What are the specifics of Russian parliamentarism?

In September 2023 Russia is holding regular elections, and in dozens of its regions citizens are electing regional and municipal authorities. But do elections have any value in a country with strong repressive machinery where any politician whom the authorities may consider dangerous can be placed in jail? In reality, elections in Russia present not only a high-cost ritual spectacle that makes it possible to fake democracy. Elections and parties still largely shape the interaction between the state and society in Russia.

Russian society is characterized by high inequality and heterogeneity. Russians hold very diverse points of view, for example, they evaluate the historical past of their country and its economic present differently. It is worth sorting out the Russian party system to understand how the diversity of society is reflected in the political sphere and what distortions arise from this.

In most modern democracies, politics is a competition between parties, and non-party politicians are very rare. For instance, we may know nothing about the current situation in Denmark but if we look up the Wikipedia page about the last parliamentary elections in this country, we will get a general idea of the political profile of the government coalition and the balance of right and left attitudes in its society. The results of any Russian elections tell us much less. First, the government policy is not predetermined by the support of the parliamentary majority. Secondly, the offer on the party market, the recruitment of parties, their programs and candidates depend to a larger extent on the permission of the Kremlin administration than on the demand from citizens (we explain how it works in our recent publication).

Electoral authoritarianism since the mid-2000s has changed the value of elections for Russian politics. Now it is not only and not so much a struggle for certain positions with the aim of influencing current political courses, but a struggle for the opportunity to send a symbolic signal about the strength and weakness of the Russian regime. In this and the following article, I will look at how, over the three post-Soviet decades, Russian parties have become what they have become.

The Legacy of the Competition Era

Throughout the Soviet period, all fundamental issues of governance would be resolved within the Communist Party (CPSU), whose apparatus was merged with state institutions. In independent post-Soviet Russia, it shifted to the opposite: the government was protected from the newly created parties' interference.

First of all, it was the President of the state who distanced himself from the party. In 1990, while Russia still remained a part of the USSR, the opposition leader Boris Yeltsin was elected to the highest state post of the Russian Republic, Chairman of Parliament. Almost immediately after that, Yeltsin announced about leaving the CPSU, since he now obeyed the will of the people, and not the party. In 1991, the post of President was created in the Russian Republic. Yeltsin, remaining a non-party member, was elected to this post.

President has become the most powerful figure in the Russian political system. At the same time, none of the presidents of Russia has ever joined a party in his post. Notably, Vladimir Putin was the chairman of the United Russia party only when he temporarily handed over the presidency to Dmitry Medvedev. And it is telling that Putin, being the chairman of United Russia, defiantly did not join its ranks.

Secondly, the government also was sidelined from the parties' influence. Starting from 1991, the governments of Russia were formed according to the technocratic principle, a cabinet official was determined by administrators-economists. The fact is that, according to the Constitution, the president became an arbitrator in case of contradictions between the parliament and the government. If the parliament consistently voted against the candidates nominated by the president for the position of prime minister or consistently voted for no confidence in the government, the president would have the right to dissolve the parliament. This led, in effect, to the fact that in the recent history of Russia there was nothing like coalition cabinets or cabinets of the ruling party. Party members rarely got positions in government, and when they did, government discipline obviously outweighed party discipline.

Third, in the 1990s, parties were prominent in federal parliamentary elections, but weak in the regions. This was due to the electoral system. In federal elections, half of the State Duma was elected from party lists, and during elections, the national campaign of the parties would be in the spotlight. Parliamentary elections would be held ahead of the presidential election year, and the percentage of parties was regarded as an important signal of the society dynamics. The second half of the Duma was elected in districts where independent candidates often won, it was difficult to generalize this part of the election results and interpret them as a signal.

Party-list elections to local and regional assemblies were very rare in the regions, and independent candidates most often won in districts. In the 1990s, none of the parties except that of Communists had enough reputation to increase the chances of candidates in individual constituencies. Therefore, strong candidates did not rush to join the parties. Heads of executive power, meanwhile, dominated the assemblies in towns and almost all regions. Thus, even here there was no question of parties ruling with the help of a majority in the assembly.

