Residents of Russia-Occupied East Ukrainian Territories Encouraged to Vote in 2021 State Duma Elections
15.09.2021
Author: Anton Shekhovtsov
One aspect of the Russian parliamentary elections that are taking place on 17-19 September 2021 that differentiates them from all the previous elections is the potential participation in the voting process of dozens of thousands of people located on the Ukrainian territories outside of the control of the Ukrainian authorities and not recognized as part of Russia by the Russian Federation itself. The territories in question do not include Crimea and Sevastopol, which Russia annexed in March 2014 and since then considers them its own territorial units, but involve what the Ukrainian authorities refer to as 'certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.' Neither Ukraine nor Russia or the larger international community recognizes independence and sovereignty of those areas, but they do consider themselves to be 'Donetsk People's Republic' and 'Lugansk People's Republic', and, for the ease of convenience, we will hereinafter refer to them as 'DPR' and 'LPR'.
The participation in the Russian elections of dozens of thousands of people residing in the 'DPR' and 'LPR' effectively occupied by the Russian Federation became possible due to the executive order1 signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 24 April 2019. The order established that 'permanent residents from certain districts of Ukraine's Donetsk and Lugansk regions [were] entitled to a fast-track procedure when applying for the Russian Federation citizenship.'
It must be stressed that Putin signed that executive order just a few days after the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as Ukraine's president, and some European officials2 and commentators3 justly noted that the order was both a challenge and a test that Moscow used to hit the newly elected and rather inexperienced Kyiv leadership. The EU expressed4 'its utmost concern' about Putin's executive order. At the same time, Ukraine and Western states declined to recognize the legitimacy of the passports issued to Ukrainians in the 'DPR' and 'LPR'. The situation turned out to be almost identical to that involving Russian passports issued to Ukrainians in annexed Crimea: neither Ukraine nor the Western community recognizes them as legitimate. In order to avoid restrictions, Russian officials would issue Russian passports registered in either Krasnodarskiy Krai or Rostov Oblast, which borders Ukraine, to the residents of Crimea, 'DPR', and 'LPR'.
The number of 'new Russian citizens' in the 'DPR'/'LPR' is difficult to ascertain, and even Russian authorities disagree on the exact numbers. In February 2021, the head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior in the Rostov Oblast Oleg Agarkov declared5 that 639 thousand Russian passports had been issued to 'DPR'/'LPR' residents through the fast-track procedure. However, speaking several months later, in July 2021, Viktor Vodolatsky, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots, said6 that the number of 'DPR'/'LPR' residents with Russian passports amounted to 611 thousand. According to the 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities, the number of inhabitants of the 'republics' was7 3.4 million in July 2021.
In 2020, residents of the 'DPR' and 'LPR' already had an experience of participating in a Russian plebiscite. The latter was not an election but the 'all-Russian voting' on amendments to the Russian constitution that took place between 25 June and 1 July 2020. At that time, 230 thousand residents of the 'DPR' and 'LPR' reportedly had8 Russian passports. For those of them willing to vote, 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities would organize special bus services to/from polling stations located in the Rostov Oblast.
However, 'new Russian citizens' were not particularly active in the voting process. For example, out of 112 thousand9 of those 'citizens' in the 'DPR', only 14.5 thousand10 took part in the plebiscite in summer 2020. Several factors contributed to the disproportionately low number of those who participated in the 'all-Russian voting': (1) many 'DPR'/'LPR' residents obtained Russian passports to be able to work in the Russian Federation and were physically absent from the 'DPR'/'LPR' during the plebiscite; (2) the COVID-19 pandemic discouraged many people from long-distance travels; and (3) those willing to take part in the 'all-Russian voting' had to pay for their bus tickets to/from the Rostov Oblast.
In July 2021, Russia's Central Election Committee announced11 that 'DPR'/'LPR' residents holding Russian passports would be able to take part in the Russian parliamentary elections with the help of remote electronic voting (REV). REV was first tested in Russia in 2019. Since then, experts have identified12 several major flaws and weaknesses of the Russian controversial REV system:
- It was possible to track people's voting behaviour as the private key for decoding the votes was accessible;
- There were significant differences between the results of the traditional voting and those of REV with regard to candidates supported by the ruling United Russia party;
- Observers were technically limited in their capacity to monitor potential violations of the integrity of the voting process;
- Voters' personal data was not sufficiently protected;
- Voters were able to vote twice or with invalid passports;
- The blockchain-based voting system used by REV is non-transparent and controlled by the authorities or state-backed companies.
