Experts from the independent analytical project "Atlas of Elections" have prepared a report on changes to Russian electoral law during the term of the outgoing State Duma. The report shows that over the past five years, election rules for State Duma deputies have worsened. Citizens' voting rights are being restricted even further, while electoral procedures are becoming less transparent and progressively less accountable to public oversight. In most cases, these regressive innovations are not entirely new; they build upon changes introduced prior to 2021. There are some positive changes as well, though unlike the regressive ones, they are largely technical in nature.

REM presents an abridged version of the report in English. The original text in Russian is available on the website.

Key Findings

1. In recent years, citizens' voting rights have been systematically restricted. This primarily concerns the right to run for office (passive suffrage): authorities have gained the power to strip citizens of their right to be elected in a targeted, extrajudicial manner, without any substantial justification. To achieve this, it is enough to designate an individual as a foreign agent and/or include them in a non-public unified registry of persons associated with extremist or terrorist organizations. In fact, we are talking about an arbitrary defeat in the rights of opposition politicians.
2. Initiated by the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Russia, a new blow has been dealt to the public oversight over territorial- and precinct-level election commissions. First, the institution of commission members with a consultative vote has been effectively abolished. Second, candidates' and parties' proxies have been stripped of their right to be present at polling stations on voting days. Third, media outlets have been banned from sending freelance correspondents to polling stations.
3. The practice of remote electronic voting (REVRead Term in glossary) continues to expand. Its implementation is accompanied by well-founded allegations of fraud and it creates favorable conditions for voter coercion. This is especially true when combined with three-day voting, during which the majority of "electronic" votes are cast from the workplace.
4. Financing election campaigns is becoming more complicated: a minimum amount may be set for voluntary donations from citizens and legal entities. This hinders the most democratic method of fundraising — collecting small-dollar donations.
5. Campaigning has become more challenging. Beginning in 2026, election campaigning is prohibited on internet resources blocked by Roskomnadzor, primarily in social media platforms outside government control. Furthermore, a ban has been introduced on using the images and voices of deceased or fictional individuals. This appears to be a targeted and politically motivated restriction aimed at the campaigns of the CPRF and LDPR, which actively used images of former communist leaders — Lenin and Stalin (CPRF), as well as the founder and long-time leader of the LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

Restrictions on the right to run for office

The ban on running for office (passive suffrage) for citizens convicted of extremist crimes has been extended by five years (under Law No. 60-FZ of 2022). Currently, a citizen cannot run in elections for five years following the date their criminal record is cleared or expunged, whereas previously the restriction ended immediately upon the expungement of the record.

Furthermore, two additional articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation have been introduced as grounds for electoral disqualification: coercion into sexual acts committed against a minor, and sexual intercourse with a person under the age of sixteen.

In 2024 (under Law No. 99-FZ), the right to run for office was stripped from individuals designated by Russian authorities as foreign agents and/or included in the registry of persons associated with extremist or terrorist organizations. Those listed in these registries are barred not only from running but also from serving as proxies or authorized representatives for candidates and parties (the ban on "foreign agents" participating in election commissions was established earlier). The only nominal safeguard against absolute arbitrariness — specifically, the potential to registry-list individuals as foreign agents or extremists during the final stage of an election campaign — is the ban on designating registered candidates as foreign agents.

Thus, the authorities have gained the ability to selectively strip citizens of their right to run for office in an extrajudicial manner and without any substantial justification, including at the initial stage of an election campaign. The very first decisions by the Ministry of Justice to expand the registry of foreign agents in 2024 demonstrated that the authorities had begun to exploit this tool: the registry came to include politicians who had planned to run in the presidential election (Ekaterina Duntsova) or in various regional campaigns that year. Subsequently, other independent politicians were added to this registry — Sergey Markov, Ksenia Cherepanova, Oleg Shein, and others.

Focusing solely on individuals designated as foreign agents, the ban affects 756 people. However, a significant portion of them are already ineligible to run, as they reside abroad and hold foreign residence permits or citizenship. A small fraction of them are currently imprisoned.

The so-called registry of extremists and terrorists remains non-public, leaving the exact number of individuals listed unknown. Nevertheless, information from this closed database is available to election commissions upon request.

Changes related to the operations of election commissions

Since 2022 (under Law No. 60-FZ), the position of election commission members with a consultative voteRead Term in glossary has been abolished in territorial, district, and precinct election commissionsRead Term in glossary. This status is now preserved exclusively within the CEC and regional election commissions. Furthermore, it is now prohibited to appoint the same individual as a consultative-vote member to more than one election commission (a practice political parties occasionally used to deploy a single highly skilled expert across multiple commissions simultaneously). A consultative-vote commission member appointed by a party to the CEC or a regional election commission is now barred from attending meetings of lower-level election commissions and reviewing their documentation.

