The phantom of competition
01.09.2024
by Andrey Pertsev
The political bloc of the Presidential Administration is attempting to present regional elections as a field of competition and struggle, although in reality, no serious confrontation is observed in gubernatorial campaigns or local parliamentary campaigns.
The Kremlin has returned to the theme of "competitive elections" for the first time in many years to let off steam among those dissatisfied with the decline in social welfare. However, in the absence of real competition and rivalry, which cannot be replaced by a semblance of competition, such strategy may backfire.
“Referendum-like” as bad form
The Presidential Administration (AP) is trying to convince the politicized segment of Russian society that the Kremlin is ready to tolerate competition in regional elections, and that the “era of overwhelming victories for government candidates is over.”
The “optimal result” for Kremlin candidates in the 2024 regional governor elections is supposedly 55% of the votes, with anything over 70% considered “bad form.” A favorable outcome for regional parliamentary elections would be electing slightly more than half of the deputies from “United Russia” (both by list and in single-member districts). Such guidelines were given to vice-governors for internal policy at a seminar on election planning that took place in June at the “Senezh” management workshop, where the political bloc of the Presidential Administration holds its events, as quoted by Vedomosti). “Total domination is not the main goal, partly because all political forces should participate in the country's affairs,” a meeting participant told Vedomosti. The agreed-upon single-member districts for candidates from the parliamentary systemic opposition in the Moscow City Duma elections are now being termed “potentially competitive” in the political management jargon.
The words “competition” and “competitive” have not been used by the AP political bloc and United Russia for several years. As Sergey Kiriyenko, Kiriyenko, former head of Rosatom took over the AP’s political bloc, clear KPIs were set for both the presidential and State Duma elections. With each new election, Kiriyenko set record after record of the percentage of votes for Vladimir Putin and United Russia, and gradually, governors were drawn into this race. In the past three years, the results for government candidates typically hovered around 70%, with 55% considered a sign of a problematic campaign, likely necessitating a second round of voting in the region. For example, last year, only in one of 21 electoral regions did the winner officially receive less than 70% of the vote — the Communist head of Khakassia, Valentin Konovalov, against whom the Kremlin unfolded a fierce media campaign. In 9 regions, election commissions gave government-backed candidates more than 80%.
United Russia gains on average 40-50% of the votes by party lists, plus the party takes almost all single-member districts, giving it a “constitutional” majority in regional parliaments. Pro-government experts, commenting on regional campaigns, called them “referendum-like”, acknowledging their plebiscitary non-competitive nature. It is hard to believe that the authorities are ready to voluntarily give up such records and “plebiscites” of approval for government candidates. The results of candidate registration in regional elections confirm this.
Diminishing Candidates
Since the return of direct gubernatorial elections in Russia in 2012, a truly competitive campaign occurred only once. In 2015, the election for the governor of the Irkutsk region was won by Sergey Levchenko, head of the CPRF regional committee. The Kremlin underestimated his figure and allowed a sufficiently popular local politician with elite support and financial resources to register. Neither before nor after Levchenko have similar precedents arisen.
Gubernatorial candidate registration is entirely in the hands of the Kremlin and local administrations, and to get on the ballot, a politician must gather support from 5 to 10% of municipal deputies. Typically, these are United Russia representatives, not only due to the party’s dominance and electoral fraud but also because local council seats are unprestigious and unpaid. Often they become an additional public burden for state employees, who depend on the authorities and certainly will not risk their primary jobs by supporting a Kremlin-unfavored candidate. This has excluded figures like former Bashkirian Prime Minister Rail Sarbayev (2014), popular Tver State Duma deputy from CPRF Vadim Solovyov (2016), and former Transbaikal Territory Vice Premier Alexey Koshelev (2013).
Initially, the so-called “municipal filter” kept strong local elites, ready to financially support systemic parties in exchange for nomination, from running. Meanwhile, the Kremlin was prepared to register high-ranked representatives of parliamentary opposition, such as State Duma deputies, to underscore formal competition. Real competition was difficult to discuss since such candidates often lacked financial resources for a full-fledged campaign. Gradually, the Kremlin and regional administrations simplified their tasks by demanding systemic parties nominate more convenient and “safe” candidates — State Duma deputies were increasingly replaced by regional parliamentarians. In 2018, the scheme failed — in three regions, elections were won by the systemic opposition members previously confirmed with the Kremlin, including LDPR State Duma deputy Sergey Furgal; one region's election results had to be canceled. After this “filtering” became even more thorough, and municipal deputies or little-known figures increasingly appeared on gubernatorial ballots.
