Report: COVID-19 pandemic and war have not altered the funding system of Russian political parties

The past five years have been marked by ongoing social crisis in Russia and extensive political changes. Under unprecedented restrictions on basic human rights and freedoms (notably freedom of movement and freedom of assembly), Russia held a national vote on constitutional amendments in 2020 and the State Duma elections in 2021. The war against Ukraine has further intensified political restrictions and Kremlin repression against opposition-minded Russians. These circumstances formed the backdrop for the 2024 presidential election.

The party system in Russia is experiencing a worsening crisis: the dominance of the ruling party has strengthened, and the ability of other political parties to represent the interests of diverse voter groups has notably weakened. This crisis, however, has barely impacted the funding system of political parties.

The Golos movement’s recent report reveals that, in modern Russia, the rules meant to ensure financial transparency of political parties for the public are not functioning as intended. Parties have become more secretive to their voters and have learned to circumvent legal restrictions aimed to protect voters' rights.

The primary conclusion of the report is that the current political party funding system in Russia facilitates the dominance of a single political party. It does not foster political competition or equality among parties, which are essential for meaningful public discourse — a prerequisite for the development of voters' free will.

Key findings

1. The income of United Russia surpasses the combined income of all other political parties by 1.8 times, making up 67% of the total revenue of all political parties over the past four years. The closest competitor, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), earns 5.4 times less. The "parliamentary five" — United Russia, CPRF, The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Just Russia, and New People — collectively accounts for over 94% of the total income of all parties. Only the Pensioners’ Party and Yabloko come close in terms of funding, but their income comes irregularly, typically increasing only during major elections.

2. While state funding is intended to promote competition, it actually contributes to inequality among parties. Nearly half (48%) of all parties’ revenue — affecting both parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties — comes from the state budget, though only the "parliamentary five" benefit from these funds. Of this budgetary support, almost 60% goes to United Russia. Restrictions on private donations, capped at 4.33 billion rubles per party per year, further widen this inequality, leaving other parties unable to match the ruling party’s budget.

3. The current system of public financial reports of political parties only partially fulfills the goal of public oversight. Over the past decade, financial transparency has declined. This decline is largely due to the increasing dominance of various foundations and non-profit organizations (NPOs) among official party donors. The origins of funds of these foundations and NPOs remain undisclosed. For example, in 2023, United Russia received over 1.2 billion rubles (around 12 million euros, or 12.5% of its total income) in donations from affiliated foundations. Additionally, the party received about 1 billion rubles (approximately 10 million euros) from foundations in the form of interest-free loans, effectively bypassing legal donation limits. Other political parties also use this strategy of channeling donations through NPOs and foundations, which serve as intermediaries. In some cases, such as with Yabloko, this approach can be attributed to safety concerns — many individuals are reluctant to openly support a party advocating for peace during an ongoing military conflict with Ukraine.

4. Political parties in Russia often act as financial intermediaries, allowing them to obscure the identities of donors supporting specific politicians during election campaigns. Sponsors' funds for a politician are first directed to the party's account, which then channels these funds into the appropriate campaign funds. Under current laws, information about such funding through these foundations only becomes publicly accessible nine months after the election date. Consequently, voters cannot determine who financially supports the campaigns of a particular party or candidate during the election period. This method also enables parties to circumvent donation limits for candidates, as the contributions appear to come directly from the party itself rather than individual donors.

5. The absence of the ultimate owner concept in the legislation also makes it possible to circumvent restrictions on the maximum size of donations. As a result, parties frequently receive large donations from multiple legal entities owned by, or connected to, a single individual or group. As a result, the owner manages to donate more than the amount allowed by law to the party's account.

6. Donations from private individuals are also commonly used to mask actual sources of funding and to evade donation limits. There are numerous instances of large donations made by individuals who most likely don’t have the financial means to do so — such as pensioners, municipal and state employees, students, and party staff members.

7. An analysis of donations to political parties has revealed cases of what appear to be "coordinated" or "imitative" campaigns. The Golos movement identified at least six legal entities that contributed substantial donations to multiple parties. The Pensioners’ Party stood out as the party with the highest number of shared donors with other parties, suggesting its role as a "spoiler" party. Four of its donors also supported other parties, including Just Russia, Civilian Power, the Communist Party (CPRF), New People, Motherland (Rodina), and United Russia.