Power was usually concentrated in the hands of governors who as a rule were not dependent on the federal center. Numerous governors got an option to control regional media, force rural citizens, enterprise workers and civil servants to loyal vote, and even falsify the results in the electoral commissions. Even in the most democratic regions, governors generally had the opportunity to put pressure on competitors and use the resources of the state apparatus. Such informal structures, known in science as electoral machines, allowed governors to lead loyal candidates with greater efficiency than an alliance with national parties. The governors could choose whether to create their own party structure in the region, join a pro-Kremlin party, or rely on informal governance without institutionalization. Thereupon, the parties were in need of governors, and even those governors who won owing to the support of the Communist Party, as a rule, subsequently tried to distance themselves from it.

Mayors in more democratic regions could have autonomy from governors and even have their own networks to mobilize voters. Also, analogs of political machines could arise around large enterprises, though neither independent mayors nor large enterprises needed to be related to the parties.

Consequently, even during the competition period direct management at the national, regional and local levels was carried out apart from the competition of parties, none of the parties obtained a chance to implement their program. What was left for the Russian parties to do? They took up diverse niches.

Notable opposition parties could, at least in theory, claim the victory of their leader in the presidential election, while parliamentary elections and legislative activity could be regarded as extended advertising before the presidential campaign. What is remarkable is that in parties as diverse as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the right-wing populist LDPR, and the democratic Yabloko, the dominance of the same party leaders continued throughout the entire competitive period of modern Russian history.

The so-called 'party of power' became a new type of political party. The 'party of power' in its functional purpose is supposed to consolidate the pro-government vote and provide support for the government's bills in the Duma and subnational assemblies. The autonomy of parties of this type is thus very limited.

The Kremlin administration was able to initiate other party projects to reach audiences with leftist, nationalist, or liberal orientations. At a minimum, such party projects took away votes from opposition parties, at a maximum they acted as allies of the authorities.

The result of the competitive period in the history of Russian parties was the formation of an internally diverse party system. In addition to the 'party of power' - United Russia, opposition parties with an established reputation and auxiliary Kremlin projects, dozens of small parties were represented on the party market, occupying a wide variety of niches and expressing the original ideas of political technologists. The parties participated in the state administration to a very limited extent, but they helped voters articulate their preferences and values, and in this sense allowed them to feel somewhat involved in politics.

The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism

In the mid-2000s, the Russian regime acquired considerable traits of electoral authoritarianism, effectively eliminating the possibility of the opposition winning national elections. The key steps in this direction were the abolition of gubernatorial elections and prohibition legislation on the registration of new parties, as well as the establishment of the Kremlin's political control over television and the symbolic intimidation of large businesses in connection with the persecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of Russia's largest oil company, who had an independent view of politics. These steps, on the one hand, weakened the existing opposition parties and, on the other hand, ruled out the probability for new ones to emerge.

The slyness of electoral authoritarianism lies in the fact that it has the outward attributes of democratic competition. As soon as a country transitions to electoral authoritarianism, it still holds elections, in which the opposition still participates, but it does not manage to win. In fact, if we look at the case of Russia, we discover that as a result of the transformation of the political regime, the same parties began to play new roles.

First, United Russia devoured all the electoral machines of the governors. This was facilitated by the manipulation of electoral systems. A mixed system with the election of at least half of the members from party lists was introduced in the elections of regional assemblies in 2003. From 2007 on, the Duma was elected only by lists. As a result, governors had incentives to put their candidates on party lists rather than run independently. In addition to that, the transition to the appointment of governors in 2004 led to the fact that the election results of United Russia became tacitly considered the main reporting criterion for the resignation or reappointment of governors. More than that, the exemplary subordination of business at the federal level made United Russia the first choice for companies and businessmen who would want to have a stake in politics.

Second, prohibitive party legislation prevented non-Kremlin projects from entering the party system. The Ministry of Justice in practice had unlimited possibilities to find minor infringements and not to register any new objectionable party. At the same time, the presidential administration used the opportunity to create auxiliary party projects for the elections in order to solve the problems of withdrawing the left and great-power (statist) electorate from the CPRF or directing the market electorate to pro-Kremlin party projects that look liberal. The replenishment of the party system was thus determined not by the public demand but by the imagination of the presidential administration.

Third, the surviving opposition parties were forced to lose part of their autonomy. Under the authoritarian regime, the opposition parties have basically lost hope of coming to power in the short term and are more concerned about their own survival. The two parties with the most consistent opposition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Yabloko, one way or another, can expel or refuse to nominate those candidates who may appear inconvenient for the authorities and, probably, moderate the critical agenda, preferring to use traditional narrow slogans instead of sharp and uniting ones. In such a situation, party leaders are required more as intermediaries for contacts with the authorities, and not as strong contenders for the presidency.

