Conditions for Citizen Election Observation in the Russian Federation Ahead of the 2021 Duma Elections

The Russian legislation provides for observation of an electoral process by representatives of electoral contestants, media, and international observers. However, it does not explicitly grant possibilities for long-term election observation and access to electoral institutions and processes.

At odds with international standards, there are no provisions for direct accreditation of citizen observers. They are forced to get accredited on behalf of contestants or media, or, since 2017, resort to nominations through the state-controlled civic chambers. The absence of a possibility for direct accreditation of citizen observers contradicts the idea of independence and neutrality of citizen election monitoring. Any affiliation might create expectations or perceptions of their loyalty to nominating actors rather than to the principles of unbiased observation.

Further restrictions include rules that no more than two observers may be nominated by any entity per polling station, with only one observer having the right to be present at a time. The same person can be appointed as an observer only to one election commission, which effectively prevents mobile observation. Another limitation defines constituencies within which observers can be nominated. This restriction further limits the mobility of observers since during regional and local elections it would only be possible to recruit observers to work within their respective regions or localities. Finally, an additional administrative hurdle requires lists of observers nominated to polling stations to be submitted three days in advance to respective territorial commissions.

At the same time, election observation through civic chambers, actively promoted by Russian state, has been long criticized by domestic and international experts due to the lack of consistent observation methodology, focus on election-day procedures without any long-term observation components, and, in particular, the chambers' perceived affiliation and loyalty to state authorities.

On 30 December 2020, provisions of the already oppressive "foreign agent" legislation were further expanded and now are also applicable to unincorporated public associations and private individuals that engage in excessively broadly defined "political activity" and receive foreign support. The latter not only includes funds, but also any material, organizational, or methodological support, even via an intermediary. The election legislation prohibits non-commercial organizations recognized as performing functions of a "foreign agent" to carry out activities in support of or thwarting the organization of elections, to nominate candidates, as well as to participate in electoral campaigns in any other form. The totality of restrictions imposed by these provisions will continue to considerably impair the ability of civil society organizations and their supporters to engage in observation or in any other activities in connection with elections, including voter education and awareness-raising campaigns.

Following pilots conducted during the September 2020 voting in Kursk and Jaroslav Oblasts, the CEC has announced the intention to expand the use of distance electronic voting to six regions during the 2021 Duma elections. While gradual introduction of new voting technologies is consistent with good international practice, electronic voting continues to carry the dangers associated with voting outside the controlled environment of polling stations, including threats to the principles of secrecy, freedom, and integrity of the vote, as well as to public confidence. The expanded use of electronic voting is likely to continue to pose challenges for election observers during the 2021 elections due to the intrinsic limits on observability of technological solutions.

Since 2012, polling stations in Russia have been equipped with video cameras to record election day proceedings and to stream footage online – measures that were argued to have been aimed at increasing the transparency and public confidence in electoral processes. Given the aggregate limitations on independent citizen observation, distance monitoring does constitute a valuable – and in some cases the only – observation mechanism, and observer organizations were able to develop tools and tactics to put it to good use. However, there should be no illusions that video observation is a replacement for and genuinely supports independent election observation. Apart from the fact that web cameras are unable to capture everything that happens at a polling station, it is difficult to carry out a large-scale observation via an online stream, nor is gaining access to and performing analyses of recordings after election day a simple task. It is hardly feasible for citizen observers to receive official recordings from election authorities for further scrutiny. The courts, as a rule, ignore the evidence of fraud based on the official video recordings captured by citizen observers.

Original text by Tatyana Hilscher-Bogussevich for Russland Analysen, based on her analysis for the European Platform for Democratic Elections. Re-published with permission.