Who rules Russian regions. Alexander Kynev on how the system of power has changed over 30 years

Alexander Kynev is an independent Russian analyst who writes about regional politics and electoral processes at the regional and local levels. His book “Who Governs Russia's Regions and How”, published in June 2024, was included in the long list of the Russian literature award Enlightener Prize.

This article is our translation of the interview with Alexander Kynev published by 7x7 media. To access the original text, follow the link. The first part of the interview in English is available here.

— Your book “Who Governs Russia's Regions and How” has been recently released. Could you briefly describe what this book is about, and what chapters does it have?

— The book tells the story of modernization and changes in the system of regional governance over the past 30 years. It focuses on the rules, on how the institutions of regional governance have been established, on who has been forming the regional administrations during these years and how, and on their staff.

For each period, the respective chapters contain sections on how the relations between governors and regional elites have been changing. I pay a lot of attention to regional elites in an attempt to answer the question of whether regional elites as such even exist today.

The part second to the last describes how over the last 20 years governors have turned from being “overlords” of their territories into managers with political responsibility, how regional parliaments have nearly lost their influence on forming the regional governments, and how the control over the regional executive power has been transferred to federal ministries and national security, defense and law enforcement agencies.

In general, the book offers unique statistical and analytical data, which, I hope, is going to be of use to those who – years later – will address the issue of what happened in Russia in the 2000s, in the 2010s, and in the 2020s.

— What is the main conclusion of the book? What should the reader pay attention to?

— At the end of the book I provide answer to the important question which has been frequently raised in recent years, especially since the start of the special operation [the term Russian authorities use for the war in Ukraine - REM] - whether Russia’s dissolution is possible, inevitable? There are constant talks about regional elites being almost ready to raise their heads, which will lead to a regional revival followed by dissolution of Russia.

In the book, I fastidiously examine, piece by piece, how regional elites were structured in the 1990s, how they changed in the 2000s, and what they are today.

I make clear that the entity that those who talk about the possible dissolution of Russia are hoping for today does not exist. All these arguments are usually based on rudimentary concepts [of what regional elites are], on memories of the past that have little or nothing to do with the reality of today.

Regional elites do not exist independently. They exist through the prism of resources of all possible kinds – power, financial, organizational, and other resources. A person without power or resources… Well, what kind of elite are we talking about? He may have personal authority; however, as evidence in practice, one can’t get far based on personal authority only. This might have been true in the 1990s, when regional elites were understood as something independent, possessing power and economic resources; nothing comparable exists in Russia now.

— How did this happen?

— A lot has changed over the past 30 years. The 1990s were a period of absolute power of governors: heads of regions were in fact overlords of the territories under their control. A governor could bring almost anyone with him into the regional administration. These people could redistribute property, could basically do anything they wanted; as a matter of fact, they didn’t take orders from anyone. This led to a system of relationships typical for the movie The Godfather – a system of informal mutual obligations.

In the 2000s, a system of parallel verticals [of power] began to emerge. Step by step, the governors started to lose control over separate structures which were gradually subordinated directly to Moscow. It started with the vertical of defense and law enforcement agencies – the Public Prosecution Office, the Interior Ministry, the Investigative Committee, and so on. The law enforcement agencies were brought out of governors’ control and were not dependent on them anymore.

At the same time, corporate verticals were being built – meaning that federal business owners bought assets from regional business owners or just hoarded the assets for themselves. Gradually, the regional business as an independent entity shrank. Today, regional business does not play such a political and economic role as it did 15 years ago. Many representatives of the regional economic elite are no longer independent entities, but top managers of federal companies.

Party verticals were also built in the same way: nomination of candidates [in regional elections] became possible through parties only. Parties were allowed to be registered only in Moscow, which meant that all candidates had to be coordinated with Moscow.

And so on. The whole point of Russia's regional policy in the 2000s was to build a multitude of parallel verticals.

At the same time, in the mid-2000s, the governors’ election procedure was canceled; they gradually lost their status of “overlords” and acquired the status of managers. The governors of today have neither the former legitimacy nor the former power. There is no legitimacy because there are no healthy competitive elections, only plebiscites on an appointed figure. There is no power because all key regional officials are appointed in consultation with federal agencies. These key officials (and sometimes the governors themselves) rotate frequently. On average, a major regional official at the level of deputy governor rarely stays in his position for longer than 2-3 years.

— The situation with political and managerial elites is clear, but where did the economic elites disappear?