Fourth, regional and local politics turned out to be directed within the framework of the competition of parties. This was a mechanical effect of introducing a part of the list vote in the elections of regional and local assemblies. In fact, this meant entering the bureaucratic and economic elite into United Russia and the departure of non-co-opted bureaucrats and businesspeople to branches of other parties. Program divisions on the ground have remained weak, and party branches in the regions thus experience a staff shortage. At the same time, regional authorities often successfully use their influence to isolate inconvenient opponents or grass-roots activists from inclusion in the local party struggle.

The results of the impact of the authoritarian regime were, on the one hand, the freezing of the party system, which has changed very little since 2007, and, on the other hand, the impoverishment and uniformity of the opposition agenda. Every parliamentary opposition party can use a certain set of criticism of the government, demands for better social protection and support for small and medium businesses, along with criticism of American global hegemony.

In this sense, the big opposition parties seem to be trying to surpass United Russia in the persuasiveness of their messages on patriotism and concern for the citizens. As a result, the ideological profiles of the left and right parties got mixed and, at the same time, limited by the framework of the officially permitted opposition. Finally, while in the free years the status of secondary agents was assigned to the parties, who should not be trusted with management, now critics of the president and inconvenient politicians on the ground could happen to be excluded from the party field - albeit a secondary, but still formally recognized level of the political system. And thus, they were marginalized as a non-systemic opposition. This also meant a subtle shift in the meaning of the party system for voters. If in the 1990s elections provided an opportunity to nominate a representative of their values to parliament, then under the conditions of electoral authoritarianism their choice was extremely limited. On the one hand, parties with statist, leftist and nationalist messages dominated the party system. On the other hand, the voters were faced with the fact that they could not count on a change of power, and the opposition was required to make regular humiliating compromises with the authorities. Perhaps, some part of the voters are still satisfied with the values from the muddled set offered by the parties. Nevertheless, to a large extent, voting remains a way to express support for or protest against the government.

The ambiguous deceit of electoral authoritarianism as a political regime does not imply a possibility of rigorous assessment of the election outcome. Firstly, it is difficult to examine the real level of support behind layers of fraud, forced voting at work and in a highly biased media environment. Secondly, in cases of voting for the opposition, it is difficult to separate voting for certain values from voting against the existing authorities. However, elections inevitably take place and, whether politicians like it or not, they inevitably send one or another signal of support for the authorities. Not only the figures of the final results but also the information on violations give the impression of the level of support. It is not surprising that the Russian authorities, which have long insured themselves against the victory of objectionable candidates, continue to restrict independent electoral observers. Thus, a new round of repressions against the association of observers Golos began in August 2023. The authorities are increasingly using multi-day voting, which effectively allows uncontrolled substitution of ballots, as well as online electronic voting. In the aftermath of the elections, there is a competition of interpretations, and in the end, as a rule, both the authorities and their opponents agree on whether to consider the elections a failure or a success of the authorities.

The public sphere in Russia is full of discussions about whether the elections strengthen the Russian regime of electoral authoritarianism. It seems that these discussions are not destined to stop, as successful and unsuccessful campaigns for the authorities constantly alternate. Successful elections for the government, first of all, send a signal about the popularity of the authorities and their control over society, demotivating opponents of the regime. Secondly, they allow the party system to function as a lightning rod. After all, as we know, Russian propaganda does not seek to impose the one and only interpretation of the situation so much as it undermines doubts about the veracity of facts with which the authorities are not pleased. The set of allowed parties from the menu of the party system thus makes it possible to reach those who are not happy with the current situation but do not trust the anti-system oppositionists. When elections end up being a failure for the authorities, everything turns upside down. Firstly, even a very local signal about the vulnerability of the authorities is amplified and causes anxiety and doubts in the political class. Secondly, the party opposition begins to distance itself from the authorities and converges closer with the anti-regime opposition, whom the authorities used to marginalize and exclude from the party field.

Thus, Russian elections can create a space of opportunity not only for permitted parties but also for regime opponents who are regularly excluded from the party field. What has the opposition managed to achieve in the Russian elections? This I will answer in the next article in the series.

By Alexey Gilev, University of Helsinki