National republics against the vertical power structure

by Andrey Pertsev

The Kremlin is preparing a large-scale municipal reform across Russia, aimed at abolishing tens of thousands of urban and rural settlements. Approved at the highest levels of government, the reform was introduced by prominent United Russia politicians Pavel Krasheninnikov and Andrey Klishas. The central government seeks to strengthen the vertical power structure, where the diversity of municipalities, each with its own heads and councils, complicates the model. However, the initiative has faced open criticism from the leadership of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, two affluent and populous national republics. State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin effectively sabotaged the reform's adoption by postponing its further readings.

This article explores why the Kremlin's proposal provoked outrage in national regions and drew criticism from regional politicians like Volodin. One possible explanation is that abolishing municipalities would deprive national elites and influential local groups of representation and prestigious positions, as current municipal leaders often come from local clans.

Total abolition

In mid-December 2024, the State Duma was expected to pass the municipal reform bill in its second reading. This reform would abolish the two-tier municipal governance system in Russia. Thousands of urban and rural settlements with their budgets, administrations, and councils would cease to exist. Governance would remain only at the higher level — municipal districts and urban districts — where citizens would have less influence on leadership. Yet, unexpectedly, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin proposed postponing the bill's consideration from December 12 to an undefined date, vaguely described as “next year”.

The formal authors of the reform are Pavel Krasheninnikov, head of the State Duma Committee on State Building, and Andrey Klishas, head of the Federation Council Committee on Legislation. This tandem of high-ranking United Russia members typically introduces documents that are approved — and often drafted — at the highest levels, making their adoption almost inevitable. Vedomosti newspaper reports that the municipal reform, centered on abolishing the two-tier self-governance system, originates from the Kremlin's political bloc. Authorities have been transparent about their desire to integrate local self-government into the Kremlin's vertical structure, now referred to in the updated Constitution as a “unified system of public power”. They justify their actions as a cost-saving measure on administrative expenses. In some Russian regions, the first-level municipalities have already been effectively abolished. The Moscow Region pioneered this consolidation in the mid-2010s, where opposition candidates frequently won elections in cities and large villages.

Currently, such abolitions require the approval of the councils and residents of the affected settlements through public hearings. These processes have encountered challenges even in the Moscow Region, prompting the Kremlin to propose eliminating first-level local self-government via federal initiatives that municipalities legally cannot contest.

National resistance

However, this Kremlin initiative sparked fierce resistance in national republics of Russia. The harshest criticism came from the leadership of Tatarstan, which has previously resisted federal initiatives. For instance, United Russia deputies criticized and even voted against constitutional amendments in the State Duma and the abolition of the title “President” for the heads of Russian regions. It is evident that these moves had the sanction of the republican administration, as deputies would not oppose federal initiatives without such approval. Nonetheless, republican officials had long refrained from criticizing federal actions. But the municipal reform prompted an outburst from Tatarstan's leader, Rustam Minnikhanov.

“Our country is vast, and such a nation cannot be governed by a single template. The decisions taken by the State Duma concern the state's governance system. Who gave them such authority without consulting the population? […] Now, out of nowhere, the country will argue over whether one system is right or wrong. This is a disgrace! Now we will be discussing in the Duma how the country should be governed. It is governed well enough,” Minnikhanov stated during a speech at the Republic's State Council session dedicated to the federal law.

For Minnikhanov, such sharp criticism of the federal leadership (albeit formally parliamentary) is unprecedented. Following the republican leader's remarks, the regional parliament also criticized the initiative and proposed preserving the two-tier governance system in the region. State Duma deputy from the region, United Russia member Ayrat Fattakhov, told Kommersant newspaper that the two-tier system is “one of the main tools of Tatarstan's effectiveness today”, and eliminating settlement-level governance “will diminish their leaders’ status”. Fattakhov's phrasing was overly cautious — the settlement leaders will simply lose their status once their municipalities are abolished. For national regions, distributing prestigious positions helps maintain intra-elite balance and grants influential clans roles that facilitate dialogue within the regional power structure.