In order to take part in the elections with the help of REV, one needs to have a top-level account registered with Gosuslugi, or the Public Services Portal of the Russian Federation. To register such an account, users need to present passport details and a personal insurance policy number (known by the Russian acronym SNILS) and then verify their identity at a multiservice centre or through a Russian bank online client account. However, 'DPR'/'LPR' holders of Russian passports encountered two significant problems:
- Holding a Russian passport does not automatically imply obtaining SNILS (SNILS is largely used for pensions payment, and 'DPR'/'LPR' residents are not eligible13 to receive Russian pensions without being officially registered on the territory of the Russian Federation);
- Verifying an account with Gosuslugi requires having a phone number operated by a Russian company, i.e., a phone number starting with a '+7' calling code.
To solve these problems, Russian authorities, in close cooperation with the puppet regimes in the DPR'/'LPR', implemented the following measures:
- While collecting their passports at issuing points in the Rostov Oblast, 'new Russian citizens' now simultaneously obtain SNILS and a Gosulugi account;
- The 'DPR''s mobile provider Phoenix started migration from the Ukrainian +38 calling code to the Russian one (the 'LPR''s Lugacom operator started this migration already in 2019);
- The procedure of identity verification was simplified for 'new Russian citizens.' In addition to phone numbers issued by Russian mobile operators, they can14 use e-mail accounts registered in the Russian .ru domain zone.
Furthermore, 'DPR'/'LPR' regimes started providing centralized information services on obtaining SNILS by 'new Russian citizens' through special offices: around 141 'Information centres' coordinated by the 'Peace for Lugansk' Social Movement in the 'LPR' and around 255 'Single registration centres' operated by the 'DPR''s 'Ministry of Justice.' In the 'DPR', holders of Russian passports can also obtain SNILS at human resources offices at their places of work or military service, migration departments, and public reception offices of the 'Donetsk Republic' organization. They can also receive information on SNILS through the so-called 'Information Centre 357': they need to call a short number 357 from a number registered with the Phoenix mobile provider.
While the 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities are in charge of organizing 'information services' on obtaining SNILS locally, from the Russian side, the entire process is reportedly supervised by Viktor Vodolatsky.
By the beginning of August 2021, according to the 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities, 148 thousand15 'new Russian citizens' obtained SNILS in the 'DPR', and 158 thousand16 – in the 'LPR'. This means that around 9% of the entire population of the 'DPR'/'LPR' have Russian personal insurance policy numbers. Still, it does not mean that all of them (1) successfully registered with Gosuslugi and (2) will eventually vote. According to different estimates17,18, around 100-150 thousand holders of Russian passports located in the 'DPR'/'LPR' are eligible to take part in the Russian parliamentary elections through REV, but the number of actual electronic voters is likely to be lower than 100 thousand.
In addition to REV system, some 'new Russian citizens' of the 'DPR'/'LPR' will also be taken by buses and trains to the Rostov Oblast, where they will be able to cast their votes at 16 polling stations19 established specifically for them. It is expected that around 18-20 thousand people can be transported to the Rostov Oblast to take part in the elections physically.
In an attempt to avoid additional Western sanctions against the Russian Federation, there will be no polling stations on the territories controlled by the 'DPR'/'LPR' regimes, but the authorities have established so-called 'information centres'20 where consultants will help eligible voters cast their vote through REV.
'New Russian citizens' will only be able to cast their votes for federal party lists, but they will be unable to vote for candidates in single-member districts as Russia does not officially recognize the 'DPR'/'LPR' as its own territorial units. Experts have little doubts21 that – among 'DPR'/'LPR' voters – the ruling United Russia party will score significantly better than any other Russian party allowed to run in the parliamentary elections. Moreover, it is viable to predict that United Russia will receive substantively more votes from 'new Russian citizens' than in Russia on average. The major reason for the overwhelming support for United Russia in the 'DPR'/'LPR' is the conviction22 that only Russia can solve existential problems of the 'DPR'/'LPR', so by showing loyalty to the Russian ruling party, 'new Russian citizens' of the occupied territories believe to be investing in their own future. It must be stressed here, however, that only a tiny minority of the population of the 'DPR'/'LPR', around 3%, are likely to take part in the Russian elections.
Ukraine's Foreign Ministry expectedly expressed its 'resolute protest'23 over Russia's decision to engage 'DPR'/'LPR' residents in the Russian parliamentary elections calling the corresponding developments in occupied territories of eastern Ukraine, as well as in annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, 'a flagrant violation of norms and principles of international law, the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian legislation in force.' Ukraine also called on the international community to condemn Russia's actions and not to recognize the results of the election in the Russia-occupied and annexed Ukrainian territories.
1 http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/60358
4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu
9 https://dnews.dn.ua/news/750687
10 https://dnews.dn.ua/news/751021
11 https://tass.ru/obschestvo/11941101
3 https://www.novorosinform.org
5 https://t.me/melkonyants/918
