Statement on the Russian presidential elections 2024

The text is based on the Golos report on the results of observation of the presidential election of the Russian Federation on 17 March 2024.

MAIN CONSLUSIONS

Over 24 years of Vladimir Putin's rule, presidential elections have demonstrated a kind of anti-standard in conducting electoral campaigns. However, there has never been a presidential campaign that so blatantly disregarded constitutional standards. The campaign took place in a situation where the fundamental articles of the Constitution guaranteeing political rights and freedoms were essentially invalid, and the Constitution itself was amended four years before the elections to once again bypass the presidential limit of more than two terms in office. The basic constitutional safeguard against the usurpation of power was dismantled.

The leitmotif of these elections has become the word "imitation":

• imitation of legality
• imitation of choice
• imitation of agitation
• imitation of opposition participation in the struggle for power
• imitation of openness and transparency
• imitation of observation (including "public" observation)
• imitation of the independence of electoral commissions
• imitation of the sovereignty of the people.

The only thing that was not imitated was violence against the people. We have encountered a situation where, through the use of force or under the threat of its use, paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the Constitution of Russia has essentially been violated. The article states that "no one can appropriate power in the Russian Federation." The elections took place under conditions where the state system, which is supposed to be politically neutral and act in the interests of society, in reality engaged in propaganda, coercion, and control over voters. Military censorship, which was implemented through fear and force, actually emerged in the country. People stopped discussing politics - even in the kitchen, even with neighbors and loved ones.

The climax came on the last day of voting when, in some regions, representatives of law enforcement agencies controlled the expression of voters' will, punished them for "incorrect" inscriptions on the ballot or "incorrect" time of arrival at the polling station, and even demanded to reveal the secrecy of the vote. Nothing like this had ever happened on such a scale before in Russian elections.

Even in such conditions, the organizers of the elections were afraid to conduct voting and vote counting procedures openly and honestly. Everything possible was done to limit society's ability to conduct the observation on voting days. Genuine impartial observation was attempted to be replaced by "observers from public chambers", internationally recognized observation from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of OSCE - with specially selected "international electoral experts", and video surveillance was effectively closed off, denying voters access to video broadcasts from polling stations. The absence of independent observers and the created conditions preventing openness and publicity of electoral procedures made it practically impossible to exercise real public control over these elections and to evaluate the scale of actually confirmed falsifications.

All this has made it impossible to form and express the free will of voters, to achieve reliable results of the election. The current elections failed to fulfill their main function - to give an idea of the real opinions of citizens. People were not allowed to make decisions about the future of the country independently and freely.

1. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

The recent electoral campaign was characterized by the following distinctive features.

1.1. Legislative Manipulations Prior to the Elections

The presidential elections in Russia in 2024 were conducted based on legislation significantly different from that which governed the previous elections in 2018. Changes to the Federal Law "On the Election of the President" were made 11 times between 2018 and 2023, with a total of 52 out of 87 articles of this law being amended.

Under the pretext of "voter convenience", two highly non-transparent forms of voting were introduced - remote electronic voting and multi-day voting. Both of them (especially the REV) are poorly controlled by the public, but they do facilitate administrative coercion of voters and provide wide opportunities for falsification.

The key legislative change in the presidential election legislation of Russia, which radically affected the entire political system, was the amendment to the Constitution of Russia adopted in 2020. This amendment granted the incumbent head of state the exclusive right to be re-elected for a third and fourth consecutive term (and for a fifth and sixth term overall).

It is this amendment, which does not comply with democratic standards of succession of power, that created the conditions for the actual appropriation and retention of power.

1.2. Manipulations with Limiting Passive Electoral Rights

Excessive requirements imposed by the amended laws on the procedure for nominating candidates led to significant restrictions on the passive electoral rights of Russians and artificially reduced competition in the presidential elections.

Thus, the process of collecting signatures for candidates was significantly complicated. It took place in conditions of administrative, financial, and informational inequality and with a large number of serious violations. The refusal to register Boris Nadezhdin demonstrated that departmental instructions and regulations developed by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs effectively substituted electoral legislation, and the unsupported opinions of experts replaced the will of the voters. The dropout of candidates at the registration stage turned out to be the highest compared to the campaigns of 2012 and 2018.

As a result, the incumbent head of state had the smallest number of competitors in Russian history, and the candidates themselves were the least known and least popular.