Municipal positions in settlements have become a form of symbolic currency for regional leadership, which can allocate them to local elites. Soon, this resource will be eradicated. Settlement-level status in Tatarstan is granted not only to villages and small towns but also to cities with populations of tens of thousands, such as Nizhnekamsk and Bugulma. For example, the mayor of Nizhnekamsk, Ramil Mullin, was listed among the 100 most influential people in Tatarstan. Heads of settlement-level municipalities often ascend to district heads, and district heads move on to regional ministerial positions. Conversely, officials may step down to local posts without stigma; for instance, Tatarstan's Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeny Varakin became the head of the Verkhneuslonsky District. The brother of the head of Tatarstan, Rais Minnikhanov, has been leading the Sabinsky District for about 20 years.

Under the new reform, the district level will remain, but its administrations and councils cannot accommodate the influx of officials and deputies from the abolished settlements. Even those offered positions will merely become ordinary municipal clerks — representatives of district authorities in their localities, rather than full-fledged heads of settlements, no matter how small. The system will no longer be able to reward influential local figures and clans with symbolic currency in the form of settlement-level leadership roles and council seats.

Minnikhаnov is not alone — similar, albeit milder, arguments are voiced by Bashkortostan's leader, Radiy Khabirov. His republic, like Tatarstan, is one of Russia's wealthiest and most populous regions, also hosting many influential settlement leaders who either wish to retain their positions or see them as a springboard to higher levels in the vertical power structure. For them, settlement work serves as a stepping stone.

In the republics of the North Caucasus and the Far East, municipalities also provide status opportunities for local elites — a particularly relevant factor for the Caucasus with its extended families and clans. However, these republics' leaders, many of whom are Kremlin-appointed outsiders, publicly support the reform. For instance, Dagestan's head Sergey Melikov speaks enthusiastically about “unified decision-making centers”. At the same time, in the republic itself, alongside the existing municipal governance system, a parallel "jamaat" system has developed — an informal self-governance system based on councils of elders.

Simplifying the vertical structure vs. electoral sultanetes

For residents, settlement-level governance often represents the only accessible form of authority. Settlement administrations can address basic issues, such as repairing streetlights or roads. Larger projects typically exceed their budgets, but local heads and councils can lobby for necessary initiatives at the district level. After the reform, district administrations, often located far from rural residents, will be less accessible, and consolidated councils may fail to represent every settlement. In the worst-case scenario, some settlements may lose representation altogether.

In many regions where mayoral elections in regional centers were long abolished, rural heads were still elected, often allowing for protest voting. This option will no longer exist. For national republics, electing settlement heads and deputies was a crucial symbolic assurance that “our people, our clan, are represented in power — even if only at the lowest level”. The central government is now depriving residents of this sentiment. Political scientist Arend Lijphart noted that “ethnic group representation in government reduces the risk of their protest mobilization against the state,” and “the prospect of participating in governance serves as a powerful incentive to abandon radicalism.” This prospect is now being eliminated, weakening the system’s support in national republics — a costly consequence.

Citizens are keenly aware that abolishing settlements negatively impacts their lives. In the Komi Republic, settlement councils in three municipal districts, with public backing, refused to merge into consolidated municipalities despite regional government pressure.

For national republics, the municipal reform is more painful than for average Russian regions. It not only deprives residents of representation and nearby governance but also sidelines local elites and clans from prestigious positions. Influential regional officials, such as Rustam Minnikhanov, understand this well and oppose the initiative. Figures like State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, a native of Saratov Oblast, also grasp the detrimental effects of the Kremlin’s ideas.

Tatarstan and Bashkortostan alone are home to about six million voters, roughly 7% of Russia’s electorate. These regions have long functioned as electoral sultanates, delivering high turnout and results for candidates. For example, Tatarstan gave United Russia 79% support with 79% turnout, and Bashkortostan reported 67% support with 72% turnout. National republics' municipal heads and deputies have been the engine of this administrative resource. Once municipalities are abolished, this resource will lose its foundation.

The Kremlin may put the reform on hold until after the 2026 State Duma elections due to strong backlash from national elites. After the elections, the initiative might resurface, potentially with concessions for the national republics. However, the Kremlin’s political bloc rarely forgives defiance, so a harsh response after a brief New Year lull cannot be ruled out.