrassment to bitter disappointment, but these emotions would certainly not be positive.

In fact, if we take the “black swan” scenario seriously, the reasonable tactic of the opposition would be to demand the cancelation of the elections and negotiations with the authorities. This would eventually bring citizens to the polls, but not straight away; rather after the basic demands have been met and completely different rules have been set. I have already shared my opinion on the meaning of such negotiations in an earlier publication.

It would indeed be useful to create a coalition of opposition forces to make such an agenda come true – as it has been done in Hungary in the summer of 1989. At that time, Hungarian opposition groups were weak, in conflict with each other, and held different views: not only liberal, but also nationalist and moderate-left. The authorities tried to turn the fragmentation of the opposition in their favor, but the oppositionists decided to create an “Opposition Roundtable” and put forward their demands to the authorities in solidarity, leaving their own differences behind – till the time they would have to defend their positions before the voters in a fair election campaign. This strategy proved to be quite successful.

Let’s get back to the Russian reality though. Most likely, the upcoming elections will be what they have been for the past 15 years: an expensive exercise in preserving the current government. The second aspect of authoritarian elections will not disappear either: they always open a window of opportunity for the opposition, creating a platform for political discussions, campaigning, and organizational work. There won’t be much space on this platform. The times of nationwide campaigns with a single strategy (like “smart voting”) are over. However, in some regions and cities, in some social environments, the window of opportunity is still open.

The diversity of these potentially permissive situations requires a specific approach to each of them. Local strategies may well yield results – perhaps limited, but valuable as an investment in the future. By definition, however, only those opposition groups and individual politicians who have resources on the ground and are willing to bear the risks associated with using them can benefit from this investment. No coalition strategy is required for that.

Author: Grigory Golosov

The views expressed by the author may not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board.