1.3 Lack of conditions for free political debate

During the pre-election campaign, severe restrictions on freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom to form political associations, comparable to those imposed during a state of war, were de facto in force throughout the country. Repressions are taking place in the country, with opponents of the authorities being put in prisons where they die.

The introduction of military censorship, including its legislative implementation, is of particular importance for the current campaign. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the situation regarding freedom of expression significantly deteriorated. Now, when covering the war in Ukraine, the media are obliged to use only official information from the Russian state authorities under the threat of blocking. The Prosecutor General's Office has almost unlimited powers to block websites. As a result, almost all media outlets that could broadcast a point of view different from the official one and the largest independent social networks, except for YouTube and Telegram, have been blocked in Russia. The strongest impact on freedom of speech was made by the adoption of articles in the Russian Criminal Code for "spreading fakes about the army" and "discrediting the army".

As a result of these legislative innovations, it became impossible to criticize the main political decision of the incumbent president and one of the candidates in the elections, namely the decision to start a war against Ukraine and incorporate "new territories" into Russia. Any criticism of this decision has become almost equivalent to state treason and leads to administrative and criminal prosecution with enormous prison sentences.

The restriction on holding mass events, which has been in place since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, continues to seriously hinder the implementation of citizens' rights and freedoms. This restriction still remains in force even after other limitations were canceled by Rospotrebnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare).

Repression for dissent is being carried out in Russia. Public criticism of the authorities, especially the policies of the incumbent president, is interpreted in society and perceived by law enforcement as unlawful. At the same time, demonstrations of loyalty are encouraged in every possible way. An atmosphere of fear is being fostered, and opposition activity is equated with state treason.

In such conditions, the media and candidates were unable to fulfill their social role in creating conditions for public discussion. Instead, they became allies of the authorities in attempting to "hide" these elections from voters. The amount of airtime dedicated to the elections decreased by 1.6 times compared to 2018. Many media outlets, including regional ones, hardly discussed the campaign and candidates at all, and if they did, they did not adhere to the principle of equal rights for candidates. For example, in news programs on federal television channels, Vladimir Putin was mentioned seven times more often than all other three candidates combined.

At the same time, the mass media and state and local self-government bodies and their officials tried to substitute the election campaign with informing about the work of the incumbent president, using official resources and budget funds for hidden and open agitation for the incumbent president.

1.4 Coercing voters to vote

The pressure on voters to vote in 2024 has reached its peak and has become blatant. The scale of coercion this time is unprecedented, even against the background to which Russia is already accustomed.

During the 2024 presidential campaign, the main focus of the election organizers was made on the administrative drive to the polls of controlled voters, in whose loyalty the organizers of coercion were confident. The forms of voting introduced after the previous presidential elections, namely multi-day and remote electronic voting, also helped them in this illegal pressure. This can be seen very well when analyzing the official voter turnout data. By the end of the first day, voter turnout in remote electronic voting exceeded 70%, while in the country as a whole it was over 30%. One of the peculiarities of the REV is that it does not allow to make sure that the voter casts their ballot in an environment that guarantees freedom and secrecy of expression. Under the pretext of "voter convenience," lawmakers effectively legalized voting at the workplace, that is, the convenience of administrative coercion and managerial control over voters.

On election days, there were also reports from voters that provide undeniable evidence that budgetary, state-owned organizations, state-owned companies and bureaucratic structures in Moscow received information about who of their employees voted through the REV. Organizations were questioned for their employees' poor turnout, and lists of those who had voted were sent to the management.

Every effort was made to prevent voters from slipping out of control. As a result, administrative mobilization was carried out not only in state-owned enterprises or in the public sector but also in private companies that do not have a direct relationship with the state.

2. RESULTS OF OBSERVATION DURING THE VOTING DAYS OF 15-17 MARCH

2.1. Limitation of observation opportunities during the elections

Since 2018, the possibilities for citizens to monitor elections have been significantly reduced. Firstly, the status of commissioners with consultative vote at the level of PECs and TECs, where their presence was an effective way to combat violations of the law, has been abolished. Secondly, there has been serious intervention in the work of media editorial offices aimed at limiting their ability to cover the elections. Now, freelance journalists are not allowed to be present at the counting of votes and summarizing the results.

In the run-up to the voting days the very institution of observation and, even more broadly, the principle of openness and transparency of the electoral commissions was severely damaged. In many regions, candidates and the parties that nominated them effectively denied active citizens the opportunity to go to polling stations as observers. Candidates and parties made no effort to ensure independent oversight of the voting process and the determination of results, and sabotaged the efforts of proactive citizens who offered their assistance in this regard. For the first time in Russian history, no international observers from the OSCE ODIHR were invited at all.