Instead, the law now provides for the appointment of observers to district and territorial commissions, but they are only permitted to be present on voting days and during the tabulation of votes. Furthermore, their powers are significantly weaker than those previously held by commission members with a consultative vote. In particular, they lack the right to participate in discussions at commission meetings and to verify the accuracy of the vote count.

This has dealt a severe blow to the capacity for oversight over mid- and lower-level election commissions — not only during the voting process but also throughout candidate registration and the regulation of election campaigns. The institution of election commission members with a consultative vote had been operating in Russia since 1993 and served as an effective tool for such oversight.

Since 2023 (under Law No. 184-FZ), freelance media correspondents are barred from being present at polling stations on voting days. This further restricts oversight opportunities and reduces the ability of the remaining independent media outlets to participate in monitoring electoral procedures. Additionally, the deadline for media pre-accreditation to work at polling stations was extended from three to seven days prior to the first day of voting.

The same law provides for the termination of the powers of candidates' and parties' proxies simultaneously with the end of the campaigning period. This means that proxies have lost the right to be present at polling stations on voting days and during the vote count.

Furthermore, special designated areas for observers and media representatives are now set up at polling stations. This restricts their physical capacity to actually see what is happening at the stations.

In 2024 (under Law No. 99-FZ), additional restrictions were introduced regarding the presence of media representatives at polling stations. While they previously had to apply for accreditation no later than three days in advance, they must now do so 7 days prior.

Changes to election campaigning rules

Since 2023 (under Law No. 184-FZ), additional restrictions have emerged that hinder the election campaigns of opposition parties and candidates. For instance, campaigning is now prohibited on banned internet resources — websites and social media networks, including Facebook, Instagram, and potentially Telegram and independent media, to which access is officially restricted.

Furthermore, the law may establish a minimum amount for voluntary donations from citizens and legal entities. While limiting the maximum amount is understandable and justified, restricting the minimum amount hampers the most democratic fundraising method — collecting small-dollar donations. Some regions have already exploited this option. For example, Moscow has set a minimum donation floor of 3% of the so-called subsistence minimum (approximately 600 rubles or 6.5 euros).

Starting in 2026 (under Law No. 130-FZ), it is prohibited to use the images and voices of deceased or fictional persons, including AI-generated content. This appears to be a targeted and politically motivated ban aimed at the campaigns of the CPRF and LDPR, which have actively used images of former communist leaders — Lenin and Stalin (CPRF), as well as the late founder and long-time leader of the LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

The same law reinstated the option to use the images and voices of real individuals in election campaigning, provided their consent is obtained. Experts link this to the ruling party's need to use Vladimir Putin's image and quotes.

Changes related to the voting process

Since 2022 (under Law No. 60-FZ), the possibility of conducting remote electronic voting (REV) has been officially enshrined in law. While REV had been carried out on an experimental basis since 2019, it was barely regulated by legislation. However, the statutory article on REV lacks sufficient detail and contains no real safeguards for protecting voting rights during online elections. Crucially, the implementation of REV is accompanied by well-founded suspicions of fraud and helps to create favorable conditions for voter coercion. This is especially true when combined with three-day voting, during which the majority of "electronic" votes are visibly cast from the workplace. Consequently, most independent experts consider the widespread use of REV in its current form to be premature and even harmful.

In 2025 (under Law No. 115-FZ), the practice of remote electronic voting (REV) was expanded: electronic voting ceased to be exclusively remote. In addition to REV, the law introduced the concepts of Electronic Voting (EV) and Electronic Voting System (EVS). Now, voting at a polling station can be done without a traditional paper ballot, utilizing a special electronic voting terminal (EVS) instead.

EVSs have become an analogue to the so-called "technical voting devices" (TVDs) previously used exclusively in Moscow, which allowed residents to vote online directly at polling stations. Now, this practice can be expanded to other regions through the use of EVSs. These systems are turning into more than just devices for electronic ballot counting, determining election results, and drawing up the precinct election commission (PEC) protocol — machines that have been used before. Instead, they act as data transmission devices sending information to an obscure location where votes will actually be counted and the official voting protocols generated.

Experts note that these new devices create risks of violating ballot secrecy (as they feature built-in passport scanners and video cameras), prevent voters from verifying how their votes were recorded, and make it impossible to conduct a recount using paper ballots.