— Everything is interconnected. Previously, the governor was the center of power, resources were accumulated around him, business was structured, respected people came to the governor, he helped them, they owed him something, and this strengthened the power of the governor.

Firstly, all the major assets have already been distributed. Secondly, how could a well-functioning system of obligations be established if the governor stays in his position only temporarily, and his deputies work for 2-3 years? There is no way for that.

Moreover, there are a lot of political outsiders in the regions at the moment called “the Varangians” in Russian. Around 60% of all governors and 28% of deputy governors currently in power are originally not from the regions they lead.

Under such circumstances, the old system of mutual obligations like in the movie The Godfather just can’t exist. The current system is purely technocratic. It’s based on obedience to orders, instructions, and regulations thus being the main condition for career development.

And in a technocratic system, there is almost no room for economic elites at the regional level. One could still be a rich regional businessman, but it is almost impossible to keep the influence.

— Does this new technocratic system have advantages over the old, "feudal" system?

— Different systems have different advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of the old system was that the officials were local, representing the local elite, and they were motivated to take care of the region, not just themselves.

If there is a good atmosphere developing in the city, the officials enjoy walking in the streets of the city. If there is a good restaurant, the officials would go and eat there. If there is a good road, the officials would use it. They were motivated to create an enabling environment for themselves, for their children, for their grandchildren.

Its main disadvantage was corruption, because the existing system of covering-up for each other was a prerequisite for corruption.

There is less corruption in the current system. Governors are technocrats limited by multiple instructions and surrounded by people who barely obey them – because their actual bosses are in Moscow. It is way harder and more complicated to establish a corruption network under such circumstances.

But the main disadvantage is that there is no other motivation but instructions, the motivation actually disappears. The officials from outside realize that they are not going to stay in this region forever; neither their children nor their grandchildren will live in this region.

Since governors work as called-in employees, they can’t represent the community in a crisis situation. They can’t represent the regional corporation. They can’t be communicators because they do not represent anybody. It's a bad system for crisis management. And there are a lot of crisis situations at the moment.

As a result, most Russian regions, with few exceptions, are such technocracies. Under these circumstances, it is rather unlikely that anyone would “raise his head”, there is just no one there. Thus, any changes in the regions might only result out of federal changes, but not vice versa.

If there is turbulence in Moscow, the rules of the game change, some new power emerges, and the control over the regions weakens, then some kind of “stir” might begin. As long as control stays strong, there will be no “stir”.

This system is quite stable, and in the absence of any reasons undermining its stability – economic, foreign policy, whatever – it can last for a very long time.

— There are speculations about the possible dissolution of Russia which may begin not from above, initiated by elites, but from below, due to the strengthening of more radical ethnic or regional movements. Are you considering this option?

— The book is not about national movements. I research on regional elites, the structure of regional power. The book’s title is “Who Governs Russia's Regions and How”. The movements you mentioned have nothing to do with governance. There are no tensions in the governance system today that could lead to a crisis.

I don't see any point in evaluating every loudmouth’s statements on the Internet. If these ideas are not present in the public field, if these ideas find no expression during the elections, they just don't exist. My conclusion: there is nothing of that kind in the regions.

If someone abroad likes paying money to people who dress up as representatives of non-existent governments of non-existent territories, which no one has ever elected… Well, they surely may do so, as long as they don't feel sorry for the money. But it has nothing to do with real life inside Russia.

— Have there been any important changes in the system of regional governance in recent years?

— After the COVID-19 pandemic started, the staff rotation among the officials slowed down dramatically. It stayed like that during the special operation [the term Russian authorities use for the war in Ukraine - REM] as well. I explain this by the fact that in turbulent conditions experiments with staff rotation become risky. It’s better to have a tried and trusted person [as a governor] (even if he is not the best one [from the Kremlin perspective]), than to have someone new and less predictable there.

This was true before the presidential election 2024. Now we’ve entered a new phase – a wave of changes has already begun. This year, much more staff rotations will happen – almost as it has been before the COVID.

— And what does it tell us?

— It tells us that the system has retreated into itself during the crisis and has put all the changes on ice. And now they apparently consider the crisis phase to be over: they passed the bifurcation point of presidential elections, so now the changes carry much lower risks.

— So, Moscow supposedly believes that there is no crisis anymore, and everything is just fine?

— Moscow believes that the changes at the regional level do not imply additional risks at the moment.