The 2024 campaign took place in conditions of virtually complete political prohibition for candidates and parties to interact with independent observer communities and initiative opposition-minded citizens. It can be stated that the society had no opportunity to exercise real independent control over these elections.

The movement Golos monitored the course of this electoral campaign under conditions when the co-chairman of the movement, Grigory Melkonyants, was actually taken hostage, arrested on fabricated criminal charges related to organizing activities of an undesirable organization on the territory of Russia. Moreover, the authorities explicitly stated that the reason for the persecution were Golos's reports and expertise.

2.2 Non-compliance with voting and counting procedures, signs of falsifications

The absence of independent observers made it virtually impossible for public control and assessment of the scale of actually confirmed falsifications at these elections. During the three days of voting, Golos and the media received reports of possible falsifications, violations of ballot storage rules at night, and other violations from 45 regions. Traditional ballot stuffing and carousel voting were recorded.

The presence of falsifications is also indicated by the preliminary and straightforward analysis of electoral statistics, which revealed anomalies in the turnout at polling stations as early as the first day of voting.

2.3 Violence on election days, damage to ballots and PEC equipment

The past voting days were characterized by an unprecedented level of violence. A distinctive feature of the third day of voting on March 17 were reports by voters that law enforcement officers inside the polling stations began to control the voting process and their admission to the polling premises. Following incidents of ballot papers being stained with coloring substances and arson at polling stations, commissions in some regions removed the curtains from voting booths, and law enforcement officers began to walk behind voters and peer over their shoulders at their ballots. Such reports came from Moscow, Moscow Region, Irkutsk and Izhevsk. In the Moscow suburb of Odintsovo, police officers checked the contents of voters' ballots before they were dropped into the ballot box. At a polling station in Moscow, police officers demanded that the PEC chairperson open the sealed ballot box and hand them one of the ballots containing inscriptions.

In more than 20 regions, there were attempts to set fire to polling stations or to massively damage ballot papers using coloring liquids, which voters tried to pour into the ballot boxes with already filled-out ballots. According to media reports, this occurred in 28 settlements. Thirty-four people were detained in connection with these incidents. Twenty-two individuals were detained for attempting to spoil the ballots with coloring liquids, while ten were detained for attempted arson. Additionally, two people threw a firecracker and a smoke bomb onto the polling stations.

2.4 Breakdowns and malfunctions of remote electronic voting (REV) systems

Golos has repeatedly pointed out that online voting systems at the current level of technological development do not allow for the simultaneous observance of two fundamental principles of voting: its secrecy and the verifiability of the accuracy of the vote count. In addition, in both Russian remote electronic voting (REV) systems (Moscow and national), observers, candidates, and voters could not verify that real voters were casting their votes. Therefore, their use is fundamentally unacceptable.

However, in addition to these fundamental arguments, specific technical problems are consistently highlighted, which the creators of the REV systems fail to solve. From the morning of March 15th until midday, both REV systems experienced a partial outage, causing frustration among voters and observers due to the unavailability of the service. Analysis of file exports from the REV systems revealed an unusual pattern in the distribution of issued ballots during this period. Ballots were issued in irregular clusters, followed by a complete halt in issuance. However, after lunch, there was a sudden surge in the number of ballots issued.

It is also important to highlight the abnormality of the situation where the election organizing commissions (and the electoral commission system as a whole) do not control the online voting systems. This critically violates the principle of independence in their activities.

2.5. Voting in the occupied territories

Unlawful voting in the Russian presidential “election” continues in the occupied territories of Ukraine - Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhya regions. The CEC reported 80 % turnout on these territories overall.

Experts and international community repeatedly emphasized that voting in the occupied Ukrainian regions as well as methods of its realization are illegal. Russian CEC allows voting in the presidential “election” in these territories not only to holders of Russian passports but also to holders of Ukrainian passports and other identity documents, including driver's licenses. Numerous photo and video evidence exist in the media showing that voting is conducted outside voting premises – in the courtyards and car hoods. People in military uniforms holding weapons patrol the polling stations and accompany the ‘mobile’ election commissions. Any respect for electoral rights in the occupied territories is not observed.

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Overall, during the election period, the hotline call center and the "Map of Violations" received over 2000 calls and messages regarding alleged violations of electoral legislation.