The outcomes of nomination and registration of candidates to the State Duma of the Russian Federation
26.08.2021
The elections of the State Duma of Russia of the eighth convocation are marked by considerable tightening of rules for candidate nomination and registration. In fact, the rules are much worse than in 2016, when the current membership of the parliament was elected. Run on the background of harsh restrictions on freedom of expression and information and freedom of assembly and association, the elections are accompanied by a political crackdown against the most active pro-opposition citizens.
Moreover, while the generally accessible video broadcasting from the polling stations is de facto destroyed and the 'Golos' Movement1 is the first entity without formal status in the country to have been designated as the 'foreign agent', the Russian government has also forced the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to drop the idea of delegating an international observation mission.
Below are findings from a long-term election monitoring report by Golos for the 19 September 2021 elections. It covers the period of the nomination and registration of candidates to the State Duma of the Russian Federation. The organization's previous reports focused on infringements of the electoral rights of the Russian citizens2, legal peculiarities of the State Duma elections3, and the political and legal peculiarities of the regional and local elections of 19 September 20214.
The full text of the report is available here: https://www.golosinfo.org/articles/145400 (in Russian). A full English translation will be provided shortly.
Key findings
1. Citizens are much more hesitant to nominate their candidacies for the State Duma election. A likely reason is that, while the status of a candidate gives almost no advantages, it can be a burden, as candidates run a risk of various inspections and pressure, and sometimes repressions, from state bodies. Candidates also realize that the authorities possess tools for arbitrary denial of registration, assisted by the new limitations of passive suffrage, while registration via signature collection proves close to impossible, and parties can be put under pressure. It is evident in the number of parties that announced their participation in the election (15 in 2021 vs. 25 in 2016) and the number of candidates on their lists. For example, the number of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's candidates has shrunk by 12%, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's by 31%, and Just Russia's by 9.4%. As a result, some strong potential candidates could not or decided not to run or were denied registration. In some cases, strong candidates in single-mandate districts would withdraw from the race after being registered.
2. The number of candidates to drop out of the party lists is much higher than in 2016. Back then, 234 candidates dropped out throughout the campaign, out of them 143 at the stage between the list authorization and registration. This year, 190 candidates dropped out at the stage of list authorization alone, and a total of 244 by 17 August, while more court hearings can occur during the rest of the campaign. Formally, the number of registration denials to single-mandate candidates has decreased from 244 in 2016 to 181 now. However, while 15 party-nominated candidates with a parliamentary benefit5 were rejected in 2016; this time, this figure is up to 25.
3. The number and share of the registered self-nominated candidates have hit the low of 2016. Back then, only 23 self-nominees passed the registration phase or 7.7% of the nominees. This time, only 11, or 6.3% of self-nominees were granted registration. The majority of them (6 out of 11) are the so-called 'administrative' candidates6. In three other cases, registering the self-nominated candidates was useful for the 'administrative' candidates by splitting the pro-protest voters in competitive districts.
4. As a result, the number of registered single-mandate candidates has also dwindled since 2016 (2091 to 2072, some of them also dropped out later), despite the fact that 13 parties joined the race in 2016 as opposed to 14 this year.
5. Law enforcement and the executive bodies have de facto taken up the role of vetting candidate hopefuls as one of the main actors in the process of filtering out unwanted candidates at the early stages of the elections. The vague wording of the current 'anti-extremist' law has turned it into a handy tool for the authorities to filter out pro-opposition politicians. At the federal level, the majority of candidates are disqualified after judicial decisions on candidates' involvement in 'extremist' organizations. Notably, some judgments on the 'involvement' (and respective lawsuits) come exactly as a response to someone's nomination to stand for elections and are openly used for restricting the competition.
6. Concurrently, the Central Electoral Commission of Russia and district electoral commissions are gradually losing their agency. Established as dedicated bodies beyond traditional state hierarchies to defend the electoral rights of voters, now they de facto rely on the Ministry of Justice, police, and courts in their decision-making on candidate registration. This is visible in registration denials to the candidates accused of breaching the 'anti-extremist' law or possessing foreign financial instruments, and also during the verification of signatures. In arguments between state bodies and candidates, commissions a priori take the side of the authorities, while any doubts are interpreted against the candidates and result in infringements on their rights. This is in conflict with the very idea of an independent election administration body whose role is to fence off the election outcome from the executive's influences.
7. The flawed provision on depriving citizens of passive suffrage7 due to their possession of foreign bank accounts or financial instruments by the time of joining the electoral race must also be noted. The argument behind this norm was to defend the sovereignty of the Russian people. In reality, though, the compliance procedure of this legislative provision opened up a close-to-unlimited possibility for foreign influence upon the Russian election. While the authorized Russian bodies have no enforcement tools on this provision, they have to rely on formal responses coming from foreign states. It means that Russian citizens can suffer restrictions of electoral rights even due to an intentional or unintentional error in a foreign body's response.
References:
1 The largest independent citizen election observation initiative in Russia
5 The right to nominate lists and candidates to the State Duma without collecting signatures.
6 The candidates nominated and supported by the administration (although formally, they can come from different parties or run as independents).
7 The right to stand for election.