This year’s campaign distinctly shows such “diminishing” of candidates. For example, in the Orenburg region, only one candidate has the status of a regional deputy, the same situation in the Transbaikal Territory and Murmansk region. The campaign in the Kemerovo region — an extremely managed region electorally — is characterized by the participation of a district-level municipal deputy nominated by the CPRF. In the Khabarovsk region, the New People party nominated State Duma deputy Roza Chemeris, who has no connection to the region. Chemeris is a prominent figure among the Primorsky Krai elites, whom Khabarovsk residents traditionally see as competitors, especially after the Far Eastern Federal District capital was moved from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok. In five regions (Transbaikal Territory, Saint Petersburg, Orenburg region, Altai Republic, and Lipetsk region), there are no CPRF candidates. Even little-known local CPRF representatives, like Pyotr Bukach in Altai, didn’t pass the filter due to fears that the region’s populace would vote for any CPRF representative out of protest.
The party composition also speaks to the “diminishing” of gubernatorial ballot participants. In three regions (Transbaikalia, St. Petersburg, and Altai), only one representative of a parliamentary party will be present among the candidates — and in all three, it’s the LDPR, which does not have any popular politicians in its regional branches. New People, due to personnel shortage, nominated candidates in only 10 of 21 regions where direct gubernatorial elections are taking place. To fill the ballot, the authorities use spoilers and namesakes from small parties — most often from the Communists of Russia and the Green Alternative (ZA).
In such conditions, government nominees simply cannot reach the threshold for the second round because there is no one to bring government-backed candidates to it. Unknown names will not attract protest votes; such voters are discerning and will not vote for obvious spoilers or no-names from systemic parties. The same goes for regional parliamentary elections. The ratings of systemic parties fluctuate at historically minimal levels (CPRF and LDPR around 9%, New People about 6%, Just Russia around 3-4%). These parties are ready to meet the Kremlin halfway and forgo nominating potentially strong candidates. This year, Yabloko — the only systemic opposition party calling for peaceful negotiations — was cut off from the elections completely.
Many Russians might want to vote against United Russia, whose rating is 37%, but they see no alternatives, which means they are likely to stay home. The authorities have long tried to lower turnout — primarily by denying the registration of strong candidates. As a result, only loyalists and voters dependent on administrations at various levels, pushed to the polls through corporate and state employee mobilization, show up to vote. This, combined with outright fraud, yields exceedingly high official percentages for government candidates. The main harbinger of this outcome — elimination of any competition — is evident at the registration stage. Therefore, neither gubernatorial candidates nor United Russia will possibly be able to get lower percentages, as supposedly advised in the AP.
Protest Prevention
Most likely, the Kremlin understands that Russians are unhappy with high prices; according to official statistics, more and more citizens believe their financial situation is worsening, and they fear mobilization. The invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Kursk region, where gubernatorial elections were also planned, does not improve the citizens' positive outlook either. In August, Vladimir Putin's approval rating dropped by 5,5% compared to June, and this is according to data from the Kremlin-affiliated VTsIOM.
Kremlin political managers believe that rumors of fictitious competition will help release some tension by temporarily creating the illusion of political struggle. No doubt these rumors are calculated so that citizens will not scrutinize the candidates’ composition and will take the supposed directives at face value. High results for government candidates can then be explained by their popularity and the opposition’s passivity: “The Kremlin would like to allow competition, but the opposition did ’not perform.”
Sergey Kiriyenko copied this technology from his predecessor Vyacheslav Volodin. After the protests against election fraud in the 2011 State Duma elections, the latter also promoted the so-called “COL-factor” (competition–openness–legitimacy). Naturally, neither the first, second, nor third were in play — the “municipal filter” consistently barred unwanted gubernatorial candidates, and commissions denied independent candidates for deputy. In the end, Volodin’s COL became a joke among politicized Russians. The same fate awaits Kiriyenko’s fictional competition.
The political bloc seems to have another plan — artificially lower government candidates' results with low turnout and draw percentages for no-names. However, popular trust in such election results would be even less than faith in government representatives’ records — citizens understand how extremely high numbers are achieved, and direct manipulation would completely undermine trust in the electoral system.
